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 Abstract 
The human-nonhuman animal boundary marks the interchange between human and 
animal, culture and nature, the social and the natural. This powerfully symbolic site 
has traditionally been structured via religion-based ideas of humanity's origins, that 
in the West have been used to maintain a strictly impermeable boundary: humans, 
created in God's own image and blessed with a soul on one side, on the other the 
senseless, soulless beast. This image is one which has come under threat from work 
in multiples branches of the natural and social sciences; in the humanities; and from 
animal rights activists and other social movements. Such culturally contested 
territory makes fertile ground for the study of interactions between science and 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ĨƌĂŵĞĚǀŝĂ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ?ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-work' (1983), and Bowker 
 ?^ƚĂƌ ?ƐƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
Using the fossilised figures of palaeoanthropological research as a prominent 
site at which the aforementioned boundary is constructed, the thesis considers both 
ŚŽǁ ƐƵĐŚ  “ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬƐ ? ĂƌĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ŚƵŵĂŶ-nonhuman 
animal dichotomy, and how the boundaries between science and nonscience culture 
are negotiated during this process. The project makes use of two case studies - the 
ŝŶĨĂŵŽƵƐ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ DĂŶ  ?ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ  ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ &ůŽƌĞƐ  ‘ŚŽďďŝƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
Both received huge scientific and popular attention at the time of their respective 
discoveries, and it is a critical discourse analysis of relevant scientific and popular 
news media that provides the research data. 
The thesis addresses how missing links create connections far beyond simply 
their antecedents and descendants. Indeed, their emblematic position sees them use 
to explore fundamental notions of humanness, becoming tied to all manner of socio-
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚŝƐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ?
position is made culturally meaningful. Such actions requires repeated transgression 
of the science-ŶŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ? Ă ůĞƐƐŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ  ‘ĐĂŶŽŶŝĐĂů ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵ ?ŵŽĚĞůƐŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĂŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ?
multi-directional  ‘ŚǇĚƌŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ŵŽĚĞůŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉůĂĐĞ ?dŚĞƚŚĞƐŝƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐďǇĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ
attention to the gaps between formally recognised categories, and how these are 
utilised by scientists and journalists alike, both in the translation of these missing 
 links between different systems of meaning, and in their role as a creative space for 
all parties to think with. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
We are accustomed to look upon the shackled form of a conquered monster, but 
there  W there you could look at a thing monstrous and free. It was unearthly, and the 
men were  W No, they were not inhuman. Well, you know, that was the worst of it  W 
this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would come slowly to one. They howled 
and leaped, and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the 
thought of their inhumanity  W like yours  W the thought of your remote kinship with 
this wild and passionate uproar. Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man 
enough you would admit to yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a 
response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a dim suspicion of there being a 
meaning in it which you  W you so remote from the night of first ages  W could 
comprehend. And why not? The mind of man is capable of anything  W because 
everything is in it, all the past as well as all the future (Conrad 1990: 32 [1902]). 
 
The discovery that we had a long-lost relative who died out only a few thousand 
years ago is amazing enough. Finding one alive today and gazing into its eyes would 
be mind-blowing. In those dark, flickering little pupils, would we see a disturbing 
shadow of our own bestial past - or the comforting recognition of a fellow intelligent 
being? (Daily Mail 30.10.2004: 48). 
 
1. Introduction 
/Ŷ:ŽƐĞƉŚŽŶƌĂĚ ?Ɛaccount ŽĨDĂƌůŽǁ ?ƐũŽƵƌŶĞǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůŝĞŶǁilderness of central 
ĨƌŝĐĂ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘,ĞĂƌƚŽĨĂƌŬŶĞƐƐ ? ůŝĞƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĞƉŝĐ ?ƵŶĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌŝŽƌ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ
inhabitants, but within Marlow and, by extension, each of us. The passage above 
speaks of this ominous union between the Edwardian Englishman and the untamed 
savages he appraises from the precarious safety of his steamboat. The symbolic 
bond between these parties is in many respects the same as that between 20
th
 and 
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21
st
 century Western publics, and the archaic human fossils reanimated by 
palaeoanthroƉŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ? tŚĂƚ ƚŚƌŝůůƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  “ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ
inhumanity  W like yours  W the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and 
ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞƵƉƌŽĂƌ ? ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƉĂƐƐĂŐĞĂďŽǀĞƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĞDaily Mail attempting to 
elucidate this same relationship 102 years later, but here the savage is LB1, newly 
discovered type specimen of the species Homo floresiensis. The suitability of 
ŽŶƌĂĚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĞŶĚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ĨŽƌƚĞŶǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇĂƚ
Piltdown, England, of a creature half ape, half human, saw the living savage invoked 
ĂƐĂƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞĨŽƌWŝůƚĚŽǁŶDĂŶ ?ƐƐĞŵŝ-ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ŝŶŽŶƌĂĚ ?ƐƐƚŝƌƌŝŶŐ
vision of these spear-ǁŝĞůĚŝŶŐ ďƌƵƚĞƐ ǁĞ ƐĞĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ  ‘DĂŶ ƚŚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? ƚƌŽƉĞ
around which 20
th
 century fossil humans were invariably recreated. Such was its 
durability through times of enormous cultural upheaval that the template remain 
operational in 2004 during floresiensis ? ũŽƵƌŶĞǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ
recontextualised for a new era. One might also see what is to follow as an attempt to 
unshackle the 'conquered monsters' we find in black-boxed scientific accounts of 
archaic human ancestors, and to study them 'monstrous and free': before the lid has 
ďĞĞŶĐůŽƐĞĚ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ŝŶDĂƌůŽǁ ?ƐůĂƐƚǁŽƌĚƐĂďŽǀĞ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞĂŚŝŶƚŽĨĂƚŚĞŵĞƚŚĂƚ I 
shall return to throughout the thesis  W that these accounts of the past are, to a much 
greater degree, stories of the present. 
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?ƐHomo floresiensis, the thesis will use as case study the 
1912 discovery of Piltdown Man, scientifically Eoanthropus Dawsoni, though I will 
refrain from labouring through further introductions at this early stage. The 92 years 
between the discoveries is both a hindrance and an aid. On the one hand, the very 
different circumstances (spatially, as well as temporally) of the finds makes direct 
comparisons difficult. On the other, its makes similarities between the two all the 
more striking. Regardless, the method of analysis used (see below) demands a 
sensitivity to the context in which any data exists, and it is this sensitivity which will 
mediate potential problems in this regard. 
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dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ / ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ĂƐ  ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬƐ ? ? dŚŝƐ
colloquial term is perhaps the best recognised for such entities and was used heavily 
during the Piltdown episode. In all the coverage collected of LB1, the phrase does 
not appear once however. No doubt this is a reflection of its unpopularity with 
modern scientists, who baulk at the implied simplicity of evolution which betrays its 
origins in the very earliest daǇƐ ŽĨ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ  ?ĨŝƌƐƚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐ ŝŶ >ǇĞůů ?Ɛ
Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man (1863)). In addition to a being a 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚƵƐĂŐĞŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌŝŶŐ
of the problems these discoveries pose to our categorical systems. As a transitionary 
ĨŽƌŵ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚǁŽ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞ ĐůĂƐƐĞƐ ?  ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ ? ŝƐ ƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă
human-animal binary
1
, and though modern scientists might shun the term, the 
conceptual confusions it heralds remain all too apparent in the work here. 
 Missing links offer the opportunity to observe the negotiation of the 
boundary between humans and nonhuman animals by scientists and journalists. The 
cultural importance of the human Wanimal boundary has already been demonstrated 
by writers such as Haraway, who refers to boundary straddling figures 
 ?ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ƉƌŝŵĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ ŚĞƌ ƚĞǆƚ ? WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ŵĂŶ ŚĞƌĞ ) ĂƐ  “ŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ďŽƌĚĞƌ
ǌŽŶĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚŽƐĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŵǇƚŚŝĐƉŽůĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? )ŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?,ĂƌĂǁĂǇ
seeks to escape from the nature-culture dualism, and does so by demonstrating how 
ďŽƚŚ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ŝŶĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ
are the culturally constructed outcome of the particular socio-political context in 
                                                     
1
 Any constructivist attempt to discuss the human-animal boundary is hampered by the assumptions 
implicit in our languaŐĞ ?,ƵŵĂŶƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƌĞŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ?ĂŶĚǇĞƚ  “ĂŶŝŵĂů ? ŝŶ ŝƚƐĐŽŵŵŽŶ
usage tends to preclude humans. As such tensions are at the heart of the discussion here, they must 
ďĞ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ? dŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĂǀŽŝĚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƵŶǁŝĞůĚǇ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ  “ŚƵŵĂŶ-nonhuman 
ĂŶŝŵĂů ? ? ďƵƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŬĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞǆƚ / ǁŝůů ƉĞƌƐĞǀĞƌĞ ǁŝƚŚ  “ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ  “ĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ? ? ĂƐŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
ƌĞĂĚĞƌ ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ĂǁĂƌĞ ŽĨ ƐƵĐŚ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?  “WƌŝŵĂƚĞ ? ǁŝůů ĂůƐŽďĞ ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ  “ŶŽŶ-
ŚƵŵĂŶƉƌŝŵĂƚĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?
 
4 
 
which the work takes place. Similar efforts to show how fluid, and culturally 
dependant, our ideas of what nature is have included investigations of hunting 
(Cartmill 1996), pet ownership (Franklin 1999), meat eating (Fiddes 1992) and 
anthropomorphism (Daston & Mitman 2005).  
 
The case studies will be explored with two research questions in mind: 
 
What shapes the positioning of missing links relative to the human-animal 
boundary? 
 
What do we learn about the communication of knowledge between science culture 
and popular culture during these episodes? 
 
The answers to these will be used to inform a third, overarching question: 
 
What is the relationship between scientific and popular classification systems 
during these episodes? 
 
The source material of the thesis  W science journal media and mainstream 
news media  W will be compared to see how constructions of these figures change 
across fora. Furthermore, the critical discourse analysis used will seek to position the 
texts studied within their wider socio-cultural contexts as a means of locating the 
otherwise unseen influences shaping these imaginings. This data will be used to 
explore the symbolic role of missing links; to critique existing models of science 
communication; to attempt to find some form of synthesis of the concepts of 
5 
 
 “ďŽƵŶdary-ǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚ “ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇŽďũĞĐƚ ? ?ƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŚŽǁďŽƚŚƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
cultures use dynamic, graduating categorisations whilst formally remaining wedded 
to fixed, discrete ones, and finally to show how conceptual spaces within popular 
culture classifications are utilised as important creative spaces for scientists and 
nonscientists alike. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The two strands of the thesis connect not only through the missing link, but also 
through their shared conceptual structures. At issue are two binary concepts  W 
human-animal; science-culture  W which are theoretically discrete, yet in practice 
transgressed daily. The questions then are of boundary construction and boundary 
crossing. The thesis owes a debt in this regard both to the work of Gieryn, specifically 
ŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-ǁŽƌŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚŽǁŬĞƌ ?^ƚĂƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨ
classification. The former stems from a recognition of a disparity between numerous 
failed attempts to separate science from other forms of knowledge production 
theoretically, and the on-going separation of the two in practice that occurs every 
day. It seeks to address this disparity by focusing on how science is conducted 
 “ĚŽǁŶ-ƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ŽĨŝƚƐĂĐƚƵĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶŝƚƐĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌŝĞƐ
anĚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞƐ ?'ŽŝŶŐďĞǇŽŶĚ>ĂƚŽƵƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )
two-faced Janusian visage of science engaging different groups with different voices, 
boundary work in practice involves the deployment of multiple, contextually 
dependent, imaŐĞƐ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ Ăŝŵ ŽĨ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
ĚĞŵĂƌĐĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵǁŝĚĞƌƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?/ŶĨŽƌŵĞĚŝŶƉĂƌƚďǇďŽƚƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůƐƚƵĚǇ
of how professions compete with one another for jurisdiction, at the heart of 
'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ ŵŽĚĞů ŝƐ Ă ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ that such every-day demarcations have a very 
tangible effect, both on how knowledge claims are treated, and how future work is 
supported. 
KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?ƐŽĨ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?ƐŵŽĚĞů  W its sharp, narrow focus  W is 
also its greatest weakness. Although a powerful tool for analysing micro level 
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boundary actions, the model has little to say on the role of structure in boundary 
drawing; on how boundaries become embedded in the systems of meaning through 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚ ?,ĞƌĞŽǁŬĞƌ  ?^ƚĂƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ?0) magisterial analysis of 
 ‘ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚƐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? ŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ?dŚŽƵŐŚƐŚĂƌŝŶŐ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ
cross-cultural interactions, Bowker & Star approach the issue at the macro level, 
paying particular attention to interactions between explicit, formal classifications 
and implicit, mundane classifications. Underpinning this distinction are two differing 
methods of classification. Formal classifications are based on Aristotelian, binary 
principles: that there are consistent, unique classificatory principles in operation; 
that categories are mutually exclusive, and that any system is complete (ibid. p10-
11). The authors stress however that these are ideals which no system fully meets in 
practice. Mundane, everyday classifications rely on what Rosch (1978) calls 
 ‘ƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉĞƐ ? ?ŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞƐ ? (1953), prototype 
classification involves categorising objects into fuzzily-bounded, overlapping classes, 
on the basis of dynamic, metaphorical linkages. This distinction will be applied here 
in the explication of how science culture and Western popular culture, both based 
on Aristotelian methods of classification, interact with the episodic, local 
classifications of everyday actions which are prototypic in nature. Making sense of 
missing links requires not only the classification of such entities within both cultural 
systems, but also their successful transition from prototypic classifications to these 
systems. It is in these processes that the thesis will seek to find answers. 
 
3. The Missing Link 
ƉƉůǇŝŶŐ 'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ-culture boundary-work model to the human-animal 
boundary reflects the great parallels between the two. Both boundaries carry 
enormous practical implications, the first enabling the on-going dominance of 
science as the source of knowledge production, and the second enabling the on-
going dominance of humans in relation to the natural world. As with the former, the 
human-animal boundary is marked by a disparity between failed theoretical 
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attempts to clearly delineate the two whilst, at the same time, a successful division is 
maintained in popular culture. Traditional Judeo-Christian beliefs have helped 
support a rigid, distinct boundary between human and non-human animal within 
Western culture (Thomas 1996:17-25), furthered by prominent thinkers such as 
Aristotle and Descartes, yet almost 150 years ago Origin of the Species demonstrated 
that humans were fundamentally connected to other animals; that rather than being 
ƵŶŝƋƵĞůǇĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ'ŽĚ ?ƐŽǁŶ ŝŵĂŐĞ ?ŽƵƌĂŶĐĞƐƚŽrs were in fact nonhuman too. A 
flood of scientific research in the twentieth century, primarily into the great apes, 
has undercut a number of grounds on which the boundary might be maintained. 
Primatology research with chimpanzees has found evidence of tool use and 
 “ĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐ ? ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƚŽ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? <ĂǁĂŝ  ? ? ?  ? tŚŝƚĞŶ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚĞ
ability to converse in sign language has also been attributed to them (e.g. Gardner & 
Gardner 1975); whilst the recent chimpanzee genome project confirmed that chimps 
share approximately 98 per cent
2
 of their genome with ourselves (The Chimpanzee 
Sequencing and Analysis Consortium 2005). Features thought to be unique to human 
speech have been identified in other species, such as grammatical recursion in 
starlings (Gentner et al. 2006). In addition, there is a growing body of science seeking 
to attribute personality - formerly a quality strictly reserved for those on the human 
side of the line - to animals as diverse as octopuses and mice (Mather and Anderson 
1993, Gosling 2001). On a philosophical level too attempts are being made to 
challenging existing dichotomous understandings (Singer 1990, Gray 2002). 
 Despite this mountain of evidence suggesting that any differences that do 
exist are but differences of degree rather than of kind, and that the boundary as it 
stands may be built on decidedly shaky ground, a strict division is still maintained in 
                                                     
2
 The preciseness of such figures, which can vary by several percentage points depending on the 
particular genetic material being analyzed, and the methods used, must be taken with a pinch of salt 
(see Marks 2003). Regardless, chimpanzees share the vast majority of their genome with ourselves. 
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Western culture. This is evidenced in our language
3
; in our laws; in our treatment of 
animals in the meat and diary industry and in our use of them scientific testing; in 
countless examples of economic development being put before ecological 
protection. As with the science Wculture divide, the maintenance of dichotomous 
understandings of humans and animals, as opposed to understandings of humans as 
animals, raises the question of how this dichotomy is preserved, and what role 
science plays in it.  
 >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ ƵƐĞĨƵů ŚĞƌĞ ŝŶ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐũƵƐƚ ŚŽǁ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƚŚĞ
disparity between theoretical and practical divisions of nature, culture, and science 
are. He argues that modernity is essentially built upon a system of ontological 
gerrymandering, that relies on a clear theoretical separation of nature and culture 
whilst in practice the joining of the two is the very thing that sustains the project. 
This joining takes the form of hybrids, the interlinking of human and 
nonhuman/object, whether conceptually or physically, but this profusion of 
mediation is, paradoxically, only made possible by insisting that nature and culture 
are entirely independent of one another. To explain this paradox Latour makes a 
comparison with premodern societies where no such division between nature and 
culture exists and in fact their co-constitution is a conceptual bedrock  W here the cost 
of allowing hybrids to propagate is simply too great, as it could threaten their entire 
world view. The crucial lesson that I wish to take from this is that science is 
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĂŶƚƵƉŽŶŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĂŶĚŶŽŶŚƵŵĂŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
and so not only does science help construct the nature-culture boundary, it is also 
constructed by it. Not only then is the inspiration for the boundary-work model  W the 
disjuncture between theory and practice  W present at the human Wanimal boundary, 
it is also, if we accept >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞ
edifice of science/culture/nature. In this light, utilizing the science Wculture boundary-
work model is all the more appropriate. 
                                                     
3
 See footnote 1 
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It should be noted that there is a great deal of debate within biology 
regarding how the classification of life should be organized. The original system, 
Linnaean taxonomy, is based heavily on the notion of natural kinds, and so seeks to 
order species in fixed hierarchies. The more recent cladistics system rejects some of 
these essentialist notions, and limits itself to showing relative evolutionary 
relationships between species. As these distinctions are largely irrelevant to the 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ Ăƚ ŚĂŶĚ ? / ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƌĞĨĞƌ ŚĞƌĞ ƚŽ  ‘ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?  W by which I mean an 
Aristotelian system of classifying life used by scientists that seeks to order evolution 
through dividing it into discrete, exclusive units. Further discuss of this is given in 
chapter two. 
 
4. Structure of the Thesis 
The data chapters of the thesis are structured around the two case studies and the 
two boundaries investigated. Chapter four then considers the first case study, 
Piltdown Man, in relation to the human-animal boundary, and chapter five considers 
the science-nonscience boundary during this case. Chapters six and seven consider 
these boundaries in relation to the second case study, LB1, but the order is reversed, 
so that chapter six deals with the science-nonscience boundary. The reason for this 
was that the two science-nonscience chapters were felt to be more closely aligned 
than the human-animal chapters, and would reward sequential running. I now 
proceed to discuss each chapter in more detail. 
 
In chapter three I discuss the design of the thesis and the research methods 
used. How the thesis evolved from its beginnings, and how the case studies came to 
be selected is considered first. The data chosen and how it was gathered and 
analysed is detailed, with particular attention paid to explicating the critical 
discourse analysis used to study the data. The difficulties of utilising that most 
elusive of concepts  W  ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? W is also discussed. 
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Chapter four, the first data chapter, considers Piltdown Man and his 
positioning in relation to the human-animal boundary. It begins by outlining the 
resolute challenge such an obvious chimera posed for popular binary conceptions of 
the human-animal boundary. The response of scientists and journalists was 
unhesitating: declare the figure human, even whilst simultaneously acknowledging 
its nonhuman features. The deciding ĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶůĂǇŶŽƚŝŶWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
fossilised remains, but in its symbolic appeal. This appeal saw it become tied to a 
strongly nationalistic discourse, as English scientists sought an ancient ancestor to 
call their own. European and American scientists by contrast saw only the mistaken 
conjoining of an ape jaw and human skull. Humanising such a monster required a 
role model: a pre-existing semi-human. Scientists found the answer in contemporary 
ŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐƚƌŝďĞƐ ?Žƌ ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞlikely to be labelled. In this way Piltdown 
DĂŶ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ǁŚŝƚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ )ƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ĂƐ
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞƐĞůŝǀŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚ ?dŚƵƐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶŶŽƚ
only gave England an ancient history, but also a mandate to continue its imperial 
ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? &ŝŶĂůůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ  ‘Homo ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ďƌŝĞĨůǇ ĨůĂŐŐĞĚ ƵƉ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ŐĂǀĞ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚǇďƌŝĚŝƚǇďǇƉůĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝŶĚŝŶĂŶĞǁŐĞŶƵƐ ?ƚŚey continued to refer to it 
as human, an act that exported humanness beyond the confines of Homo and threw 
the boundaries of both into question. Careful boundary management was required 
to admit Piltdown whilst undesirables, like extant primates, where kept out. During 
ƚŚŝƐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ƚŚĞ ďŝŶĂƌǇ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ďĞĐĂŵĞ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ  ‘ƚƌŝŶĂƌǇ ? ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ
only in a unreflexive manner which left the boundary formally unthreatened. 
 
In chapter five I consider the relationship between science culture and 
popular culture, by studying the manner in which Piltdown Man was created for the 
general public. Particular attention is paid to the narratives used to reanimate the 
ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ? ƚ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝƐ ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
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science, which sees it as a rhetorical device for allowing scientists to engage with the 
public whilst simultaneously protecting their epistemic authority. Scientists referred 
to Piltdown as human within both science and mass media, the only difference being 
that in the former no justification (beyond the conflicting physical remains), and no 
explication of what human meant in this context, was given. Scientists continued to 
use human however as it the best means of engaging public interest in the find. The 
fact that human was only given any meaning with the mass media is used to critique 
the assumption underpinning the pure/popular model  W that science is the solely 
producer of useful knowledge. I support this argument further with an appraisal of 
 ‘DĂŶƚŚĞ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚions of human evolution, which demonstrate clearly the 
influence of wider cultural ideas on scientific knowledge claims. The subversion of 
the Hunter template by the Daily Express ? WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ  Wturning it into an 
ĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶƚŚĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞŵĂŶĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŵovement  W shows how such reconstructions 
are more revealing of the present than the past. As a final example of the culturally-
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬƐ ? / ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ
^ŽŵŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĂEĞĂŶĚĞƌƚŚĂůĚŝƐĐŽǀery in France in 1908. I conclude in 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ?ĂŶĚĂĚĚƚŽŝƚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂ
as a creative space in which scientists can explore concepts like humanness more 
freely. Returning finally to the trinary concept, I suggest that popular science, like the 
missing link, acts to protect the binary in which it stands, by providing a space in 
which transgressions of the binary might be safely excused. 
 
 Homo floresiensis provides the material for chapters six and seven. Chapter 
ƐŝǆĨŽůůŽǁƐŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ-nonscience boundaries. 
Like Piltdown, LB1 received huge media attention, which was both a cause and effect 
ŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬƐĂƌĞĨĂƌƌĞŵŽǀĞĚĨƌŽŵĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ? ‘ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞ ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ. 
DŽǀŝŶŐďĞǇŽŶĚ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌďĞŐŝŶƐďǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐŵŽĚĞůƐŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŵŽƌĞ ǁŝĚĞůǇ ? ƉĂǇŝŶŐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƵĐĐŚŝ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ŵŽƌĞ
complex analysis. A chronological examination of the LB1
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claims around the figure were first made, and how they dispersed and evolved. As at 
Piltdown, the manner in which knowledge spread through different fora lends 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŽ ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? &Žƌ ƚŚĞ ŶŽŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ
audiences of intraspecialist and mass media, the discovery was structured around 
ƚŚƌĞĞƚƌŽƉĞƐ P ‘>ŽƐƚtŽƌůĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŚŽďďŝƚ ?ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽǁĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ‘DĂŶ
ƚŚĞ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŵŽƚŝĨƐ ?ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƌĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĐůĞĂƌ ?ĨŽƌ
example in a misanthropic imagining of the Hunter. Not only was nonscience culture 
important in this respect, but also in the many elements of the episode which took 
place solely within non intraspecialist media. For this reason I reject the uni-
directional flow of knowledge from science to nonscience culture that is implicit in 
the river metaphor used by Hilgartner. I conclude by positing my own model of 
science communication, that seeks to incorporate previous work, but better 
recognise the multi-directional nature of knowledge flows around such symbolically 
powerful entities. 
 
 Chapter seven parallels chapter four, considering how LB1, 92 years after 
Piltdown, was made to fit the human-animal binary. Again, pre-existing figures were 
central to the process of fixing its semi-humanness, but in more culturally sensitive 
times a fictional creation is required to take the role of the savage. The manner in 
which missing links forge far more numerous cultural connections than biological 
ones is evident once more, as nationalism, gender and anthropocentricism influence 
events. The chapter also extends beyond the ambitions of its companion chapter, to 
consider in more detail the scientific categorisation of these figures, and the 
interactions between it and popular categorisations. This process revolved around 
ƚŚĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ  ‘Homo ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?dŚĞĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚŽƌŝŐŝŶƐŽĨ  ‘Homo ?ĂƌĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ?
and how science, though its monopolisation of the term, was able to black-box it. 
Considering it in relation to LB1 reveals the tensions that still exist within this most 
personal of taxa, tensions which are played out in the leaching between it and 
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?KŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐŽĨƚŚŝƐ ŝƐĂ ƌĞŝĨǇŝŶŐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? ůĞĂǀŝŶŐƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ
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searching for an empirical basis to an intangible concept. Despite the two terms 
many inconsistencies and conflicts, scientists are driven to conflate the two in the 
effort to draw public interest and also, it is suggested, use this less constrained arena 
as a creative space in which to consider the wider implications of such chimeras. 
 
 The concluding chapter collates the data chapters to address the key 
questions of the thesis. The trinary concept is explored in detail, and considered in 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ'ŝĞƌǇŶĂŶĚŽǁŬĞƌ ?^ƚĂƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞĞƚŚŝĐĂůĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
human-animal boundary is considered, and the possible outcomes of undermining it. 
This final section returns us to the symbolic role of the boundary with which I began. 
 
The question of questions for mankind ? the problem which underlies all others, and 
is more deeply interesting than any other ? is the ascertainment of the place which 
Man occupies in nature and of his relations to the universe of things (Huxley 1863 
[2007]). 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
In the following chapter I shall provide some background to some of the key issues of 
the thesis. I begin by discussing the act of classification, to provide a wider 
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞďƌŝĞĨĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŽǁŬĞƌ ?^ƚĂƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŽƌŬŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽŶĞ ?
I shall then move on to discuss taxonomy more specifically, as the scientific method 
of classification, before finally focusing on the missing link and its history. 
 Several prominent themes of the thesis are not covered here, as discussion of 
them is left to the chapter, or chapters, in which they are particularly relevant. 
Discussion of boundary work and boundary objects takes place primarily in chapters 
ŽŶĞ ĂŶĚ ĞŝŐŚƚ ? /Ŷ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ƚŚƌĞĞ / ƵŶƉĂĐŬ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ? ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ƐŽ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƚŽ
chapter five, is, appropriately, left for that chapter. Chapter six discusses models of 
science communication more generally. Although all this material could have been 
analysed here, it was felt that the reader would be better served by distributing such 
material to where it was most needed. 
 
1. Classification 
The popular conception of a missing link is simply of an individual that at some point 
in the past stood on the evolutionary line between modern humans and modern 
primates. However, the popular conception is a reduction of a far more complex 
natural world. Problematic in the hunt for a missing link is that a simple model 
mistakes human classification for biological fact.  
The practice of classification is integral to human thought. At its most basic, it is the 
grouping together - and separation of - objects and/or individuals on the basis of a 
selection of criteria. In grouping together otherwise disparate elements, 
classification allows the unimaginable complexity of the social and natural worlds to 
be reduced down to a consistency that the limited human mind is able to grasp.  
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ĞƌŐĞƌ ĂŶĚ >ƵĐŬŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ǁŽƌŬ ĂĨĨŽƌĚƐ Ă ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ
ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨŚŽǁĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌ ‘ƚǇƉŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇƌ ĨĞƌƚŽŝƚ ?ŝƐĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ
in our comprehension of the world. The world is viewed as a continuum of 
typifications, ranging from the specific to the anonymous. At the specific end is the 
face-to-ĨĂĐĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  “ŚĞƌĞ ĂŶĚ ŶŽǁ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚǇƉŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ
relatively detailed and also open to adjustment depending on the behaviour of the 
other; 
 
dŚƵƐ/ĂƉƉƌĞŚĞŶĚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĂƐ ‘ĂŵĂŶ ? ? ‘ĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ? ? ‘ĂďƵǇĞƌ ? ? ‘ĂũŽǀŝĂůƚǇƉĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ
ƐŽŽŶ ?ůůƚŚĞƐĞƚǇƉŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶŐŽŝŶŐůǇĂĨĨĞĐƚŵǇŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŚŝŵ QKƵƌĨĂĐĞ-
to-face interaction will be patterned by these typifications as long as they do not 
become problematic through interference on his part (ibid. p45). 
 
ƚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵĂƌĞŐƌĂŶĚĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?
(see below) which reduces what is in reality a huge number of complex individuals 
down to a limited number of stereotypes, which can be grouped together and 
imagined as one unit. It is the sum of these typifications, and the patterns of 
interaction coded within them, that comprise the social structure of society. 
To pursue this idea further, it is necessary to understand Berger and 
>ƵĐŬŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇ ŝŶ ŵŽƌĞ ĚĞƚĂŝů ? dŚĞǇ ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ŽĐĐƵƉǇ Ă ƵŶŝƋƵĞ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĂŶŝŵĂůǁŽƌůĚŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶŽ “ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇĨŝǆĞĚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
relationship to the eŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?  ?ibid. p65). As a result our relationship with the 
ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůǁŽƌůĚŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚďǇĂ ‘ǁŽƌůĚŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ? ibid.), that if unchecked would 
leave human existence in a perpetual state of chaos. In a statement that should be 
borne in mind throughout this thesis, they declare 
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While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to say that 
man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that man produces himself (ibid. 
p66). 
 
This world openness, a fragile connection to the external world, helps to explain the 
 ‘ĂůůƵƌĞ ŽĨ ďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ůŝĞƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ŝŶ
chapters four and seven, and which the missing link itself appeals to. This can be 
ƐĞĞŶ ŝŶ ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ŝ ǁŚŝĐh patriotism uses 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨ “ŬŝŶƐŚŝƉ ?ŵŽƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ ?Vaterland, patria )ŽƌƚŚĂƚŽĨŚŽŵĞ ? P 
 
ŽƚŚ ŝĚŝŽŵƐ ĚĞŶŽƚĞ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽŶĞ ŝƐ ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇ ƚŝĞĚ  ? Q ? /Ŷ ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ
 ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƵŶĐŚŽƐĞŶ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ? ŶĂƚŝŽŶ-ness is 
assimilated to skin-colour, gender, parentage and birth-era  W all those things one 
ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ŚĞůƉ ? ŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ƚŝĞƐ ? ŽŶĞ ƐĞŶƐĞƐ ǁŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĐĂůů  ‘ƚŚĞ
beauty of gemeinschaft ? ?dŽƉƵƚ ŝƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇ ?ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƐƵĐŚƚŝĞƐĂƌĞ
not chosen, they have about them a halo of disinterestedness (p143). 
 
Without any biologically based instinct to bring stability to our existence, it is 
necessary to create order for ourselves, and this is achieved through the social 
world. The act of typification is one element of this effort, reducing complexity and 
ordering it. Another element is habitualization, the typification and repetition of 
behaviour. An example would be the social rules governing polite conduct when 
meeting a stranger. By carrying out the accepted behaviour of shaking hands in such 
situations, one avoids an internal debate about how to physically acknowledge the 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐŽŶĞŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƚŽĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞŽŶŽƚŚĞƌŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
content of conversation. This narrows the potentially huge number of choices we 
face each day in living our lives, moving many decisions into the cognitive 
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background, to allow us to focus on only the most pressing. In this way, 
ŚĂďŝƚƵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƐƚŝŶĐƚ ? ? 
The final element is institutionalization. This occurs when habitualized actions 
are reciprocally typified by types of actors; 
 
What must be stressed is the reciprocity of institutional typifications and the 
typicality of not only the actions but also the actors in institutions. The 
typifications of habitualized actions that constitute institutions are always shared 
ones (ibid. p72). 
 
Institutions shape our behaviour by influencing patterns of conduct, as the 
institution of science shapes the behaviour of scientists. Like any other feature of the 
social world, institutions reside ultimately in the minds of individuals, but they 
develop coercive power beyond that of subjective thoughts in the here and now 
though the transcending nature of sign systems like language. Language holds the 
history of an institution in the present; it brings the past (and future) into the here 
and now, not as subjective knowledge, but as knowledge external to our own 
biographies, as facts about the world. As such, they have a much greater coercive 
power. This process is centrally important to the influence of scientific classification. 
Berger and Luckmann base their sociology of knowledge within the framework of 
^ĐŚƵƚǌ ?Ɛ  ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞǁŽƌůĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐ ŝǀĞǁŽƌůĚŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ
which our day to day lives occur. In scientific thinking similarly, our knowledge of the 
world is formed through constructs; through abstractions, idealizations, 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƚĐĞƚĞƌĂ ?&ŽƌƚŚŝƐƌĞĂƐŽŶ ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ? ?ĂƐƐĞůĨ-defined entities, do not exist. 
Instead they are selected from the external world by our minds, and as such are 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĨĂĐƚƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?  “dŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚ ? ŝŶĚĂŝůǇ ůŝĨĞŽƌ ŝŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ǁĞ
are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that we grasp merely 
certain aspects of it, nameůǇƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽƵƐ ? ?ibid. p5). 
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Although classification is integral to all human thought, whether popular, scientific, 
or any other, Bauman argues that it is only in modernity that classification is marked 
ŽƵƚďǇƚŚĞƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽĨ “ŽƌĚĞƌĂƐĂƚĂƐŬ Q as the archetype for all other tasks, one that 
renders all other tasks mere metaphors of itself ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇĐĂŶŽŶůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽů
what it knows, and it can only know what it has classified. The outcome of this 
process should be (apparently) definitive, stable knowledge regarding the workings 
of our environment. Ranged against order is chaos and ambivalence; the unordered 
and hence uncontrolled. This is experienced as a threat; it renders us powerless, 
resulting in anxiety and indecision. Nowhere is this threat countered with such 
ĨĞƌŽĐŝƚǇƚŚĂŶŝŶŵŽĚĞƌŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? “born out of the overwhelming ambition to conquer 
EĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞŝƚƚŽŚƵŵĂŶŶĞĞĚƐ ? ?ibid. p39), an ethos which can be traced 
ďĂĐŬ ƚŽ &ƌĂŶĐŝƐ ĂĐŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ  “scientia potentia est 4  ? (1597). 
Classification is more than simply an ordering of knowledge however: it has a power 
dynamic too. The practice of ordering creates dichotomies, separating those within 
from those without, but at the same time suggests symmetry and equality between 
groups. Bauman considers this a sham, as the creation of a dichotomy requires the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂ ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?Ɖ ? ? )ƚŽƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞĚŝǀŝĚĞ ?ƐĂ
result an asymmetry of power is at the root of all such dichotomies. 
 However, no classification offers a complete fit, as nature and society can 
always produce cases which fall between classes, or which span two or more classes 
simultaneously. This creates a third category which challenges the comfortable 
dichotomy of order and disorder; us and them; good and bad. This ambivalence is an 
unavoidable outcome of the ordering project in modernity; the greater the push to 
order, the greater the production of ambivalence. In the physical world, this 
ĂŵďŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ƌĞĂůŝǌĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ǁĂƐƚĞ ?, defined by its refusal to comply with 
accepted divisions; 
                                                     
4
 dŚĞ>ĂƚŝŶŵĂǆŝŵ “ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂĞƐƚ ?translates as "for also knowledge itself is power", or simply 
 “ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝƐƉŽǁĞƌ ? ? 
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They are waste, as they defy classification and explode the tidiness of the grid. 
They are the disallowed mixture of categories that must not mix. They earned 
their death-sentence by resisting separation (p15). 
 
Such a violent response is a measure of the threat these ambivalent groups pose to 
ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ŽƌĚĞƌ ? tŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ? ĂƵŵĂŶ ƌĞĨ ƌƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞƌƐ ? ? ǁŚŽ ďǇ
ƚŚĞŝƌǀĞƌǇĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞĐĂůůŝŶƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŵŽĚĞůŽĨ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞŶĞŵǇ ? ?
 ‘ƐƚŚĂƚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƐƚƐĂůůƐŽĐŝĂůůŝĨĞĂŶĚĂůůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
ǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƚĐŚŝƚƵƉĂŶĚŚŽůĚŝƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐƚƌĂŶŐĞƌƐĂƉƐƐŽĐŝĂůůŝĨĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ? 
ĂƵŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŽŶ ĂŵďŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞ ǁŝƚŚ ŽƵŐůĂƐ ? ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ
pollution taboos. Douglas takes her cue from seemingly the most mundane of 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? Ěŝƌƚ ? Ɛ ǁŝƚŚ ĂƵŵĂŶ ?Ɛ  ‘ǁĂƐƚĞ ? ? Ěŝƌƚ ŝƐ ƐŽ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ƌĞĨƵƐĂů ƚŽ
comply with our attempts at order. There is nothing inherent in certain matter which 
ŵĂŬĞƐŝƚ ‘Ěŝƌƚ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚǁŝƚŚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ ?^Žŝů ŝŶƚŚĞŐĂƌĚĞŶŝƐ
simply soil, only when it is deposited by shoes across a gleaming kitchen floor does it 
become dirt. This suggests both an ordered system of relations - certain materials 
should be in certain places - and a breach of that system by the dirt. Hence the 
practice of cleaning is an ordering of the environment as much as anything else, the 
removal of soil from the house a confirmation of the distinction between inside and 
out, culture and nature. 
 
/Ŷ ĐŚĂƐŝŶŐ Ěŝƌƚ Q ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ďǇ ĂŶǆŝĞƚǇ ƚŽ ĞƐĐĂƉĞ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ? ďƵƚ ĂƌĞ
positively re-ŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐ ŽƵƌ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ŝƚ ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵ ƚŽ ĂŶ ŝĚĞĂ Q ŝƚ ŝƐ Ă
creative movement, an attempt to relate form to function, to make unity of 
experience. (1969:2) 
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In Implicit Meanings (1975), Douglas refers to the maintenance of the dichotomy 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚŶĂƚƵƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉƵƌŝƚǇƌƵůĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?
which polices a no-ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ land between the two by prohibiting the excursion of 
natural processes into the social world. 
An important lesson to take from all the accounts above is that there is no 
disconnect between the ordering of social categories and the ordering of the natural 
world. The two are interlinked in the process of structuring the world we perceive, 
and also in the meaning invested in this structuring. The search for structure 
ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚĐŚĂŽƐĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ ‘ǁĂƐƚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞƌƐ ?ĂůŝŬĞ ?ŶĂůŽŐŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŽƌŶŽƚ ?ŵĂǇ
be extended between the social and natural realms to justify the divisions drawn. 
 ‘ŽƐŵŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?  ?ibid. p226) drawing on divisions of the natural world, become self-
evident truths utilized within societies, as they do in the Lele society studied by 
Douglas, where the principles of  hygiene and diet mirror those for classifying animal 
kinds (ibid. p209). In the case of science specifically, Bauman lays responsibility for 
philosophical environment in which Hitler carried out his extermination of the Jews 
at the feet of modern science. What is more comforting to think of as an momentary 
act of madness was in fact a wholly rational project from the point of view of its 
perpetrators, devoid of any moral dimension, in fitting with its status as scientific 
social engineering. When the rational, supposedly objective, division of the natural 
world by modern science was mapped on to the social world, the eugenics 
movement was born. dŚĞ  ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂů ŽƌĚĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ďǇ Ă
dichotomizing science hide the asymmetry of power present in its creation, giving 
legitimacy to the division of the haves and have-nots.  
This intertwining between the ordering of natural and social worlds is also 
uncovered in Levi-^ƚƌĂƵƐƐ ? ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŽƚĞŵŝƐŵ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ƚŽ
Bauman, he states; 
 
The resemblances and differences of animal species are translated into terms 
of friendship and conflict, solidarity and opposition. In other words the world 
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of animal life is represented in terms of social relations similar to those of 
human society (p160).  
 
Animals become metaphorical devices for structuring and imagining human 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?EĂƚƵƌĂůƐƉĞĐŝĞƐĂƌĞĐŚŽƐĞŶŶŽƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚƚŽĞĂƚ ? ?ďƵƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ƚŽ ƚŚŝŶŬ ?  ?ibid. p162). This is the role we shall see taken on by the 
missing link. 
It is worth noting that both Douglas and Bauman alike state that no 
classification can ever be comprehensive. For Bauman the outcome is ambivalence, 
which in turn encourages greater efforts at classification, inevitably leading to even 
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ĂŵďŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞ ? &Žƌ ŽƵŐůĂƐ ? ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ŶŽŶ-Ĩŝƚ ? ŐŝǀĞƐ ƵƐ Ă ĐŚĂŶĐĞ  ‘ƚŽ ĚŝǀĞƐƚ ŽƵƌ
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŚĂůŽ ŽĨ ĞƚĞƌŶĂů ƚƌƵƚŚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? )ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ƌĞĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĞ ŚŽǁ ǁĞ
construct categories and deal with anomaly. This is the standpoint taken here too 
(see chapter three). 
 
2. Taxonomy and Classification 
Throughout the thesis I refer to scientific classification simply as taxonomy. 
However, a protracted debate has taken place within the philosophy of science as to 
the degree to which scientific classification of biological organisms is revealing of 
natural kinds, as opposed to merely the cognitive constructions of scientists, and 
what particular method is best suited to the task of classifying. The field of work is 
too large to attempt to chart here, but it is worth considering a few of the most 
fundamental questions raised.  
 Perhaps most fundamental of all is the criteria upon which to base any 
classification. Ultimately, the choice lies between attempting to classify organisms 
based upon comparisons of total number of characteristics, or classifying based on 
comparing selected characteristics. Both are problematic. The former, often referred 
to as numerical taxonomy (e.g. Sneath & Sokal 1973) faces the insurmountable 
22 
 
problem that there is no finite number of characteristics in any organism, a problem 
Pratt (1972) equates with attempting to count the number of heaps of flour within a 
bag; 
 
you can only count heaps once the flour has been poured out, just as you can 
only count characters once the individual has been described in a particular 
way (p317). 
 
To describe the individual in a particular way is merely to resort to the latter choice 
available however, that is a comparison of selected characteristics. This raises the 
question of on what grounds one is selecting however. Do the distinctions produced 
by this selecƚŝŽŶƌĞǀĞĂůŶĂƚƵƌĂůŬŝŶĚƐ ‘ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?
Žƌ ũƵƐƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ? ?  ?&ĂůĞƐ  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ
Linnaeus and the Mammalia class (see chp. 7, sec. 1.2) shows how socio-cultural 
factors can influence the selection of criteria and so radically shape if not the 
membership of a group, then certainly the conception of it. In terms of group 
membership, a distinction must be made between species and higher level taxa, 
which have no physical reality in the sense that a species might be argued to have. At 
the species level, the presence of reproductive communities allows for a defence of 
the natural kinds concept, as attempted by the Biological Species Concept (BSC), 
defined here by one of its strongest baĐŬĞƌƐ ?ƌŶƐƚDĂǇƌ ? ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐŝƐĂƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ
community of populations (reproductively isolated from others) that occupies a 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŶŝĐŚĞŝŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐŝƐũƵƐƚŽŶĞŽĨŵĂŶǇƐƵĐŚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ
however; no less than ten are listed by de Queiroz in his (1999) paper. That so many 
systems of defining species should propagate is testament to the problems faced by 
scientists attempting to chart the uneven and variegated biological world. Dupre 
(2001) argues that the classical teleological tree of life image of evolution as 
consisting of sharply defined channels splitting cleanly at various nodal points must 
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be rejected, and that instead evolution would be better thought of as an estuary at 
low tide; 
 
We find large streams of water and many side streams, some petering out, 
others rejoining a main channel or crossing into a different channel, and a 
few maintaining their integrity to the ocean; there are islands around which 
streams flow and then rejoin; eddies and vortices; and so on. Some parts of 
the general flow are naturally and coherently distinguishable, and it is easy 
enough to recognise parts of the pattern that are definitely not parts of the 
ƐĂŵĞ  ‘ƵŶŝƚ ŽĨ ĨůŽǁ ? ? Ƶƚ ŝŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ many cases where any such 
distinction into discrete units would be largely arbitrary (pp.207-208). 
 
dŽŐŝǀĞũƵƐƚŽŶĞ ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ )ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ ‘ŶŽŶ-Ĩŝƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ ?ŝƚ
gives no account of asexual organisms, which have been the only forms of life on our 
planet for the greater part of its history (ibid. p206). As a result philosophers like 
Dupre and Kitcher (1984) have called for a rejection of monist attempts of 
classification, and argued instead for a pluralist approach, which makes a pragmatic 
utilization of whichever classificatory system provides the best results for specific 
research foci. Such a pragmatic approach calls into question whether the existence 
of natural kinds in the Aristotelian essentialist sense can be maintained: if an 
individual can be categorized differently dependent on the classificatory system 
used, how can it be said to have an immutable essence? Interestingly, Pratt (1972) 
attempts to argue that natural kinds can be defined as any group which proves to be 
inductively valid as, he argues, a group will only have such validity if it has a shared 
phylogenetic heritage. This conception implies  W without acknowledging - that 
nature is defined only by what humans ask of it, which appears counter-intuitive to 
the perception of nature as being the Other to humanity and our attempts at 
ordering, as detailed here by Bauman; 
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The concept of Nature, in its modern rendition, opposes the concept of 
ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇďǇǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐƉĂǁŶĞĚ QŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƐƉŽŝůƐƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ
harmony, the design, and thus refuses purpose and meaning, is Nature. 
(1991:40). 
 
I do not here attempt to provide any resolution to what is an extensive and 
on-going debate. The point I hope to make is that biological classification is a 
complex and contentious task, which even at the species level struggles to defend 
the notion of natural kinds. This is not to say for one moment that biological 
classification is wholly constructed or arbitrary, but rather that there is no privileged 
ǁŝŶĚŽǁ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ĐĂŶ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĞ ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ǁŽƌůĚ  ‘ĂƐ ŝƚ ŝƐ ? ? ŶŽ
method guaranteed to reveal natural kinds. The wealth of differing species models 
ĂƌĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŵƐ ƌĞĨƵƐĞ ƐŝŵƉůĞ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? WƌĂƚƚ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ
species as inductively valid groups could be said to be how species groups are 
formed in practice by scientists, however, such a definition subverts the idea of 
natural kinds to such a degree as to make it meaningless. This argument brings to 
ŵŝŶĚ>ĂƚŽƵƌ ?ƐƚŚŝƌĚƌƵůĞŽĨŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? 
 
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇŝƐƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨEĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƌĞƉresentation, 
not its consequences, we can never use this consequence, Nature, to explain 
how and why a controversy has been settled (1987:99). 
 
Pratt is guilty of just this however: labeling groups as natural kinds post hoc, on the 
proviso that they survive their period of scientific debate for long enough to become 
black boxed. As Latour argues though, it is not Nature which determines whether a 
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claim survives long enough to become black boxed, but the process of scientific 
debate. 
In recent decades a concerted attempt has been made to make biological 
classification more methodologically rigorous in an effort to escape debates like the 
one above. One outcome of this has been cladistics, a method of taxonomy which 
seeks to chart the relative relationships between different species by comparing for 
similarity and difference on the assumption that similarity will be revealing of a 
ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ƉŚǇůŽŐĞŶǇ ? &ƌŽŵ ƚŚŝƐ Ă ďƌĂŶĐŚŝŶŐ ĚŝĂŐƌĂŵ ? Žƌ  ‘ƚƌĞĞ ŽĨ ůŝĨĞ ? ? ŝƐ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ?
showing the evolutionary relationship between different groups. One advocate 
argues that cladistics avoids  ‘any prior assumptions about cause and effect, or 
ĂŶĐĞƐƚƌǇĂŶĚĚĞƐĐĞŶƚ QĐůĂĚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŝƐĂ ǁĂǇŽĨ  ‘ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ? ?ŽĨ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚ ƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŽĨ
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĂƐǁĞǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŚĞŵƚŽďĞ ? ?'ĞĞ2001:6).  
 Can cladistics illuminate the search for a missing link then? Firstly, it must be 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĐůĂĚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŶǇ  ‘ŵĂŐŝĐ ďƵůůĞƚ ? ƌĞŵĞĚǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
philosophical problems already encountered with taxonomy, as its novel 
methodological elements are focused on producing empirically valid, testable 
knowledge through a clear, rigorous epistemology, rather than solving philosophical 
issues regarding the relationship of knowledge and reality. Like any biological 
taxonomy, cladistics requires the comparison of characteristics, a process which we 
have already seen to be philosophically problematic in the selection process 
required. Whilst cladistics offers no answer to these considerations, it does attempt 
to stabilize the comparison of characterŝƐƚŝĐƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƐƚƌŝĐƚ ĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ KĐĐĂŵ ?Ɛ
razor, that is, where two or more interpretations are possible, the most 
parsimonious is chosen. What this means in operation is that the interpretation that 
requires the fewest evolutionary changes is assumed. CoŶƚƌĂƌǇ ƚŽ'ĞĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ ? ƚŚŝƐ
itself requires a considerable assumption, as there is no necessary reason to assume 
that evolution will always take the simplest route (Felsenstein 1983). In addition, the 
 ‘ƚƌĞĞ ŽĨ ůŝĨĞ ? ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĂŶ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚion that may be reasonably 
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successful for ordering higher mammals, but is far more problematic elsewhere, 
ǁŚĞƌĞƵƉƌĞ ?Ɛ ‘ĞƐƚƵĂƌǇŽĨůŝĨĞ ?ŵĂǇďĞŵŽƌĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ? 
In regards to the missing link specifically, cladistics faces the same difficulties 
as any other taxonomy, namely, a dearth of evidence from the fossil record, which 
makes the identification of distinguishing characteristics extremely difficult (Hawks 
2004, Woods & Collard 1999), discussed in detail below. In addition, the relatively 
close evolutionary relationship between modern Homo sapiens and our immediate 
ancestors makes any parsimonious selection of characters prone to error. Gee 
himself is obviously in agreement with at least some of these points, as he argues 
that even cladistics is unsuited for the task of identifying a missing link, and that the 
ŽŶůǇ ǁĂǇ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌ ůŝĨĞ ŽŶ ĂƌƚŚ ŝŶ Ă
scientifically acceptable way is to give up on any notions of revealing our ancestry, 
and instead to limit ourselves to investigating our relative relationship to other 
contemporary species.  
The absence of any meta-ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĞƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐĂƵŵĂŶĂŶĚŽƵŐůĂƐ ?
claim that no classification ever provides a complete fit, and that in the spaces 
between the natural world and our attempts to order it, there lies ambivalence, the 
threat of the unknown and the uncontrolled.  
 
3. Missing Links 
The story of the missing link begins in 19
th
 Century Europe, as evolutionary science 
began to challenge the dominant Judeo-Christian tradition for the right to 
circumscribe the origins of humans. At stake was, and is, perhaps the greatest story 
of all; not just how we came to be here, but also who we are, and how we are 
related to the world in which we live. The present can only be understood with 
reference to what has gone before it; in shaping the past one may shape the present. 
,ŽůĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŽĐůĂŝŵŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƉĂƐƚĂůůŽǁƐĂŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽĚĞƉůŽǇ
enormously powerful discourses dictating what is and is not acceptable behaviour, 
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bǇ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ? ŚƵŵĂŶ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ĂŶĚ ďǇ ĐĂůůŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƉŽƚĞŶƚ
notions of heredity. Such discourses continue to be deployed by all sides in debates 
that involve issues of human identity, ranging from intensely personal issues like race 
and sĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇ  ?Ğ ?Ő ?  “ŚŽŵŽƐĞǆƵĂů ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ŝƐunnatural ? ) ƚŽ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ůŝŬĞ
ĞĐŽůŽŐǇ ?Ğ ?Ő ? “ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŝƐĚƌŝǀŝŶŐŝƚƐanimal brothers and sisters ƚŽĞǆƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ) ? 
The first assumption to be rejected is the notion of the Missing Link, the idea 
of a single group, or even individual, which bridges human and nonhuman lineages. 
Any fossil which is recovered today is merely a snap-shot, a glimpse at a single 
moment in evolution on a timeline that stretches back six million or so years to our 
split with primates. To be the Missing Link in the strictest sense, the fossilised 
individual would have had to be the progenitor of two or more offspring, one of 
ǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƐƐĞĚŝƚƐŐĞŶĞƐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƚĞůŝŶĞ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ ŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƐƉĂƐƐĞĚĚŽǁŶ
the human line. This individual, or group, would have had to exist at the exact point 
in time when a formerly cohesive group began to divide, and form two separate 
breeding pools. Amazingly, throughout evolution there must have been many such 
groups, in fact wherever one line of evolution branched into two (or more). Here we 
ĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚĨŝŶĚŝŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ
such groups today.  
This leads us to the first of several problems which the search for a missing 
link presents; palaeoanthropological classification relies heavily upon incomplete 
fossil data. The conditions necessary to turn bone to fossil, and the luck and skill 
involved in uncovering them, means that the only a tiny number of specimens are 
available. It has been calculated that a collection of ten skulls uncovered from East 
Turkana in Kenya represent only one individual in every one hundred million of the 
original population (Reader 1981:16). Of 6000 species of extinct mammal thought to 
have existed at one time or another, fossil evidence only exists for between 60 and 
180 of them (Lewin 2005:64). Reader quotes a scientist describing the challenge to 
understand human evolution from fossils as being  ‘ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ůŝŬĞ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĨŽůůŽǁ ƚŚĞ
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story of War and Peace from twelve pages torn at randŽŵĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďŽŽŬ ?  ?Reader 
1981:16). 
When finds are made they are inevitably incomplete, to the degree that 
some posited missing links consist of nothing more than a single bone. The dangers 
of this were demonstrated by Nebraska man, a find in 1922 which was comprised of 
only a single tooth. It was originally thought to be the tooth of an ancient human, 
ĨƌŽŵ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂŶ ĞŶƚŝƌĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ? ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ǁŝƚŚ ĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ ŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ
reconstruction, but by 1927 it had been established that the tooth was actually that 
of a peccary, a close relative of the pig, and Nebraska man was no more. As such, 
Nebraska man serves as an example of the power not of fossils, but of the beliefs we 
attach to them, beliefs which can extract an entire species from a single tooth. 
Though obviously an extreme example, the case demonstrates how flimsy the 
relationship between theory and evidence can be in palaeoanthropology. The 
incompleteness of fossils is a recurring problem in the search for a missing link, and a 
regular source of controversy (e.g. see http://www.talkorigins.org/). 
A discussion of taxonomy also leads us to a second, related point, namely, 
what criteria distinguish modern anatomical Homo sapiens from our evolutionary 
relatives - at what point does a missing link become so similar as to be 
indistinguishable, and, reversing the time line, at what point does it become so 
different as to not be a link with humanity at all? Unfortunately, the clearest 
distinguishing criterion between Homo sapiens and all other contemporary life on 
Earth, namely our use of highly developed language systems, makes for a poor 
interrogator of fossils. In recent years scientists have begun to look at the size of the 
holes in vertebrae through which vocal nerves pass through, on the premise that our 
language use requires considerably more nerve fibres for the fine control breathing 
required for speech  W hence a larger hole  W than species that do not/did not speak. 
On this evidence it appears language appeared between 500,000 and 1mya
5
. 
                                                     
5
  ‘ŵǇĂ ?ŝƐĂŶĂďďƌĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŵŝůůŝŽŶǇĞĂƌƐĂŐŽ ? ? 
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However, few fossils have been complete enough to study in this way. Given these 
limits, and the apparently recent arrival of language, other criteria are required as 
well. 
Being, as they are, incomplete skeletons, the information that can be drawn 
from hominid
6
 fossils ŝƐŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?ŝƐĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚĞƌŵ ?ĂŶĚ
scientists have been ingenious in extracting details from what is often no more than 
a handful of mineralized, fragmented bone. Nevertheless, restricted to anatomical 
data, the task of determining whether a fossil is a missing link has fallen to two main 
criteria; brain size (determined by skull capacity) and bipedalism. Conventional 
thinking amongst evolutionists has been that the development of larger brains 
marked the evolution of Homo sapiens, a belief we will return to later with Piltdown 
man. Over the last fifty years it has become clear, though, that brain expansion only 
really took off around 2mya, and rapid expansion only as recently as 500,000 years 
ago, reaching current size about 150,000 years ago (Dunbar 2004:22-30). The 4mya 
footprints Mary Leakey uncovered at Laetoli in Tanzania show that bipedalism was a 
much earlier adaptation however. A third distinguishing criteria has been tool use, 
evidence of cultural, rather than biological development, early examples of which 
appear to date to around 3mya, but these are little different from the rocks used to 
break open nuts by chimpanzees today. More developed handaxes appear around 
2mya, but no further improvement appears until the last 50,000 years, at the time of 
the so called Upper Palaeolithic Revolution.  
This confusion of dates highlights the difficulty in determining a missing link. 
No rubicon exists in our past across which we irrevocably became human, as our 
identifying traits as humans evolved piecemeal over several million years. Hence the 
                                                     
6
  “,ŽŵŝŶĂŶ ? ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƐƉĞĐŝĨǇ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞǆƚŝŶĐƚ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ŝŶ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ƚŽ  “ŚŽŵŝŶŝĚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ
refers to any member of the Hominidae family (humans, chimps, gorillas and orangutans). 'Hominin' 
encompasses humans and their closest living relatives chimpanzees, along with their mutual 
ancestors. 
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ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƚŚŝƐ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ Ă ůŝŶŬ ƚŽ ? ? ?  ƐŚŽƌƚ ŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
current view of our evolutionary line should be effective in conveying the complexity 
of answering such a question. The general consensus amongst evolutionists is that 
anatomically modern Homo sapiens appeared about 150,000 years ago, around the 
time that our brains stopped expanding  (e.g. Dawkins 2004:56-85, Lewin 2005). 
Before this existed Archaic Homo sapiens, who had slightly smaller skulls and more 
robust skeletons, up until around 1mya. Some scientists however see Archaic as a 
subspecies of Homo sapiens, whilst others see them as a separate species entirely; 
Homo heidelbergensis. Neanderthal man is now believed to be a fellow descendant 
of Archaic Homo sapiens, though (limited) genetic evidence implies that their lineage 
was separate from our own. If the recently found Homo florensis survives its current 
controversy and comes to be accepted, then another hominan species existed up 
until as recently as 12,000 years ago. 
Preceding the Archaics the hominan line grades into Homo ergaster (formerly 
known as erectus), though it must be noted that here, as elsewhere, there is 
evidence of a considerable overlap between the two species, as ergaster is believed 
to have persisted up until 250,000 years ago. Ergaster had a smaller brain still, with a 
 ‘ƐǁĞƉƚ ďĂĐŬ ? ƐŬƵůů ĂŶĚ ƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐ ĐŚŝŶ ? ƌŽƵŶĚ  ?ŵǇĂergaster appeared from Homo 
habilis, though in addition some recognize a similar contemporary called Homo 
rudolfensis. Habilis ?ďƌĂŝŶǁĂƐĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇ  ? ? ?ĐĐ ?ĨĂƌƐŵĂůůĞƌƚŚĂŶŵŽĚĞƌŶHomo 
sapiens at 1400cc, but considered to be enough to mark the beginning of its 
expansion, which is the reason for its inclusion in the Homo genus. 
Looking back past Homo habilis the picture becomes even less clear, as the 
human lineage emerges from the genus Australopithecus, a family of gracile apes. At 
this time our ancestors co-exist with a number of other species, including 
Australopithecus robustus, Australopithecus boisei and Australopithecus afarensis. 
Beyond these, two recent finds, Orrorin tugenesis and Sahelanthropus tchadensis, 
both who show evidence of bipedalism and date to around 6-7mya, occupy the 
period around which the human and chimpanzee lineages join. 
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This flurry of Latin hints at how non-linear evolution really is, a riposte to the 
idea of a simple straight line progression from primitive ape to complex human. In 
ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĂŶŐůĞĚ ? ŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŽƵƐ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŽƵƌ ůŝŶĞĂŐĞƐ ? ĚĞƐĐĞŶt, a missing link 
ďĞŐŝŶƐƚŽĂƉƉĞĂƌůĞƐƐůŝŬĞĂůŝŶŬŝŶĂĐŚĂŝŶ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞĂůŝŶŬŝŶĂƐƉŝĚĞƌ ?ƐǁĞď ?/ŶĂůů
this confusion does the missing link become the link between anatomically modern 
humans and Archaic Homo sapiens, or somewhere between Archaic and Homo 
ergaster ǁŚĞŶ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ? Žƌ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ  ‘,ŽŵŽ ?- 
habilis and its predecessor Australopithecus, or back further still between the biped 
human and quadruped primate lines? The hope that a missing link will illuminate for 
us today an Adam and Eve; the first man and woman who walked the Earth, is 
ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ĨůĂǁĞĚ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ŶŽ  ‘ĨŝƌƐƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ďƵƚŝŶƐ ĞĂĚ Ă ŵƵůƚŝƚƵĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŝŶǇ
gradations towards what we are today. 
What all this demonstrates is the problems faced when trying to determine 
whether a fossil is a missing link or not. Species do not exist, as a taxonomic 
evolution tree might imply, as discrete groups which suddenly one day evolve into 
one or more new species, en masse. According to the traditional Darwinian 
 ‘ŐƌĂĚƵĂůŝƐƚ ? ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ƐůŽǁ ? ƐƚĞĂĚǇ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽŶĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ
and its ancestor(s) is likely to be drawn out over hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions of years. At any one point during this process, the various individuals which 
make up the group will display those traits that mark out the new species to varying 
degrees, so that any one individual may be phenotypically or genotypically closer to 
another individual several generations previously or subsequently, than to any 
particular one of theŝƌ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝĞƐ ? KŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞĚ ŽĨ ƵƉƌĞ ?Ɛ
imagining of evolution as an estuary at low tide. Similarly, for any particular gene an 
individual may actually be closer to individuals in another species entirely than 
individuals in their own group, as is the case with the blood groups of humans and 
chimpanzees (Dawkins 2004:55). For a considerable span of time after an 
evolutionary line has begun to split, it is also likely that individuals in the two groups 
would retain the ability to cross-breed. All of this means that the single snap-shot in 
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time that a fossil exposes is massively unsuited to the task of identifying a missing 
link.  
The alternative account of evolution, punctuated equilibrium theory, 
promoted by Gould (2002) amongst others, argues that that, whilst gradual 
evolution does occur, more frequently evolution takes place in bursts of 
development, followed by long periods of little change. This does not make the 
search for a missing link any easier however. If human evolution were marked by 
punctuated equilibrium rather than gradualism, then one would expect to find fewer 
intermediaries between species, as the period of change would happen relatively 
quickly. This might make it easier to define the species that have led to Homo 
sapiens, as they would exist as more discrete groups. However, the stop-start nature 
of development could make it even harder to construct a chronological picture of 
evolution, and the lack of intermediaries could make the reconstruction of 
evolutionary relationships between species more difficult. For a strict conception of 
the missing link, the rate of evolution makes no actual difference, as it will always 
begin with one reproductive couple/community whose offspring become separated 
from one another. 
The difficulties faced when attempting to create a coherent account of 
human ancestry are such that Gee (2001) has argued that any such attempts must be 
divorced from science altogether, as it is a task which cannot be accomplished in any 
scientifically valid way. The reasons for this are largely those already discussed,  
ǁŚŝĐŚ 'ĞĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ  ‘ĞĞƉ dŝŵĞ ? ? ĞĞƉ dŝŵĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ
geological timescales  W millions, even billions of years. Within this temporal 
hinterland, the empirical data upon which palaeoanthropology relies is simply not up 
to the task asked of it;  
 
each fossil is an infinitesimal dot, lost in a fathomless sea of time, whose 
relationship with other fossils and organisms living in the present day is 
obscure. Any story we tell against the compass of geological time which links 
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these fossils in sequences of cause and effect  W or ancestry and descent  W is, 
therefore, only ours to make (ibid. p1). 
 
Gee asserts that Deep Time cannot support contemporary attempts at 
structuring it into a narrative, in effect, restricting palaeoanthropology to mere fossil 
hunting. He argues that fossil evidence is so fragmentary and insufficient that in 
ĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƌŝǀĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ŽŶĞ ŚĂƐ ŶŽ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ďƵƚ ƚŽ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŽŶ
two other factors; firstly, whether the presentation of the claim conforms to already-
ŚĞůĚƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŚĞůĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ
authority. Obviously neither of these factors is in keeping with the scientific ideal of 
rational empiricism, though a palaeoanthropologist might counter (with good 
reason) that factors such as authority play a powerful role within all sciences, and 
that the perceived gulf between available evidence and the vastness of reality is not 
distinct to palaeoanthropology, but rather is a common to all branches of science in 
ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŝŶĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?
Returning to the mention of Adam and Eve, it is perhaps necessary to clarify 
the position of the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘DŝƚŽĐŚŽŶĚƌŝĂůǀĞ ?ǁŚŽĨŽƵŶĚĨĂŵĞŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?
Mitochondrial Eve was the result of a study that sampled the mitochondrial genome 
of 147 individuals from diverse groups and compared them (Cann et al. 1987). As 
ŵŝƚŽĐŚŽŶĚƌŝĂ ŽŶůǇ ƉĂƐƐĚŽǁŶ ƚŚĞ ĨĞŵĂůĞ ůŝŶĞĂŐĞ  ?ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŽ ĐŚŝůĚ ?ŚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǀĞ ?
reference) its evolution is easier to track than other DNA. By comparing the 
difference between the mitochondria tested, and checking this against the dates of 
ŚƵŵĂŶ ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ĨƌŝĐĂ ? Ă  ‘ƚĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?  ?ibid. p33) date was produced for the 
ancestor of all contemporary human mitochondrial DNA. This gave a result of 
140,000-290,000 years ago. Newsweek ƌĂŶĂĐŽǀĞƌĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐ  ‘dŚĞ^ĞĂƌĐŚ ĨŽƌĚĂŵ
ĂŶĚǀĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞƉŝĐƚĞĚĂŶĂŬĞĚĨƌŝĐĂŶĐŽƵƉůĞŝŶĂ “'ĂƌĚĞŶŽĨĚĞŶ ?ƚǇƉĞƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?
The biblical imagery was further reinforced by showing the Eve figure offering an 
apple to the man. 
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The pinches of salt that should be taken with this work are as follows; firstly 
the inaccuracy of the dating means that Eve would have been one of probably 
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of individuals who lived and died during this 
period. Secondly, and more relevant to the missing link story, what this reveals is the 
common ancestor of our mitochondrial genome, but this makes up just a tiny 
fraction of the roughly 30,000 genes on the human genome. Humans are no more 
reducible to their mitochondria than their toe nails, and to imply that the first human 
could be defined by its mitochondrial DNA is nonsensical. Rather than the literal Ur-
ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?  ‘ ‘ǀĞ ? ǁĂƐ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ŵĂŶǇ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ŝŶĂ ƉŽpulation from which 
ŵŽĚĞƌŶŚƵŵĂŶƐĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇĞǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ?>ĞǁŝŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?dŚĞĨŝŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞŝƐ
perhaps the most obvious, and yet is ignored all too often in Missing Link debates. 
This is the conflagration of limited, empirically-based scientific claims (in this case a 
female individual living 140,000-290,000 years was the progenitor of all 
ŵŝƚŽĐŚŽŶĚƌŝĂ ŐĞŶĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ) ǁŝƚŚ ĨĂŝƚŚ-based stories, despite the 
glaring contradictions involved in trying to blend an evolutionary and a creationist 
account of human origins together. The appeal of such an approach is that a faith-
based account will always be able to offer far more answers than a scientific 
approach committed to testability. As is typical of scientific claims, the knowledge 
produced of Mitochondrial Eve only raises more questions; such as how did she 
ůŝǀĞ ? ?ǁŚǇǁĂƐŚĞƌŵŝƚŽĐŚŽŶĚƌŝĂƉĂƐƐĞĚŽŶĂŶĚŶŽƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?Ɛ ? ?ǁŚĂƚĚŽĞƐĂůů
this mean for us today? The production of knowledge only creates more 
ambivalence around it, and it is often the most intriguing questions raised, those of 
 ‘ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐŵŽƐƚƉŽŽƌůǇƐƵŝƚĞĚƚŽĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐ ?dŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ
of the Mitochondrial Eve story can be read as an attempt to overcome ambivalence 
by attaching the empirical claim, anchored as it is in the external world, with a 
system of meaning (the story of Creation) which has no such debt to events external 
to the human mind, and hence is not limited by the relationship of order and 
ambivalence that science is. In this way a limited claim about our past is invested 
with meaning for us today. 
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&ƌŽŵĂƵŵĂŶ ?ƐĂŶĚĞƌŐĞƌ  ?>ƵĐŬŵĂŶŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŽŶĞ ŝƐƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽƌĞĂĚƚŚĞ
ĂƉƉĞĂůŽĨŚĞƌĞĚŝƚǇĂƐƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂůŽĨŽƌĚĞƌ ? /ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ?ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
relationship with our surroundings is characƚĞƌŝǌĞĚďǇĂďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů  ‘ǁŽƌůĚ-ŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ?
(Berger & Luckmann 1991:65), from which the desire for order and stability stems, 
lest we be lost in chaos. We have no option but to construct this order from our 
social world, but this does not preclude a desire for some form of biological order 
ƚŽŽ ?ĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚƚŽƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽƵƌůŝǀĞƐ ?ƚŽƚĞůůƵƐ ‘ǁŚŽǁĞĂƌĞ ? ?/ŶĨĂĐƚĂƐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
the natural, external world, as opposed to the elements of our cognitive 
constructions, there is the temptation to view biological orderings as superior, being 
more factual, to those of our social world. From this stance, the search for a missing 
link becomes a search for world-closedness, to narrow down the dizzying possibilities 
the natural world offers, by reading our ancestors as institutions by which to order 
our lives. Like all systems of classification, it is the search for order. This is the 
powerful allure of the historical human-animal boundary, and what is at stake in 
scientific orderings of it. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methods 
 
In the following chapter I shall outline the evolution of the thesis, and its 
methodological framework. In the first section I discuss the considerable change in 
focus from the original plan and how the case studies came to be chosen. In section 
two I explain the data sources used, with particular attention paid to explaining in 
ŵŽƌĞ ĚĞƚĂŝů ŚŽǁ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƚĂŶŐŝďůĞ ĞŶƚŝƚǇ  ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
purposes of investigation. In section three I cover how data was gathered, and 
provide some statistics on the news media used. In section four I run through the 
method of data analysis used  W namely, critical discourse analysis, as well as some of 
the implications and assumptions of this approach. Finally, the brief section five 
considers the ethical dimensions to the research. 
 
1. Genesis of Thesis 
In some respects, the thesis has changed considerably from the original proposal. 
dŚĞ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ǁĂƐ ŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘Humans, Apes and Genetics: Myths and Science ? ?
and aimed to explore the manner in which comparative genomics was reconstructing 
the human-nonhuman boundary through its study of primate genomes. The 
discovery of Homo floresiensis during the first year of the thesis, and the resulting 
media coverage, changed this focus radically. The roles that extant non-human 
primates and extinct missing links hold in respect of the human-animal boundary are 
in many respects indistinguishable, a fact I alluded to in chapter one. In light of these 
parallels, and the topicality of the discovery on Flores, it was decided that it would 
be beneficial to incorporate this archaic primate into the study. As the Flores find 
was still very much unsettled at this time it was agreed with my supervisors that I 
should take a look at another famous missing link as a pilot study, for which Piltdown 
man was perfectly suited. Like floresiensis, Piltdown was a very literal rebuke to the 
notion of a human-animal binary, and it too received considerable mainstream 
media coverage. The ninety two years separating the finds also allowed a welcome 
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historical dimension to the study, given the interest in socio-cultural influences on 
the scientific study of such creatures. The very different circumstances of the two 
finds aided the task of identifying such influences.  
The material generated from this pilot work was so great that the decision 
was to use Flores and Piltdown as a case study. It quickly became apparent that 
incorporating both this work and the primate genomics work within one thesis 
would be impossible, and so the decision was taken to switch the focus entirely to 
missing links. Appropriately foreshadowing events in the real world, (proto) man had 
displaced ape. 
Despite this change of fields, from genomics to palaeoanthropology, the 
interests of the thesis were left unchanged. The focus remained on the interactions 
between science- and popular- culture in drawing the boundary between human and 
animal. The specific field of science may have changed, but the vastly superior 
attention accorded to both floresiensis and Piltdown man, comparative to even the 
most newsworthy comparative genomics, meant that the new field was far better 
ƐƵŝƚĞĚĨŽƌĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ŵĂŝŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? 
 Within the text of the thesis itself, I have gradually introduced the theories 
used and applied them with increasing complexity to the questions at hand. As a 
ƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚƌŝŶĂƌǇ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŚǇĚƌŽůŽŐŝĐ ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ
communication, are built on over the course of the thesis. This allowed the concepts 
used to be tested and refined against all the data analysed, before they were 
deployed to their full extent. It also, I hope, affords the reader an easier introduction 
into the framework of the thesis, avoiding overburdening the early chapters. Finally, 
such an approach  W i.e. of gradual development  W appears fitting for a thesis which 
fixes its gaze on attempts to understand the process of evolution (assuming one 
discounts the theory of punctuated equilibrium, which would make for a rather 
jarring read). 
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2. Data Sources 
The research consisted of a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of science and 
mainstream media coverage of the two case studies, supported by a literature 
review of appropriate texts. I will discuss CDA in detail below, but here I wish to 
focus on the choice of materials used. To study the interaction between scientific 
and popular knowledge claims, its was necessary to begin with intraspecialist 
scientific media, that is to say the peer-reviewed journal papers in which the 
discoveries were initially detailed, and any others which followed in response. 
ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐůŽŝƚƌĞ ?^ŚŝŶŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ
media coverage was also studied, as an example of an intermediate stage between 
the two realms of interest. By interspecialist, I am referring to what is more 
commonly know as popular science: material aimed at nonspecialist scientists and 
nonscientists generally, examples being New Scientist and Scientific American. This 
was the news and analysis provided by science magazines aimed at scientists and lay 
public alike. 
Analysing popular culture is a rather different task from analysing science 
culture, as it is not embodied in any formalised institution and its practices, whether 
material or semiotic, in the manner that science is. In light of this it is tempting to 
define popular culture by what it is not: as being those ideas and practices which is 
not claimed by any formal profession. To do so would be a mistake however, for 
more than one reason. For a start, this would be to imply that rigid lines can be 
drawn between popular culture and other forms, yet a considerable part of this 
thesis is concerned with questioning the walls that are erected between science and 
popular culture. Additionally, there are professions - an appropriate example being 
newspaper journalism - which do operate within this realm, but the difference is 
that, unlike scientists, these professions can claim no monopoly on the production of 
knowledge within their realm. Science too is, of course, highly influential on popular 
culture (and vice versa). It is, clearly, a hopeless task to attempt to define popular 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? ĨŽƌ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĞǀĞƌǇǁŚĞƌĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ  “ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇpar 
excellence ?dŚŝƐ ŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇůŝĨĞ ?  ?ĞƌŐĞƌ  ?>ƵĐŬŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ?:35), which 
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may incorporate ideas from science as easily as it does from religion, or any other 
system of knowledge. It is this definition that that I will take as identifying popular 
culture, as being that which constitutes the   
 
common sense world typically taken for granted, and this means that these 
structures of daily life are not themselves recognized or appreciated formally by 
common sense. Rather, common sense sees the world, acts in the world, and 
interprets the world through these implicit typifications (Schutz 1973:xxvii). 
 
Given that popular culture lacks the centralised system which underpins 
science culture, evidencing it is undeniably more problematic. Newspapers are 
however as good a proxy as any, being (as part of journalism more generally) the 
primary industry tasked with providing the public with current, reliable (in theory) 
information about the external world. Their influence can be read in their sales 
figures (see below) which reveal their mass audiences, and in this respect the timing 
of Piltdown is fortuitous, as it was during the 1910s that the news media in the UK 
began to achieve mass readership for the first time (Stevenson 1990:402). However, 
one must always remain aware of the intangibles associated with attempting to 
chart popular culture in this way: 
 
Does media science make a difference to how people think about science? 
Possibly, but we do not know. How can we separate the influences of a 
particular medium from those of other media and from other sources of 
impressions and influences? We cannot. Do media give people information? 
Yes, sometimes, to a certain extent. Does that information have any effect? 
Sometimes, for some people: but when, and how much, and for whom, we 
do not know (Gregory and Miller 1998:131). 
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These issues are unavoidable in attempting to study an entity as abstract as popular 
culture, and in the absence of any better source, the print news media was chosen as 
the most appropriate means of studying reactions to the challenges raised by the 
missing links. 
At this stage, it is important to state that although popular culture is treated 
as single, unified entity for the purpose of analysis, it is recognised that its 
ontological reality is in fact hugely complex, and interlinked with countless more 
specific, local forms of knowing and knowledge. Any single individual is liable to have 
their experiences and world-view structured as much by the nuances of their daily 
existence: their job and education; those they come into contact with; any number 
of demographic variables; religious beliefs etcetera, as they are by the overarching 
framework of popular culture, which can be thought of as a residue, or concentrate, 
of these more specialised cultures. This dynamic, multi-layered picture is supported 
by Bowker & Star: 
 
If someone is comfortable with the things and language used by a group of 
others, we say that he or she is a member of that group. In this sense, 
categories  W our own and those of others  W come from action and in turn 
from relationships. They are, as sociologists like Aaron Cicourel (1964) remind 
us, continually remade and refreshed, with a lot of skilled work.  (2000:285). 
  
No analysis could hope to encompass all of popular culture: in its 
complexities it appears fractal, with any level of detail incomplete, limited by its 
resolution. This thesis is no exception, and with the viewing field necessarily wide, to 
incorporate both science and popular culture, specialist and general media, and a 
time span of a century, much of this intricacy is beyond the scope of my research: to 
problematise the boundaries of science culture-popular culture, and human-animal, 
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are considered to be challenge enough. For that reason a heuristic conception of 
popular culture is operated here, that strips away those nodes deemed extraneous. 
It must be kept in mind however that the fuzzy, multi-level relationship found here 
between popular and science cultures is not unique, and that a profusion of cultures 
 W overlooked here  W share such a tangled border with each other, and those singled 
out here. 
 
2.1 Secondary Sources 
ƐƚŚĞƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĨŽĐƵƐǁĂƐŽŶŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĐůĂŝŵƐŵĂĚĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƌĞĂůŵ ?ĂŶĚ
their relationship to those made within science, it was not felt that interviews with 
stakeholders (i.e. scientists and journalists) would be necessary: their relevant views 
would, by definition, be available publicly in the form of texts. This approach also 
meant that more time could be devoted to textual gathering and analysis. There 
were exceptional cases where information was required that was not available to the 
public however. In chapter seven, as the remit of the thesis developed, it became 
ďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐŵĞĂŶƚďǇƚŚĞůĂďĞů ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?/ƚ
became apparent that this was a somewhat grey area, as despite their usage of it the 
term remained a nonscientific one. To clarify the issue I contacted several prominent 
scientists by email for their views. Given the small role this question plays in the 
thesis as a whole, full interviews would have been an extravagance. 
That said, several unplanned-for sources did materialise over the course of 
the research, and it was felt that it would be far more rewarding to take a pragmatic, 
opportunistic approach to such materials, rather than disregard them on the grounds 
that they did not fall within the original remit. An example of such material was the 
Nature press release announcing the Flores discovery. This was a serendipitous 
addition to the data set, received  W unrequested  W from Nature during an email 
correspondence regarding minor details of the press conference that announced the 
discovery. Once received however it was of use in charting the flow of information 
from the original intraspecialist publications on the find to the mainstream news 
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media. Another useful sourĐĞƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞDŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇŽĨ
> ?  ?DŽƌǁŽŽĚ  ?ǀĂŶKŽƐƚĞƌǌĞĞ  ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚ'ƌĞŐŽƌǇ&ŽƌƚŚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
accounts of reactions on Flores to the discovery. This final source was particularly 
helpful as it helped span a gap in the data, namely local accounts of the Flores 
discovery. If at all possible it would have been beneficial to analyse Indonesia media 
ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ĐůĞĂƌĞƌ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ
out. However as much of this coverage would have been Indonesian, or possibly 
even local dialects, such an element of the research was simply unviable in terms of 
translation costs. 
  
3. Data Gathering 
3.1 Piltdown 
The limited extent of digitised, searchable databases for the period in question 
created problems researching Piltdown that were not applicable to Flores. First it 
was necessary to gather intra- and inter-specialist science journal coverage. Nature ?Ɛ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ǁĂƐ ŽďƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ĨƌŽŵ tĞď ŽĨ ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞ
(apps.isiknowledge.com). Further sources were obtained from secondary literature, 
such as published literature concerned with the fraudulent nature of Piltdown (e.g. 
Spencer 1990, Weiner 1980), and through a citation search of the Nature material. In 
total 33 articles were recovered, dating between 1913 and 1922 (though all but one 
ǁĞƌĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ? ? ? ) ?tŚŝůƐƚĞǀĞƌǇĞĨĨŽƌƚǁĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĂůů ‘ĐŽƌĞ ?
articles were included, by which I mean all relevant material produced by discoverers 
Dawson & Woodward, rival scientist Keith, and the most prominent critics from the 
debate, it is possible that some material was missed due to the limited nature of 
applicable search tools. However, I am confident that the search was comprehensive 
enough to be considered representative. 
For mainstream UK media coverage, it was first necessary to identify periods 
ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚWŝůƚĚŽǁŶǁĂƐ  “ŶĞǁƐǁŽƌƚŚǇ ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚǀŝĂĂ ƐĞĂƌĐŚŽĨ ƚŚĞ Times 
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ŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐĚŝŐŝƚĂůĂƌĐŚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?dŚĞ
Times was, at the time of analysis
7
, the only UK national paper to have a digitally 
indexed archive of the period in question. From these sources two periods of heavy 
coverage were identified, the first being the six weeks between the leaking of the 
discovery in mid-November 1912 up to the end of that year, including the official 
announcement on December 18
th
, the second being August-September 1913, during 
which time Piltdown featured prominently at two scientific conferences. Copies of 
the Manchester Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mirror, Daily Express and Illustrated 
London News were then searched by hand at the British Library, Colindale, for 
coverage of the Piltdown find during these dates, and added to the Times material. 
These papers were chosen to represent both ends of the market: what would today 
ďĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ ‘ďƌŽĂĚƐŚĞĞƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚĂďůŽŝĚ ? ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞManchester Guardian was 
a regional paper at this time, it was chosen for inclusion because it broke the 
Piltdown story originally.  
 
Coverage by the respective newspapers, and their circulation figures, is shown 
below- 
Number of articles/letters on Piltdown (Nov-Dec 1912 & Aug-Sept 1913) 
Daily Express   8 
Daily Telegraph  2 
Daily Mirror   0 
Illustrated London News 10 
Manchester Guardian  9 
                                                     
7
 The Guardian now has a digitally indexed archive, but this only became available in Oct 2007, a year 
after the research took place. 
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Times    12 
 
Circulation Figures 1910 
Daily Express   400,000 
Daily Telegraph  230,000 
Daily Mirror   630,000 
Illustrated London News 200,000* 
Manchester Guardian  40,000 
Times    45,000 
 
Taken from Butler (1975) British Political Facts 1900-1975, R&R Clark Ltd. 
* Estimate by The Illustrated London News Picture Library. 
 
The Mirror was the only newspaper to be published in a tabloid format at this time, 
although the Express took a similar approach to content (Bromley 1997). The Mirror 
boasted the widest circulation figures of any paper during the period of study, but 
Piltdown did not feature at all in the time frames identified. As a result, the Mirror 
played no further part in the analysis. 
 
3.2 Flores 
The comprehensive search facilities readily available today made the task of 
recovering material on Homo floresiensis a far easier, time-efficient task compared 
to the Piltdown case. This was particularly the case in respect to newspaper 
coverage, which was gathered using a LexisNexis search (lexisnexis.com) for the 
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ƚĞƌŵƐ  ‘,ŽŵŽ ĨůŽƌĞƐŝĞŶƐŝƐ ? ?  ‘&ůŽƌĞƐ ŚŽďďŝƚ ? ?  ‘&ůŽƌĞƐ ŝƐůĂŶĚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘,ƵŵĂŶ ŚŽďďŝƚ ? ? Ɛ
before, newspapers were selected that would reflect both the broadsheet and 
tabloid sections of the UK market. 
 
Number of articles/letters on Flores discovery (Oct 2004  ? Jan 2007) 
Daily Express   3 
Daily Mail   7 
Daily Mirror   2 
Daily Telegraph  8 
Guardian   19 
Times    11 
Sun    3 
Readership* Figures (2007) 
Daily Express   1,678,000 
Daily Mail   5,409,000 
Daily Mirror   3,773,000 
Daily Telegraph  2,107,000 
Guardian   1,114,000 
Times    1,627,000 
Sun    8,051,000 
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* Readership refers to the number of people reading a title on an average day over the 
stated time period. Source: National Readership Survey (www.nrs.co.uk). 
 
 Intraspecialist material was sourced through a Web of Knowledge search, 
ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘,ŽŵŽ ĨůŽƌĞƐŝĞŶƐŝƐ ? ? /Ŷ ƚŽƚĂů  ? ?ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?
the interspecialist magazines New Scientist and Scientific American, in addition to the 
interspecialist material in hybrids Nature and Science, were searched individually 
using their own databases. From this 42 articles were gathered. The much greater 
volume of material sourced for the Flores case study comparative to the Piltdown 
one in part reflects the greater ease of finding them, but it also reflects the much 
greater volume of material actually produced by publications in the more recent 
time frame. It was then necessary to expand the data set if it was to remain 
representative. 
 
4. Data Analysis 
4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
The data analysis of the thesis was underpinned by critical discourse analysis. 
The key tenet of CDA is not a particular technique of examination, but rather a 
demand that we view the data to be analysed as inseparable from the social 
structures, and their associated cultures, within with it exists. We must then consider 
ďŽƚŚ ŝĨǁĞĂƌĞƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĞŝƚŚĞƌ ? /ŶƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝƚĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ  ‘ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-
ǁŽƌŬ ? ?'ŝĞƌǇŶ ? ? ? ? )ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨŽĐƵƐĞƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶ
ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂƐƚŚĞƐŝƚĞĂƚǁŚŝĐŚƐŽĐŝŽ-cultural boundary drawing takes place. 
It was not a concern of the thesis to provide a guide to CDA techniques, and 
so its influences on the thesis go unheralded. Like the proverbial Victorian child, I 
was happy for it to be see but not heard. For this reason, it is all the more important 
here to set out clearly what remains in the background elsewhere, namely, the ideas 
underpinning CDA, and how it framed the research. 
47 
 
dŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚďǇĂĚŝǀĞƌƐĞďŽĚǇŽĨůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?ďƵƚŚĞƌĞŝƚ
will be primarily be based upon the methods advocated by Fairclough (2003). 
Following this method, the discourses (being forms of ontological representation 
which shape what ever social objects they discuss) within the texts studied are read 
as being in a dialectical relationship with the cultures in which they exist, that is to 
say they are mutually constitutive of one another. At the heart of the CDA approach 
lies a neo-Marxist informed interest in power relations, that eschews economic 
determinants in favour of cultural factors in the building, maintenance and 
destruction of networks of power. For that reason texts are a major source of 
interest for critical discourse, as repositories of culture which may be dissected to 
reveal the forces which shaped them. 
 To better understand a CDA approach it is necessary to consider some of its 
general principles and concepts, as identified by Wodak (in Titscher et al 2000:146)-  
x The focus of CDA is not linguistics per se, but rather with the linguistic nature of 
social and culturĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? /Ŷ ĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂƐ ŽŶ
praxis, CDA is politically involved and concerned with social issues, and their 
constitution within power relations.  
x  ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚĞǆƚ ?  ‘dĞǆƚ ? ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ Ă ďŽĚǇ ŽĨ ǁƌŝƚƚĞn 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? Žƌ Ă ƚƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǀĞƌďĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚĞƌĂƐ  ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ĐŽǀĞƌƐ Ă
ŵƵĐŚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĂƌĞĂ ? ‘/ƐŚĂůůƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵdiscourse to refer to the whole process of 
ƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƚĞǆƚŝƐũƵƐƚĂƉĂƌƚ ? ?&ĂŝƌĐůŽƵŐŚŝŶibid. p147).  
x As all discourse is embedded within specific cultural, historical, ideological and 
intertexual frameworks, context is crucial to the understanding of any given 
example of it. For example, to determine whether a text is ideological it is 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
requires the analyst to look beyond just the text itself to the relations that 
constitute it (Wodak in ibid. p146). 
x The relationship between discourse and society and culture is understood to be a 
dialectic one; they are mutually constitutive of one another. All examples of 
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language either reproduce or challenge society and culture. Language then is 
never neutral, but rather is understood as a form of social practice which may be 
used to achieve actions at the societal (in addition to the interpersonal) level. 
This is not merely a mechanistic cause-and-effect however; the influence of any 
instance of language depends upon the context in which the language occurs. To 
understand this dialectic relationship, CDA seeks to use an interdisciplinary 
approach, combining social theories with textual analysis. 
 
'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ ƵƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨhegemony, which details the subtle interplays of 
power in which the superstructure became contested terrain between the different 
sociĂůĐůĂƐƐĞƐ ?ŝƐĂŬĞǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĂŶƚƚŽ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁĂƐ
that rather than rule purely through physical domination, the ruling classes utilise 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?  ?'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ŝŶ ^ǁŝŶŐĞǁŽŽĚ  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ŽǀĞƌ
subordinate groƵƉƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĂƚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŝƚŚ ‘ƚŚĞ
ƐƉŝƌŝƚ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ĐƵƐƚŽŵƐ ? ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?  ?^ǁŝŶŐĞǁŽŽĚ
2000:118). This saturation is achieved through the dissemination of the ruling 
ŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐh discourse.  
'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĚƌĂǁƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
discourse, and the role these discourses play in shaping our conceptions of the 
world, at both an individual and societal level. Rather than being a source of purely 
objective knowledge, science is seen to be a institution with its own discursive 
practices, and which uses its position in contemporary Western societies as a 
privileged knowledge provider to disseminate its ideologies. Of equal importance is 
the social influences that shape scientific discourse  W it is the mediation of power 
through a two-way relationship that CDA seeks to understand. In this respect, CDA 
suits an investigation of boundary-ǁŽƌŬ ǁĞůů ? ĂƐ ŝƚƐ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?
drawing of boundaries in their discourse encourages a focus on the power interests 
of those agents, and the manner in which they gain, and utilise, authority to support 
their boundaries. 
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/ŶŝƚƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐƐƵĞ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶďǇŝƐƚŚĞ
power of scientific discourse - as a privileged knowledge provider - in the shaping of 
ĚĞďĂƚĞƐĐĞŶƚƌŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-image, as determined in this instance by the 
reconstruction of our evolutionary ancestors. Much, if not all, of this power is based 
upŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŽďĞĂďůĞƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?
The thesis will challenge these claims by pointing out the myriad of interconnections 
between scientific and popular ideas regarding our ancestors. The aim is not as much 
to ĚĞŶŝŐƌĂƚĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚŝƐƐƚŽƌǇĂƐŝƚŝƐƚŽĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ?
The empirical data produced by science is fundamental to the project of learning 
more about our evolutionary past, yet the knowledge produced inevitably 
incorporates ideas that have not been evidenced, and ideas that cannot be evidence. 
These ideas are those of the wider culture in which scientists operate, as missing link 
stories are fundamentally stories about ourselves as much as our predecessors. It is 
worthwhile tŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚŝƐďŽƚŚƚŽŐŝǀĞ  ‘ŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌ ?ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĞŝƌĚƵĞ ?
and also to recognise the limits of science, lest its authority be wielded in the 
ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐůŝŬĞtĂƐŚďƵƌŶ ?ƐDŝŐŚƚǇ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? 
 ?ƐĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚŝĐŬĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?'ĞĞƌƚǌ ? ? ?3) of texts extends to a self-
ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝƚĚŽǀĞƚĂŝůƐƐŶƵŐůǇ
with the reflexivity clause of the strong programme (Bloor 1976). CDA is open in its 
use of a priori theorising to link a text with wider social elements, and openly 
acknowledges the role of its own ideology in its analysis. The binding textual analysis 
ǁŝƚŚ ǁŝĚĞƌ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ŚĂƐ ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ tŝĚĚŽǁƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
accusation that it is ideological interpretation rather than analysis (in Titscher et al. 
 ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? tŝĚĚŽǁƐŽŶĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚĞǆƚƐ ŝƐďŝĂƐĞĚ ĨŝƌƐƚůǇ ŝŶ
the manner in which it selects texts to support its chosen interpretation and 
secondly on the basis of a chosen ideological commitment which is evident from the 
outset. Fairclough attempts to defend against these accusations with a critical-realist 
inspired argument. Against the former accusation he points out that all textual 
analysis is inevitably selective in choosing what to study, and what questions to ask 
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of it. In response to the latter he acknowledges the role of an ideology in driving 
CDA: 
 
the belief that texts have a social, political, cognitive, moral and material 
consequences and effects, and that it is vital to understand these 
consequences and effects if we are to raise moral and political questions 
about contemporary societies (Fairclough 2003:14), 
 
but argues that any analysis of text is shaped by the subjectivity of the analyst, who 
is inevitably part of the context in which the text is interpreted. Given this, CDA only 
differs from other methods in that it is open and reflexive about its ideological 
commitments. It should also be noted that CDA does not claim to generate 
exhaustive knowledge of its subject; in recognition of the important role of context 
in CDA, no analysis can ever be considered definitive or complete because the 
context is dynamic and historically constituted, and thus open to change.  
Along the line of attack taken by Widdonwson, Schgeloff (1997) argues that 
due to its prior theorising, CDA can only find out what it already knows. Because of 
this potential weakness it is all the more vital to support CDA claims with appropriate 
ĚĂƚĂ ? Ɛ Ă ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ŐƵĂƌĚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚŝƐ ? ƚŚĞ  “ƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇ ? ĐůĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌŽŶŐ
programme is a useful bulwark. This holds that all knowledge claims, regardless of 
their success or failure, should be analysed by the same criteria. Treating claims in 
this way avoids evaluating them by criteria which were not available to 
contemporary agents e.g. theiƌ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐ  ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?Žƌ  ‘ĨĂůƐĞ ? ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐŵĂŶŶĞƌ ƚŚĞ
analyst might avoid critique-by-hindsight, that is to say agents should be judged by 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?ŶŽƚďǇƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? 
As CDA recognises the unavoidable presence of its ĂŶĂůǇƐƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ
representation in any analysis, and the role of agency in the actions and 
interpretations of others, it does not claim to ever generate a single, comprehensive 
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ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ĂŶǇ ƚĞǆƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ? 'ŝůďĞƌƚ  ? DƵůŬĂǇ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ-driven 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ƌĞũĞĐƚƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŐŽĂů ŽĨ
ƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ Ă ƐŝŶŐůĞ ? ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ŝŶ ĨĂǀŽƵƌ ŽĨ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
multiple perspectives of the scientists themselves. This standpoint acknowledges the 
problem of representation that Woolgar (1988) identified in his SSK work  W namely 
that any sociological critique of scientific representation is inherently flawed if it fails 
to recognise the role of its own representation in its critique of science.  
In recognition ŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŽǁŶǁŽƌŬŚĞƌĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂů ?
Through the manipulation of selection criteria I am able to construct an argument 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƉƌŽƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ‘ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ? ) ?ĂŶĚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?
 ‘^d^ ? ) ǁŝƚŚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŽchallenge it. None of these characters has a cohesive physical 
reality detectable to the human senses, and yet by classifying them by their shared 
agents, structures, knowledge claims etcetera, a single body can be identified. The 
strength of classification is also its weakness however; it relies upon a simplification 
of reality. To attempt a work such as this, without recourse to definitive bodies like 
 ‘ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ƌĞůǇŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽŶĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĞŽĨĂƚŽŵŝǌĞĚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞ
an exercise in disasteƌ ? KŶůǇ ďǇ  ‘ůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĨŝůƚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǀŝƐŝďůĞ ? ĐĂŶ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ďĞ
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝŶƚŽůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ?&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?Ĩ ƌĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞĂŶ
aid to knowledge rather than a hindrance, two flaws must be borne in mind. The first 
of these is recognizing that, as a necessary simplification, classification is a process of 
ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŶŽƚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ  ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨ ŝƚƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ ŝƐ
ƐƵŝƚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ ƌĞƐŝĚƵĞƐ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ŝƚ ŝƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ  ‘dƌƵƚŚ ? ? dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ
flaw relates to the power dynamic which Bauman (1991) identified, namely that the 
classification of a group inevitably requires a judgment on the part of the classifier as 
ƚŽǁŚĂƚĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂƚŽƵƚŝůŝǌĞ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇƌĞƐŝĚĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ
human mind, and hence is liable to be shaped as much by it as by the external world. 
For my analysis here this second flaw is less problematic than the first, as 
ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ůŝŬĞ  ‘ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ĂƌĞƉƌŽŶĞƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ
classifying, themselves in a manner which the natural world does not (though 
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arguably there are exceptions in palaeoanthropological classifications, for example 
 ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ? ) ? ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ĂƌĞ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ
ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ?  ?^ĐŚƵƚǌ  ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? ďĞŝŶŐthose already identified by other actors. Of course 
even utilizing the self-classified identity of a body at the meta-level of 
 ‘ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘^d^ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞŵŽǀĞƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ĂƐ
they are still required to select from these vast bodies the particular elements that 
allow them to develop their argument. For the palaeoanthropologist and the social 
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚĂůŝŬĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇŝŶŐĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝůƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƌĞĂůŝƚǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ
preclude the production of valuable, useful, knowledge however. After-all 
classification is ever present in human behaviour and allows us to operate 
successfully in our everyday life-worlds; 
 
dŽĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇŝƐŚƵŵĂŶ QtĞĂůůƐƉĞŶĚůĂƌŐĞƉĂƌƚƐŽĨŽƵƌĚĂǇƐĚŽŝŶŐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
work, often tacitly, and we make up and use a range of ad hoc classifications 
to do so. We sort dirty dishes from clean, white laundry from colourfast, 
important email to be answered from e-junk. (Bowker & Star 2000 pp.1-2). 
 
Classification should take its cues from its subject; as long as distinguishing 
criteria are anchored in the reality of the subject then the knowledge produced 
should be a useful reflection of it, whilst not being comprehensive. It must always be 
kept in mind however that, like all human knowledge, what is produced from 
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐŚĂĚŽǁƐ ŽŶ WůĂƚŽ ?Ɛ ĐĂǀĞ ǁĂůů ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ƉĞƌ ƐĞ ? dŚĞ
danger arises when we fail to acknowledge the work of classification in producing 
these shadows. Classification works like a fairground mirror, expanding some 
elements of reality whilst collapsing others. This can allow us a clear view of the 
specific elements we are interested in, but it must always be kept in mind, and 
acknowledged, that what is produced is a human distortion; 
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Each standard and each category valorizes some point of view and silences 
another. This is not inherently a bad thing  W indeed it is inescapable. But it is 
an ethical choice, and as such it is dangerous  W not bad, but dangerous (ibid 
p5). 
 
Beyond this reflexivity, in the work that follows I attempt a more holistic 
recognition of my own role throughout the text, by the overt deployment of 
metaphors to elucidate the claims made. Metaphors are powerful tools for sharing 
meaning, yet they also, in their particular idiosyncratic reimaginings, inevitably 
reveal the fingerprints of the author. By flagging up here, and in the concluding 
ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚ ?/ĂŝŵƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶǁŚĂƚŝƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ? 
The acknowledgement of potentially diverse perspectives might seem to risk 
any hope of a productive account in favour of a chaotic one. However, recognition of 
the possibility of multiple perspectives does not exclude the possibility of coherent 
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ?  ‘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ǁĞ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵƵůƚŝƉůŝĐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ǀŽŝĐĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ
which scientists and other social actors speak makes traditional sociological 
objectives unattainable, we held fast to the assumption that interpretative 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĚŝƐĐĞƌŶĞĚ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ďĂďďůĞ ŽĨ ƚŽŶŐƵĞƐ ?  ?'ŝůďĞƌƚ  ? DƵůŬĂǇ
 ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƐĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĂ  ƚŚŝƐ ǁŽƌŬ ƐŚĂůů ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ
identify. 
 
4.2 Applying CDA 
It should be clear from the discussion above that CDA is less a method of data 
analysis, than an epistemological framing of it. The research required an analysis of 
the discursive practices evident within the texts identified. This cannot be 
accomplished purely through a consideration of the text of the primary data 
however; the complex dialectic which exists between any text and the world in 
which it is embedded requires an analysis of the context in which the papers exist. 
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Fairclough refers to the way in which discourses are created, mutated and absorbed 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ĂƐ  ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? (2003:10). The operationalisation of 
CDA relies on identifying the ways in which texts achieve meaning-making. 
 The analysis then involved first a literature review to provide the theoretical 
framework. A first reading was conducted of a sample of texts, in which prominent 
discourses were identified. The whole corpus was then coded within the Nvivo 
programme. Considering the data produced in light of the theoretical framework 
allowed me to connect these discourses with the wider contexts required by CDA. 
From the coding the specific threads which would form the data chapters were 
identified. 
 
5. Ethics 
As the source data for the project was be taken almost entirely from textual material 
already in the public domain there were few ethics issues to navigate. Where 
personal communications were quoted from the respondents were asked for their 
permission to reproduce their comments. The only other ethical responsibilities 
involved in the project were for myself, as author, to accurately report and reference 
any materials used. 
There is a considerable moral dimensions to the human-animal boundary 
however, and so in the concluding chapter I shall consider the ethics of undermining 
the boundaries I have set out to critique. 
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Chapter 4: Piltdown Man: Boundary-Working the Human-Animal 
Binary 
 
1. Introduction 
Piltdown Man today has the dubious honour of being perhaps the most notorious 
scientific hoax of all time. Announced in 1912 by a team led by prominent British 
scientist A.S. Woodward and amateur geologist/archaeologist Charles Dawson, the 
fossilised figure  W apparently a creature on the cusp of humanity, with a large 
human-like skull and an ape-like jaw  W ǁĂƐ ŚĞƌĂůĚĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚ ŶŐůŝƐŚŵĂŶ ?
(Woodward 1948), and received huge scientific and popular interest. However, 
further discoveries during the 1920s and 1930s, notably Australopithecus in Africa 
ĂŶĚ ‘WĞŬŝŶŐDĂŶ ?ŝŶƐŝĂ ?ŵĂĚĞWŝůƚĚŽǁŶĂƉƉĞĂƌĂƐĂŶĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĂŶŽŵĂůǇ ? 
These other discoveries showed that in the human lineage the large ape jaw 
had shrunk before the skull had enlarged  W the opposite of the development that 
Piltdown exhibited. This contradiction was not solved until 1953, when a team of 
scientists reappraising the discovery began to suspect foul play, and sent the remains 
for analysis. Tests showed that Piltdown Man was actually no more than a modern 
human skull and a modern orangutan jaw, the bones having been stained to give the 
appearance of age, and the teeth filed to appear more human.  
 In the years since numerous names have been put forward regarding the 
identity of the hoaxer(s) (see, for example, Wiener 1980, Blinderman 1986, Russell 
2003), but for social scientists the case raises many other questions besides. Like all 
 ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ?WŝůƚĚŽǁŶDĂŶŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝŶĂůǌŽŶĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚƵŵĂŶĂŶĚ
nonhuman animal, by definition neither clearly one nor the other. In a similar (but 
ŵŽƌĞůŝƚĞƌĂů )ǁĂǇƚŽĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉƌŝŵĂƚĞƐ ?ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬƐŽĐĐƵƉǇ ‘ƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌǌŽŶĞƐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚŽƐĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŵǇƚŚŝĐƉŽůĞƐ ?  ?,ĂƌĂǁĂǇ  ? ? ? ? P ? )ŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?^ƵĐŚ
figures refuse to comply with the common binary configuration with which Western 
civilisation has conceptualised the human-animal divide. Within this Judeo-Christian 
inspired system of thought human and animal are mutually exclusive absolutes: the 
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latter as distinct from the former as the former is from God (ThomaƐ ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ
theory of evolution, introduced in the seminal On The Origin of Species (1859), 
theoretically destroyed the notion that human and animal were entirely discrete 
entities. Yet almost 150 years later such divisions are still implicit in our culture; in 
ŽƵƌƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ? ŝŶŽƵƌǀĞƌǇ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĂŶŝŵĂů ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ
precludes humans. 
 tŚĞƌĞ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŵĞĞƚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ǁĞ
can find overlaps, non-fits, lines criss-crossing. The case of Piltdown Man places this 
murky boundary zone under a microscope, a moment in time when an individual 
animal appeared to span the boundary: its jaw on one side, its skull on the other. As 
such Piltdown presented a monumental challenge to traditional binary conceptions. 
The efforts of scientists and journalists to respond to this challenge, evidenced in 
contemporary interspecialist, intraspecialist, and news media coverage, forms the 
subject of this chapter.  
dŚĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞWŝůƚĚŽǁŶĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƌelation to the human W
animal boundary became subsumed within nationalist and racial discourses that 
drove its interpretation. British coverage of the discovery was unhesitating in 
ĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ďƵƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ŶŽt its 
physical remains, that decided this. Meanwhile, so-called modern-ĚĂǇ ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ?ǁĞƌĞ
invoked in the effort to invest in Piltdown humanity, bringing the figure closer to us, 
whilst Piltdown was simultaneously used to move them further away. In such data 
we catch sight of prototypic classifications of the creature being shoehorned into 
Aristotelian classifications. Extant primates also suffered in this process, being 
denied humanness even whilst Piltdown was awarded equivalent scientific 
categorisation. Unsurprisingly, during this whole process the human Wanimal binary 
became mobilized as something more complex than a simple dichotomy, but only in 
an implicit manner that ultimately left the binary picture intact. In chapter five I will 
discuss why Piltdown ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐƚŽŽŬƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨŽƌŵƚŚĂƚŝƚĚŝĚ ?ďƵƚŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ
focus is on how Piltdown became human in the first place. 
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2. The Piltdown Discovery 
Piltdown Man was announced to the world in 1912 by a team of scientists led by the 
distinguished Arthur Smith Woodward, who was at the time campaigning to become 
Director of the British Museum of Natural History, and Charles Dawson, an amateur 
geologist/archaeologist. It was Dawson who had brought Piltdown to the attention 
of the scientific community, when he was handed two skull fragments by workers 
who were digging at the site in 1908. Dawson continued to investigate and in 1912 
formed a digging team with the aid of two colleagues, Woodward and de Chardin
8
. 
The molar tooth of a prehistoric elephant species was the first notable find, soon 
followed by more hominan skull fragments and a lower jaw bone. These bones were 
to become Piltdown Man, announced to huge scientific and popular interest in 
December of that year. The find was sensational, essentially an anatomically modern 
human skull  W though unusually thick  W with an ape-like jaw. It appeared to be the 
missing link rendered physical. Crucially, the jaw had broken off at its joint, so it was 
impossible to confirm how it connected with this atypical skull. For some at the time, 
primarily foreign scientists, the juxtaposition between the two forms was such that 
they were convinced that the find was the result of two different skeletons buried 
within the same strata becoming accidentally mixed up with one another  W the 
 “ĚƵĂůŝƐƚ ? ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ DĂŶ ǁĂƐ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƚŚĞ
mistaken joining of two never-before-seen species - the skull of an archaic human 
and the jaw of an archaic ape (e.g. Miller 1915). The British palaeoanthropological 
community and media had fewer doubts however, and here the debate hinged on 
ƚǁŽ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ŵŽŶŝƐƚ ? ǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚ ? dŚĞƐĞ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ
interpretations came from the Dawson W oodward (1913) team on one side, and 
                                                     
8
 Teilhard de Chardin was a French Jesuit priest and philosopher, as well as a palaeoanthropologist. 
Given that he did not author any work within the parameters of this study however, his own take on 
the find is unknown. 
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Prof. Arthur Keith
9
 (1914), anatomist, palaeontologist and keeper of the Hunterian 
collection at the Royal College of Surgeons, on the other. The discrepancy between 
British and European/American interpretations is something I shall return to in 
Section 6. 
 From the fragments of skull collected, Woodward constructed an individual 
with a brain capacity of 1070 c.c., roughly halfway between that of modern apes and 
humans. Due to this small skull and the large jawbone, his figure had a backwards-
sloping forehead and a pronounced muzzle: a distinctly apish appearance. The 
Dawson-Woodward team declared their figure to be a member of a species they 
labeled Eoanthropus dawsoni
10 ?dŚĞŝƌĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĞƐŶĂŵĞǁĂƐŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶŚŽŶŽƵƌ
ŽĨ ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞƌ ?ĂǁƐŽŶ ?  “ŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉƵƐ ? ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇŵĞĂŶƐ  ‘ĚĂǁŶ-ŵĂŶ ? ?ĂŶĚtook its 
ĐƵĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƐŬƵůůƐŝǌĞ ?dŚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚWŝůƚĚŽǁŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶ
genus Homo ? <ĞŝƚŚ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ ŝŶ Ă ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ĐƌĂŶŝĂů
capacity of 1500 c.c., slightly larger than the average amongst modern humans, and 
with an appearance similar to our own. Keith labeled his creation Homo 
piltdownensis, in recognition of its modern characteristics. 
 
3. Boundary man 
Piltdown Man was a chimera in a very literal sense; a figure born of the artificial 
conjoining of fragments of a modern human skull with the right side of a modern 
ŽƌĂŶŐƵƚĂŶ ?ƐũĂǁ ?dŽŽďƐĐƵƌĞƚŚĞďůƵŶƚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŚŽĂǆĞƌƉůĂĐĞĚƚǁŽ
heavily filed human molars in the jaw. As such Piltdown straddled the human-animal 
boundary in a manner that refused to comply with binary discourses. In case one is 
                                                     
9
 Both Keith and Woodward were later Knighted, but as this occurred after the events detailed here 
they will be referred to by their contemporary titles. 
10
 Under taxonomical naming conventions, the capitalized first word designates the genus, and the 
lower case second word the particular species within that genus. 
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tempted, in retrospect, to dismiss such a challenge as being merely the result of an 
artificial construction, a hoax, it is worth remembering that the existence of archaic 
figures that were neither obviously human nor nonhuman is unquestioned within 
evolutionary theory. At the turn of the twentieth century it was hypothesized that, in 
human ancestors, the brain had expanded before the jaw began to shrink
11
, 
something that the Piltdown hoaxer took heed of. The genuine discoveries that 
followed Piltdown showed that the reverse was in fact true, which is why Piltdown 
had become such an anomaly by the time it was revealed as a fake in 1953. The 
precise order of the anatomical progression from animal to human form is not 
important to the project of understanding cultural responses to boundary 
challenges, so the fact that Piltdown was a hoax, and an imperfect one, can be 
ignored for the work at hand. Instead, the focus here is directed upon the question 
of how, given what the actors involved knew at the time, did they come to declare 
Piltdown human? 
 WŝůƚĚŽǁŶDĂŶ ?ƐĚĞďƵƚŝŶƚŚĞ'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶŽŶƚŚĞ ? ?ƚŚEŽǀ ? ? ? ?ŐĂǀĞŽŶůǇƐŵĂůů
hints of the challenges this was to bring to the media. It appeared under the heading 
 “dŚĞ ĂƌůŝĞƐƚDĂŶ ? ? ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŵĂƌŬ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŽďĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƋƵĞƌǇŝŶŐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐƚŚĞĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝƚƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂ
ŚƵŵĂŶ ?/ƚƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƚĞůůƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇŽĨĂ “ŚƵŵĂŶƐŬƵůů ? ? “ďǇĨĂƌƚŚĞĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚƚƌĂĐĞ
of manŬŝŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ ǇĞƚ ďĞĞŶ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ? /ƚ ŐŽĞƐ ŽŶƚŽ ƐƚĂƚĞ  “dŚĞ ƐŬƵůů
resembles the Neanderthal specimen, but belongs to a much lower and more 
ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞ ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ ŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ? ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞƐĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ŶŽ ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚŝĞƐ ? ŚĞ ǁĂƐ “ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞ ? ? ďƵƚ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ
human. In the second half of the article some confusion appears though; 
                                                     
11
 Prof. GE Smith, who wrote an appendix to the Dawson-Woodward paper announcing Piltdown, 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐ “dŚĞĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐŝŵŝĂŶũĂǁǁŝƚŚĂŚƵŵĂŶďƌĂŝŶŝƐŶŽƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ
ƚŽ ĂŶǇŽŶĞ ĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵĂŶ Q dŚĞ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďƌĂŝŶ
preceded the refinement of the features of the somatic characterƐŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ? ?^ŵŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
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ƐŝŶĐĞ ĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŐĂŝŶĞĚ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚ ŚĂƐ ďĞŶ ĨĞůƚ ĨŽƌ
ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĂƉĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞůŽǁĞƐƚ men. 
The gulf between the two has not yet been bridged though we must wait for 
the judgment of the experts to know how much it has been narrowed by the 
discovery in Sussex. (19.11.12:8). 
dŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ďƌŝĚŐŝŶŐ ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ ĨŽƌ  ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ ? ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƵŶĐŽmmon. Talk of 
 “ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĂƉĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ůŽǁĞƐƚŵĞŶ ?ŐŝǀĞƐƚŚŝƐďƌŝĚŐĞĂǀĞƌƚŝĐĂů ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂů ?
ƉůĂŶĞ ?ŵƵĐŚ ůŝŬĞĂ  ‘>ĂŵĂƌĐŬŝĂŶ ůĂĚĚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐǀĞƌƚŝĐĂůďƌŝĚŐĞ
plays on a biblical conception of human-animal relations that sees humans as figures 
halfway between animals and God in a hierarchy of greatness, and as clearly 
delineated from the former as from the latter. It is this traditional binary 
understanding that the chimeric Piltdown causes such great problems for. In the 
ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ?s specific use here, the effect achieved is a semantic slight-of-hand. The 
first half of this quote seems to suggest that Piltdown Man is a link between the 
 “ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚ ĂƉĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  “ůŽǁĞƐƚ ŵĞŶ ? ? Ă ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚ ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽ ƉƌĞĐůƵĚĞ Śŝŵ ĨƌŽŵ
either one and hence ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ĐůĂŝŵ Śŝŵ ĂƐ ŚƵŵĂŶ ?
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ ůŝŶĞ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽWŝůƚĚŽǁŶŶĂƌƌŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŐƵůĨĐŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĂĚ
as meaning that this is a figure that exists on the shore of the human landmass, and 
that extends it backwards inƚŽƚŚĞ “ŐƵůĨ ? ?ƐŽůĞĂǀŝŶŐĂƐŵĂůůĞƌŐĂƉĨŽƌĂŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬ
to span. Hence he might still perhaps be claimed as human. No resolution is offered, 
as the contradictions go unacknowledged. 
 This conceptual confusion is the result of a process we shall see repeatedly in 
our study  W a prototypic classification of a figure displaying contradictory 
characteristics being explicated as an Aristotelian classification. This flags up the key 
question of this chapter: how was such a chimera of the human and the nonhuman 
reconciled with traditional binary understandings of the human-animal boundary? 
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4. The Challenge of a Non-fit 
dŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶDĂŶ ?ƐĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞĂƚƚŚĞ'ĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
Society on the 18
th
 ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ĂǁƐŽŶ  ? tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ƉĂƉĞƌ Ěetailing the 
ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇĂƐƐƵŵĞƐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƐƚĂƌƚ ?ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “KŶƚŚĞŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ
of a Paleolithic Human Skull and Mandible in Flint-ĞĂƌŝŶŐ'ƌĂǀĞů Q ? ?ĂǁƐŽŶŐŝǀĞƐ
little mention of the hominan remains in his section of the paper, but crucially he 
ĚŽĞƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĨŝŶĚŝŶŐďŽƚŚĂŶ “ƵŶƵƐƵĂůůǇƚŚŝĐŬŚƵŵĂŶƉĂƌŝĞƚĂůďŽŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? )ĂŶĚ
 “ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ŚĂůĨ ŽĨ Ă ŚƵŵĂŶ ŵĂŶĚŝďůĞ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ
ƌĞƉĞĂƚƐ ƚŚŝƐ ĐůĂŝŵ ?  “dŚĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ Ă ďƌĂŝŶ-case 
and onĞƌĂŵƵƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĚŝďůĞ ?ǁŝƚŚůŽǁĞƌŵŽůĂƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?KŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨ
the jaw however, he appears to contradict his earlier claim: 
 
The great width of the temporal insertion, the situation of the mylohyoid 
groove behind rather than in line with the ĚĞŶƚĂůĨŽƌĂŵĞŶ QĂƌĞĂůůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌƐ
of the mandible in apes, not in man (p.131).  
 
KĨƚŚĞƚĞĞƚŚ ?ŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ “dŚĞŵŽůĂƌƚĞĞƚŚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĂƌĞŽĨ
the most primitive type, and must be regarded as reminiscent of the apes in their 
narrŽǁŶĞƐƐ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ Ă ĨŝŶĂů ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ? ŽŶ ŚŝƐ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĂǁĂƌĚ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ
membership of an entirely new species; 
 
The brain-case alone, though specifically distinguished from all known human 
crania of equally low brain-capacity, by the characters of its supraorbital 
border, and the upward extension of its temporal muscles, could scarcely be 
removed from the genus Homo; the bone of the mandible so far as 
preserved, however, is so completely distinct from that of Homo in the shape 
of the symphysis and the parallelism of the molar-premolar series on the two 
sides, that the facial parts of the skull almost certainly differed in 
62 
 
fundamental characters from those of any typically human skull. I therefore 
propose that the Piltdown specimen be regarded as the type of a new genus 
of the family Hominidae, to be named Eoanthropus (p.135). 
 
 'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĚƐŝŐŚƚ ? ŵƵĐŚ ŽĨ ĂǁƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ tŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ƉĂƉĞƌ ŝƐ
unsurprising: Piltdown had a skull that appeared very similar to modern Homo 
sapiens except for its size (accordŝŶŐƚŽtŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ )ĂŶĚĂĨĞǁŵŝŶŽƌ
details, and a jaw that appeared very similar to that of an ape, except the teeth, 
which in many respects were like those of modern Homo sapiens. Despite showing 
an awareness of these contradictions however, both authors label Piltdown as 
human. Even the features which appear ape-like become human once they are 
placed in the context of the whole being. This is perhaps fitting if humanity is tied to 
a particular taxonomic group, given that Linnaean taxonomy operates at the level of 
the organism, rather than sub-parts of it
12
. As I detail in Chapter 6 however, despite 
ŝƚƐ ƵƐĂŐĞ ďǇ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ŝƐ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚĞůǇ Ă ŶŽŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ǁŝƚŚ ŶŽ ĐůĞĂƌ
linkage to taxonomy. Here too, I show that human and Homo were by no means tied 
together (see below).  
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂǁƐŽŶ ?tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƌĂŝƐĞƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚǇ
the being as a whole becomes human rather than ape - or something else entirely - 
when its constituent parts are so conflicting. Is it that greater importance is attached 
to the skull than the jaw - that a species essence resides in the skull that is not 
present in other bones? If so this would mean that, had the Piltdown hoaxer had the 
foresight provided by the later discoveries of Peking man and Australopithecus
13
, and 
                                                     
12
 For a more detailed appraisal of Linnaean taxonomy see Farber (2000). 
13
 Peking man was discovered in China during excavations in the 1920s and was an example of Homo 
erectus. Australopithecus was discovered in 1924 in South Africa. Both showed that the modern 
human jaw evolved before the skull, opposite to the pattern of evolution implied by Piltdown Man. 
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placed a human jaw with an ape skull, then Piltdown would have been labeled an 
ape. Consideration of the scientific and media discourses around this figure suggest 
though that it is unlikely that Piltdown would ever be anything but human. This 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝƐ ŵŝƌƌŽƌĞĚ ŝŶ ŝƌŬĞ  ? DŝĐŚĂĞů ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ
boundary crosser  W xenotransplantation animals. Referencing Douglas (1966), they 
ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ Ă  “ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƉƵƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽŵĂŬĞ ƐƵĐŚ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ŵŽre 
ƉƵďůŝĐůǇ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ ? dŚŝƐ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ƉƵƐŚĞƐ ĐŚŝŵĞƌĂƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ?  ‘ƉƵƌĞ ?
state: 
 
For example, where media reports have described the scientific creation of a 
mouse with a sheep gene, it is described as just that -- a mouse with gene X. Or, 
it may be described as a cross-species mouse. But, when the transgene is a copy 
ŽĨ Ă ŚƵŵĂŶ ŐĞŶĞ ? ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ P /ƚ ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ  ? Q ? /Ĩ
what is transplanted is part-human, then boundaries are not being so blatantly 
transgressed. (p.254). 
 
It is notable that in both Birke & Michael's example and my own, the pure state is 
that of human, reflecting the self-interested position we hold as classifiers. Forcing 
Piltdown to be human denies its uncomfortable transgression of boundaries. I will 
explore this process below, before returning to the question above  W if Piltdown had 
to be pure, why pure human and not pure ape? 
 
4.1 The Popular Reception 
The opening metaphorical broadsides of islands of humanity and gulfs to be 
spanned, launched in the Guardian ?Ɛ EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ƉƌĞĨĂĐĞ ƚŚĞ
conceptual problems that Dawson and Woodward become enmeshed in. The media 
coverage following their official announcement fares no better, and as the debate 
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evolves the construction and attribution of humanity becomes increasing complex, 
and seemingly divorced from simple binary understandings of human and animal. 
 The Guardian ?Ɛ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ƋƵŽƚĞƐ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ĂƐ
ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ  “ƚŚĞ ƐŬƵůů ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ĂƐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ Ă ŚŝƚŚĞƌƚŽ ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ
homo  ?ƐŝĐ ? ĨŽƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ Ă ŶĞǁ ŶĂŵĞ ŝƐ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? ,ĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĂŶ ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ P WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ŝƐ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ “homo ? ĂŶĚ ǇĞƚ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ
ƉůĂĐĞƐ ŝƚ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶƵƐ  “Eoanthropus. ? dŚŝƐ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
published version of the speech, so it may be that Woodward was misquoted, or that 
he made an error which was corrected for the published account. However, in a later 
article, the Guardian ƋƵŽƚĞƐ <ĞŝƚŚ ĂƐ ƐĂǇŝŶŐ  “WŽƐƐŝďůǇ ŚĞ  ?tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ Ă
little too precipitate in sayŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ďĞůŽŶŐƐ ƚŽ Ă ŶĞǁ ŐĞŶƵƐ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?
(20.12.12:16), which suggests that the potential exists for humanity to be detached 
from the genus Homo (see sections 6 & 7).  
 These confusions herald a boundary debate which never materializes. The 
physical manifestation of the human-animal binary within one individual - what we 
know with hindsight to be a human skull with an orangutan jaw, and which was to all 
intents recognised as such at the time - might be expected to prompt a discussion of 
how this character challenged existing dichotomous understandings. One could 
imagine that such a figure would provoke considerable debate, especially arriving at 
a time when such figures were exceedingly rare  W WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇŚĂǀŝŶŐŽŶůǇ
been pre-empted by a handful of figures such as Neanderthal man and Java man. 
Despite the conflicting evidence though, Piltdown begins, and remains throughout 
ƚŚĞ ŵĞĚŝĂ ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇ  ‘ŵĂŶ ? ? ZĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐ Ž ǁĞĂŬĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŝĚ
categories of human and animal, the consensus is to force Piltdown Man to fit 
accepted ideas, even if the results appeared self-contradicting. A typical example of 
such coverage comes from the Illustrated London News (28.12.12:950): 
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the man (part of whose jaw and skull were found) was undoubtedly akin to 
the apes. The lower jaw is unmistakably ape-like, while presenting other 
features indubitably human. 
 
In another example, the Times (11.08.13:3) states  
 
ƚŚĞ ŽůĚĞƐƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ǇĞƚ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƵƌŽƉĞ Q Ă ďĞŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐƉĂƌƚůǇ
ape, partly man.  
 
From the Express (20.12.12:1): 
 
a new race of men, in points strongly resembling the apes, but still 
ƵŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůǇ “ŵĂŶ ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚĚĞǀŽŝĚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨ ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ? 
 
ZĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇ ?ĂƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ  W usually implicitly in labelling the 
discoverǇ “ŵĂŶ ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞTimes quote 
above  W is juxtaposed with a recognition of nonhuman features. As well as the ape 
mandible and the suggested absence of speech, these conflicting features include; 
that the skull ǁĂƐƐŚĂƉĞĚůŝŬĞĂĐŚŝŵƉĂŶǌĞĞ ?Ɛ ?Times 19.12.12:4); that the neck was 
like that of an ape (ibid.); and that it walked like chimp, with a shuffling gait (Express 
23.12.12:1). Clearly, the physical contradictions identified by Dawson and Woodward 
were recognized too by the journalists involved, and yet no one sought to question 
ƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĞƌĞďĞĨŽƌĞƵƐǁĂƐĂ ‘ŵĂŶ ? ?
 
 
66 
 
5. Forcing a Fit 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĂƐŚƵŵĂŶƉƌŽŵƉƚƐ ƚǁŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ?ŽŶǁŚĂƚŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ
ǁĂƐ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ĐŽŶƐtructed?; and why did its human status remain so 
untouchable? In response to the former question, all the evidence concerned had to 
be drawn from the very fragmentary sources that palaeoanthropology deals in. In 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞĂŶĂƚŽŵŝĐĂů  ?ƐŬƵůl fragment and jaw measurements and 
reconstructions), abstractions from anatomical evidence (such as speech capabilities, 
posture), and lithic (both Eolithic and Chellean tools
14
 were discovered at the 
Piltdown site). In consideration of the latter, one Times piece suggests that stone 
tools can only be an effect, not a cause of human status: 
 
ƚŚĞ “ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽůŝƚŚŝĐĨůŝŶƚƐŚĂƐĨŽƌŵĂŶǇǇĞĂƌƐďĞĞŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚ  W one 
of the chief objections to their acceptance having been that they had never 
been found in intimate association with human bones. With this discovery 
that objection finally disappears (25.12.12:8). 
 
The tools then became tools because they were discovered in association with 
human bones, rather than vice versa. As already shown, Dawson and WoodwaƌĚ ?Ɛ
ƉĂƉĞƌůŽĐĂƚĞƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƐŬƵůůĂŶĚƚĞĞƚŚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƐǁĞ
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ŬŶŽǁ ŽĨĨĞƌ ŶŽ ĐůĞĂƌ ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ƚŽ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ĂƐ ŚƵŵĂŶ Žƌ ŶŽƚ ?
Unsurprisingly, the media too focus primarily on the skull, jaw and teeth. However, 
in a reflection of their position within popular culture, free of the constraints of the 
ŵŽƌĞ ĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ƌĞĂůŵ ? ŵĞĚŝĂ ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ĞǆƉĂŶĚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ?
One Illustrated London News piece discusses the possible lifestyle of Piltdown, 
including skills and tool use: 
                                                     
14
 ŽůŝƚŚƐ  ?ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇ  “ĚĂǁŶƐƚŽŶĞ ƚŽŽůƐ ? )ĂƌĞĐƌƵĚĞƐƚŽŶĞ ĨůŝŶƚƐ ? ƐŚĂƌƉĞŶĞĚŽŶŽŶĞƐŝĚĞ ?ŚĞůůĞĂŶ ƚŽŽůƐ
were slightly more developed and worked on both planes to provide a finer edge. 
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He was a man of low stature, very muscular, and had not yet attained that 
graceful poise of the body which is so characteristic of the human race to-
ĚĂǇ ? Ƶƚ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ďǇ ŶŽ ŵĞĂŶƐ ůĂĐŬŝŶŐ ŝŶ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ Q ,Ğ ŚĂĚ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ
inherited the use of fire from his forbears, and this useful ally served to 
harden the ends of his wooden spears and perhaps to cook his food 
(28.12.12:958). 
 
WĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƚŚĞŶ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ƐƚĞŵƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŽŽů ĂŶĚ ĨŝƌĞ ƵƐĞ ? ^ƵĐŚ ƐŬŝůůƐ ǁŽƵůĚ
seem to require language, or at least a developed form of social learning, which is 
one key attribute of humans. There is no sign of consensus on this however. The 
Express titles one article with the following header: 
 
The New Woman
15
 (200,000 Years Ago). She Could Not Cook. She Could Not 
Talk. She Could Not Wash. She Could Not Light A Fire (23.12.12:1). 
 
Here Piltdown is simultaneously claimed as human and stripped of many basic 
human characteristics. The article does go on to assert that Piltdown could use tools 
and clothe itself in animal skin, but here, as with all the coverage both popular and 
scientific, its humanity is not negotiated as an outcome of these skills, but is 
assumed from the start. Nowhere, in any of the literature, does there appear an 
                                                     
15
  “dŚĞEĞǁtŽŵĂŶ ?ŽĨ ƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůǇ ĨĞŵĂůĞŐĞŶĚĞƌŽĨ ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ă
suggestion made by Woodward on account of certain anatomical features of the skull. The other 
papers largely ignore this claim, but the Express makes great play of it. At this time of course the 
Suffragette and Suffragist movements were demanding that women be given the vote, and the 
Express was presumably playing on this theme. See Chapter 5 for further discussion. 
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ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛhuman membership; the anatomical features are 
contradictory, as are the suggested skills; the tools are unsuited to conferring such 
status, and the general consensus is that it would have been unable to talk. 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐǁĂƐƚŚĞŶďƵŝůƚŽŶƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ precarious of ground. 
 
6. Species Boundaries, National Boundaries 
This brings us to our second question - ǁŚǇ ǁĂƐ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ƐŽ
unassailable despite the contradictory evidence? There are two answers, I would 
suggest. The first of these is simƉůǇƚŚĂƚWŝůƚĚŽǁŶƚŚĞ “ďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚƐǁŽŵĂŶ ?  ?Express 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ ĞǆĐŝƚŝŶŐ ŶĞǁƐ ƚŚĂŶ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ƚŚĞ “ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ĂƉĞ ?  ?ibid.). As a 
primitive human Piltdown takes on an immediacy, a relevancy, to popular culture 
that it would not have as an ape. Piltdown as a human  “Ĩŝƚ ?Ɛ ?ǁĞůůǁŝƚŚŵĞĚŝĂŶĞǁƐ
ǀĂůƵĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞƚŽĚĂŝůǇ ůŝĨĞ ?  ?ĂƐƐŝĚǇ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?^ƵĐŚ
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĂŶ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĂďůĞ ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƉƌŝŶƚ ũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ƐŝŶĐĞ
ƚŚĞ ƌŝƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘EĞǁ :ŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ  ?>ĞĞ  ?980:121). For scientists and 
journalists alike, such sensationalism (if that is not too strong a word) means greater 
public interest and hence greater rewards, whether in terms of status, resources or 
finances.  
 The second answer is related to this, but is both more complex and more 
interesting from a boundary perspective. It also demonstrates why the construction 
of the human-animal boundary impacts on us as humans, and not just on our 
treatment of those on the other side of the line. It is linked to the first answer by the 
fact that it concerns the anthropocentricism that makes Piltdown the human more 
interesting to readers than Piltdown the ape. As a human, Piltdown becomes one of 
 “ƵƐ ? ?ŝƚũŽŝŶƐŚƵŵĂŶƐŽŶŽƵƌƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞďŝŶĂƌǇĚŝǀŝĚĞ ?KďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ? we do not 
construct our social alliances purely in species terms. Other important boundaries in 
the drawing of social alliances are the boundaries of nations and races, and both had 
ĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞƚŽƉůĂǇŝŶWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? 
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 Piltdown was the first, and remains the only, major palaeoanthropological 
discovery to be found in England. He arrived at a time when Britain was, thanks to 
the likes of Darwin and Huxley, at the forefront of evolutionary theory. Great 
imperial rivals such as France (Dryopithecus fontani) and Germany (Homo 
Neanderthalensis)
16
 had already enjoyed the discoveries of ancient evolutionary 
ancestors within their borders. Although the idea of relating a creature that lived 
hundreds of thousands of years ago to a particular nation state - that at best might 
claim a few hundred years contiguous history - is logically nonsensical, nationalists 
can still draw powerful historical discourses from them to support ideas of national 
greatness. Such themes were certainly present in the reception of Piltdown Man. 
The first report in the Guardian ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĚ  “ƋƵŝƚĞ ĂƐĞĂƌůǇĂƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ
ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ƵƌŽƉĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? ĂŶĚ ůĂƚĞƌ ŽŶĚĞĐůĂ ĞƐ  “ŝƚ ŝƐ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ
satisfactory to English scientists that this find should have been made here and that 
it should have been made by two well-ŬŶŽǁŶ ŶŐůŝƐŚ ŐĞŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
Arthur Keith, in the same piece, states 
 
[A] pleasing fact is that this model has been prepared by an Englishman, for 
hitherto all these models have been done on the Continent. In all these 
matters we are regaining the prestige we enjoyed half a century ago in the 
days of Huxley and Prestwich  W the heyday of English anthropology. 
 
The Express ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞƐ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ĂƐ  “ŶĐĞƐƚƌĞƐƐ KĨ dŚĞ ŶŐůŝƐŚ
Race dŽĚĂǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞIllustrated London News ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ  “ƚŚŝƐ ŶĐŝĞŶƚ
ƌŝƚŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶmemoirs of Piltdown, published only five 
years before the hoax was unmasked, are entitled The Earliest Englishman (1948). 
                                                     
16
 Remains of Dryopithecus fontani and Homo neanderthalensis were discovered in France and 
Germany respectively in 1856, and as such were the first recognized hominan discoveries. 
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Nationalist concerns were not restricted purely to the media and popular science 
however, but were present in the scientific realm as well. This theme even 
penetrates the intraspecialist science media: in the discussion section of a follow-up 
paper, a tool found with the remains is referred to as being that most quintessential 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶŐůŝƐŚ ŐĞŶƚůĞŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ƚƌĂƉƉŝŶŐƐ P Ă  “ĐƌŝĐŬĞƚ-ďĂƚ ?  ?ĂǁƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ
1915:148). More tellingly, whilst the reception amongst the English scientific 
community was overwhelmingly positive (though not without exception
17
) towards 
the monist interpretation of Piltdown, in Europe and America reaction was far more 
mixed. Prominent American palaeoanthropologists Miller (1915, 1918), MacCurdy 
(1916) and Hrdlicka (1922) all expressed considerable doubts over the belief that the 
jaw and skull were from the same individual or species. Miller (1915) also provides a 
bibliography of papers in which European scientists give their opinions on Piltdown, 
and there is clearly a degree of scepticism not present in Britain. This impression is 
supported by the media coverage:  
 
German anthropologists, jealous no doubt for the superior antiquity of the 
Heidelberg and Neanderthal remains, have been especially skeptical (Guardian 
12.08.13:6). 
 
That the original reconstruction of the Piltdown skull is open to criticism is 
evident from the proceedings at a meeting of German anthropologists held last 
week in Nuremburg [sic]. English anatomists were openly censured for giving 
their approval to the manner in which the Piltdown skull had been 
reconstructed (Times 11.08.13:3). 
                                                     
17
 A few British scientists, such as Professor Waterston, an ĂŶĂƚŽŵŝƐƚ Ăƚ <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ŽůůĞŐĞ ? >ŽŶĚŽŶ ?
remained skeptical throughout the debate (see McCurdy 1916:230). 
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KƵƚůŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĐĂƐĞƐŽĨtŽŽĚǁĂƌĚĂŶĚ<ĞŝƚŚ ?ƐŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ƚŚĞExpress adds: 
 
There is even a third party, however, dimly heard from Germany, which 
suggests that the jaw does not belong to the skull at all, but to an ape who 
chanced to leave his remains close by (12.08.13:7). 
 
Piltdown the earliest Englishman was far more appealing than Piltdown the earliest 
English ape, and this meant that English scientists and journalists alike were willing 
to weaken the requirements needed to cross the human-animal boundary. In fact, 
such was their keenness that no questions were asked of Piltdown upon its arrival, it 
was simply waved through the checks which one might expect.
18
  
 
 /ƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝsion to create a new genus for 
Piltdown was a recognition of its boundary-blurring characteristics; after-all 
 “ŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉƵƐ ? placed it outside the genus Homo. And yet in addition to the fact that 
Eoanthropus ŵĞĂŶƐ ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇ  ‘ĚĂǁŶman ? ? ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ƚo its human status 
ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐ ĂŶǇ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-straddling nature was 
recognized in the discourse surrounding it.  
 dŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨtŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵŝĐůĂďĞůůŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĂƚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŝƐĞǆƉŽƌƚĞĚ
beyond the confines of the genus Homo. There is, of course, no scientific definition 
                                                     
18
 Nationalism continues to play a role in many debates involving fossil ancestors, for example the 
argument between Native Americans and scientists over the ownership of Kennewick man (e.g. 
Thomas 2001), and elements of the dispute between Australian and Indonesia scientists over the 
Flores remains (e.g. Editorial, Nature 2006). 
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ŽĨ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ Homo sapiens, and yet 
within the Piltdown debate both scientists and journalists use the term repeatedly 
and  unquestioningly. We, as modern Homo sapiens, are not alone within our genus; 
heidelbergensis and neanderthalensis (Heidelberg man and Neanderthal man 
respectively), as well as the recently discovered flores ?ĂƌĞĂůůƉƌĞĨĂĐĞĚďǇ ‘Homo ? ?ĂƐ
are several long extinct species
19
. As such, it is perhaps understandable that 
scientists might refer to these figures as human, taking the word to be 
interchangeable with the term Homo. When humanity begins to be applied by 
scientists to figures outside of Homo, as it is here, its definition - its distinction - 
becomes increasingly stretched. 
 However, this is not to say that there are not strategies available to mask 
such problems. In the Piltdown debate a prominent device for hiding the 
ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐŝĞƐŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂ ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬ ? ?>ĂďĞůŝŶŐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶĂƐĂ  ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬ ? ?
as it is in the first science journal coverage to appear (Haddon 1913:92), and as 
numerous media reports do, allows an escape from the human Wanimal dichotomy. A 
ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŽŶĞŶŽƌƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ůŝŬĞĂƵŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) “ƚŚŝƌĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?20 it is 
the outcome of a disjuncture between our dichotomous constructions of nature, and 
the contiguous reality of it. A figure that is neither clearly human nor animal is either 
simply forced by will alone into one of the categories  W as happens repeatedly in the 
case before us  W or becomes something else entirely, in the case here a missing link. 
                                                     
19
 There is no clear scientific consensus on the number of species within the genus Homo (it is hoped 
that this thesis helps show that no such agreement is possible) but some list as many as eight  W H. 
ergaster, H. erectus, H. habilis, H. heidelbergensis, H. neanderthalensis, H. rudolfensis, H. sapiens 
(Wood & Collard 1999), plus newly discovered H. floresiensis. 
20
 ĂƵŵĂŶ ?Ɛ  “ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ? ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞĨƵƐĞƚŽ ĐŽŵƉůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ Ăƚ ŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
social and natural worlds. Bauman argues that the process of classification inevitably throws up cases 
 W ƚŚĞ “ƚŚŝƌĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚĞŝƚŚĞƌƐƚƌĂĚĚůĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽƌĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇĂŶǇ ?ŽƵŐůĂƐ ?
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ƉƵƌŝƚǇƌƵůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĂůƐŽĐŽǀĞƌƐƐƵĐŚŽďũĞĐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚƌĂŶƐŐƌĞƐƐĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
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However, for Bauman, these third categories are a threat to the status quo, as they 
reveal the dichotomy for the sham it is: 
 
They are waste, as they defy classification and explode the tidiness of the 
grid. They are the disallowed mixture of categories that must not mix. They 
earned their death-sentence by resisting separation (ibid. p15). 
 
The missing link, in contrast, acts to protect the human Wanimal dichotomy. It allows 
Ă ůŝƚĞƌĂů  ‘ŶŽ-ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ůĂŶĚ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ĨƌŽŶƚůŝŶĞƐ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ Ă ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ůŝŬĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ
might safely shelter. In such a way the difficult questions  W such as whether Piltdown 
was human, and on what grounds  W can be avoided. It is telling of the failure of both 
scientists and journalists to really engage with the issue that they fail equally to 
recognize this as an escape route even when attempting to use it. Whilst they 
position Piltdown as a missing link, simultaneously he/she is being declared human, 
rendering the strategy useless.  
 
7. Race and Species 
'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ŵŽĚĞůŽĨďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-work demonstrates how the boundaries of 
science are contextually dependent  W where the aim is to protect itself from religion 
some element of it  W say the scientific method  W might be depicted as empirical and 
clinical; when demarcating it from engineering it might become almost philosophical 
in its pursuit of ideas. A similar process is visible at work in the drawing of human-
animal boundaries in the Piltdown debate. Whereas the treatment of Piltdown 
expanded the limits of humanity, and so weakened its exclusivity, elsewhere in the 
ƐĂŵĞ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ƌŝŐŝĚůǇ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ? <ĞŝƚŚ ?Ɛ ƋƵŽƚĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ Ă  “ŶĞǁ
ŐĞŶƵƐ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?  ?Guardian 20.12.12:16), and WŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
human Piltdown to the genus Eoanthropus: both imply that humanity becomes a 
characteristic of all within the Hominidae family. This would mean that chimpanzees 
74 
 
(Pan), gorillas (Gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo) become eligible for human 
membership. Unsurprisingly though, despite repeated mention of chimps - and apes 
generically - in relation to the Piltdown jaw, there is not a single mention within the 
scientific or popular literature regarding the attribution of humanity to our 
contemporary relatives in the Hominidae family. Where Piltdown is waved through 
they are waved away. A crucial difference of course between contemporary primates 
on the one hand, and Piltdown and our fellow inhabitants of Homo on the other, is 
that the latter are all extinct and so their inclusion as human and/or Homo raises no 
practical issues regarding their treatment. Awarding contemporary primates the 
same classification would not only demand a reappraisal of our dealings with them, 
but also leave the binary nature Wculture model entirely unsupportable and so would 
threaten, like the crack in the dam, to quickly bring down the entire edifice, as 
Cavalieri and Singer acknowledge when they discuss how awarding rights to apes 
could lead eventually to the extension of such protection to all animals (1996:304-
311). It could carry then a considerable philosophical, as well as material (in terms of 
requiring ecological protection and ethical treatment) cost. The absence of any living 
Piltdown, Neanderthal or Flores means that their classification as human is easier to 
negotiate within existing boundary models (due to the lack of challenging empirical 
evidence) and poses no material threat to human economies. 
 There is a second process of boundary-working going on simultaneously. The 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƐƚƌĞƚĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ  “ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?ŽĨĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŝƚƐďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐǁŝĚĞƌƚŽ
encompass more landmarks, is used to distance white Europeans from indigenous 
groups  W and non-whites generally - at the same time that it is allowing Piltdown to 
be brought closer to us. There are two elements to this. The first achieves its effect 
ƐŝŵƉůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐǁŝƚŚŶŽŶ-
ǁŚŝƚĞƐ ? /Ŷ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƉĂƉĞƌ ? ŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ďƌĂin 
ƐŝǌĞ “ĞƋƵĂůƐƚŚĂƚŽĨƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞůŽǁĞƐƚƐŬƵůůƐŽĨƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ? 
 ^ŝŵŝůĂƌ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƉĞƉƉĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁƐ ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? KŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
canines (only uncovered later), the Illustrated London News states that they would 
75 
 
ŚĂǀĞ “ĂŶĂƉĞ-like character met with in savage races to-ĚĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?KŶƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞ ƉĂŐĞ ŝƚ ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ƵƉ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ƉŚŽƚŽƐ ŽĨ ƚŚƌĞĞ ũĂǁƐ ? ůĂďĞůĞĚ  “<ĂĨĨŝƌ ? ?
 “ŚŝŵƉĂŶǌĞĞ ? ĂŶĚ  “/ŶĚŝĂŶ ? ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ĞůŽǁ ŝƚ ? ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƐ ƚŚƌĞĞ
ŵŽƌĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ  “ŚŝŵƉĂŶǌĞĞ ?ĂŶĚ  “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞŽĨĂƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƌǇ P
 “dŽƌƌĞƐ ^ƚƌĂŝƚ /ƐůĂŶĚĞƌ ? ? ůƐŽ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? Ă ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ
ĞŽůŝƚŚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ŝŶ ŝƚ P  “ƚŚĞǇ ƐƉĞĂŬ ĂƐ ƐƵƌĞůǇ ĂƐ ĚŝĚ ƚŚĞ
ĨŽŽƚƉƌŝŶƚƐ ĨŽƵŶĚ ďǇ ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ƌƵƐŽĞ ? ? dŚĞfootprints in question were of course 
ƚŚŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďůĂĐŬ ƐĂǀĂŐĞ ? ǁŚŽ ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ĐĂůůĞĚ  “DĂŶ &ƌŝĚĂǇ ? ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂǇ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
implicit link is made between Piltdown and non-whites. Continuing, of the brain, the 
Express ƐĂǇƐ P “ĂƐůĂƌŐĞĂƐƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞůŽǁĞƐƚƚǇƉĞŽf savage  W the Australian aboriginal 
Žƌ ƚŚĞ dĂƐŵĂŶŝĂŶƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ĂŶĚ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ Times  “ƚŚĞ ƐŬƵůů ŽĨ
Eoanthropus, though typically human, was as low in brain capacity as that of the 
ůŽǁĞƐƚ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? dŚĞGuardian quotes KeŝƚŚ ĂƐ ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ  “ŝŶ
size of brain it is human  W at least equal to the brains of many individuals in living 
ƌĂĐĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? KŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ĐŽƵ Ě ƚĂůŬ ? ƚŚĞTimes 
asserts 
 
/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ũĂǁƐ ŽĨ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ ƚƵďĞƌĐůĞƐ Q ŵŽŶŐ the lower 
races, and particularly those with imperfect speech, the tubercle was 
practically absent (16.9.13:6). 
 
 The second element is more subtle, but just as effective. Throughout the 
ĚĞďĂƚĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůĐŽŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ “ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ƌĂĐĞ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
ďĞĐŽŵĞŝŶĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĂďůĞ ?^ƚŽĐŬŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŽƌŬƐŚŽǁƐ ǁ “ƌĂĐĞ ?ĂƐĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŶ
the early 20
th
 ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ǁĂƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ďůƵƌƌĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  “ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? dŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ
achieved in the Piltdown case is that species becomes weakened as a divider and 
race becomes strengthened. The Express ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶĂƐ “ĂƌĂĐĞŽĨŵĞŶǁŚŽ
ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚƚĂůŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? )ĂŶĚŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ “ƚŚĞŵŽŶŬĞǇƌĂĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞ
Illustrated London News we have this theme rendered explicit in a suggestion that 
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Piltdown is no more different from modern Homo sapiens than we are from each 
other: 
 
these fragments of man from the Sussex gravel tell us that already at this 
early period the human race had begun to split up into different peoples 
(28.12.12:958). 
 
The Guardian makes a similar link, stating; 
 
in Europe we have (in order of antiquity) the Chellean, Acheulean, 
Mousterian, Aurignacian, Solatrean, and Magdalenian classifications, based 
mainly on handiwork : and the Heidelberg, Gibraltar, Neanderthal, Grimaldi, 
Galley Hill, Krapina, Cro Magnon, and other categories based on an 
anatomical study of skeletons and skulls. We have by no means exhausted 
the bases of classification even now : there remain, for instance, the straight-
haired, wavy-haired and curly-haired peoples, the peoples with projecting 
muzzles, the peoples with their heads set on like hammer-heads and many 
others (19.12.12:16). 
 
Reconciling the formal Aristotelian classification of Piltdown with the more 
graduated, prototypic classifications used by agents during the episode to 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞ ? ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ĂŶ ĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? dŚŝƐ ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ ƐƉĂĐĞ ? ŝƚ ƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞƐ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ĂůůŽǁƐ Ă ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ƚŽ ďĞ
opened up between white Europeans and other Homo sapiens. This ape jaw and 
ŚƵŵĂŶƐŬƵůůŚĂƐƚƌĂǀĞůĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ “ĚŽƵďƚĨƵůďŽƌĚĞƌůĂŶĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĂďůĞŵĂŶ
ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚƵďŝƚĂďůĞĂƉĞ ?  ?Guardian 19.12.12:16) to become a human no more remote 
from white Europeans than an Aborigine, and certainly residing much closer than the 
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great apes despite its apparently equivalent taxonomic status. It is a journey which 
shows how negotiations of the human-animal boundary can influence our treatment 
not just of animals, but of other humans as well. An ape jaw with a human skull 
passed through the boundary to become the earliest Englishman, on the basis that it 
(apparently) died where  W millions of years later  W the English nation was formed, 
whilst many contemporary humans were pushed in the other direction, condemned 
for lacking white skin and European language. 
 Remarkably, the binary conception of humans and animals emerges from this 
boundary exercise seemingly unscathed. Despite moving the boundary backwards 
and forwards, reinforcing it in places and pulling it down in others, no one in the 
Piltdown debate takes a moment to question its presence, or its implications, in the 
first place. The question of on what foundations this divider is being built is never 
asked. Much like the scientist who boundary-works their territory in public 
discourses whilst remaining wedded to the idea of a clear demarcation between 
science and other forms of knowledge (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984), the discourses 
surrounding Piltdown work the boundary without acknowledging the ambiguities 
they raise. The human-animal binary, which remains formally unquestioned, is 
ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ƐƵƉƉůĂŶƚĞĚ ďǇ Ă  “ƚƌŝŶĂƌǇ ? ŽĨ ǁŚŝƚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ  ? ŶŽŶ-white 
 “^ĂǀĂŐĞ ? ?ŶŝŵĂů ? /ƚ ŝƐ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƉĂĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ / ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉĂƌƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ŵŽƵƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ
Birke & Michael (1998) discuss in the quote given above is being placed. I will discuss 
this concept further in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
8. Conclusion 
dŚĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽWŝůƚĚŽǁŶDĂŶ ?Ɛ ŚǇďƌŝĚŝƚǇ ǁĂƐ ? ŝŶ ŵĂŶǇƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ďůƵŶƚ ĂŶĚ
ďƌƵƚĂů P ƚŽ ĨŽƌĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ďŽǆ ŵĂƌŬĞĚ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ŽĨ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
fĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƌŝǀŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƉĂƌƚǁĂƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞŵĂǆŝŵƵŵ
public interest in the find, but more obvious was a nationalistic wish that Piltdown 
provide England with a glorious ancient history. Behind this scene however was a far 
more complex, subtle process of opening up space, of enlarging the box so that 
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Piltdown might fit. The careful positioning of Piltdown relative to prototypically 
conceived non-ǁŚŝƚĞ  ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĞǆƚĂŶƚ ŶŽŶŚƵŵĂŶ ƉƌŝŵĂƚĞƐ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŽ
happen, even whilst it was being fixed as human. The decision of scientists to 
classifying the find outside the genus Homo ǁĂƐĂƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŶŽŶĨŝƚ ?
yet in continuing to label the find human they called into question the boundaries of 
both categories, an outcome I shall return to in chapter seven. 
/ŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ/ŚĂǀĞƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƐŚŝĨƚ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?ƐďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-work model from an 
ontology of cultural boundaries to an ontology of natural boundaries. Of course 
 ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĂƐƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌŚĂƐƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƐŚŽǁ ?ŝƐĂĐƵůƚƵƌĂůartefact. Transplanting 
'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?ƐŵŽĚĞů ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůŶŽƚŽŶůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
science-culture and human-animal boundaries outlined in my introduction above, 
but also as it serves as a reminder of the strong relationship between the 
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚŶĂƚƵƌĂůǁŽƌůĚƐ ?ƐŽƵŐůĂƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŽƌŬŽŶƚŚĞ “ƌƵůĞƐ
ŽĨ ƉƵƌŝƚǇ ? ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ? ƐŽĐŝĂů ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ǀŝĂ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
natural world, and the manipulation of the natural world (the removal of dirt from 
the home for example) is used to add coherence to the social world. At Piltdown we 
see this process working in both directions similarly  W Piltdown as natural empirical 
ĨĂĐƚ ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ  “ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ? ĂǁĂǇ ĨƌŽŵ ǁŚŝƚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐ ? ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ǁŚŝůƐƚ
social relations with other nations act as a spur for British scientists to position 
Piltdown as human.  
 The boundary-work model also encourages one to consider the role of agents 
in boundary construction, and their strategic aims. The uneasy relationship that 
exists between a contiguous nature, our compartmentalized formal understandings 
of it, and the social world often results in a disjuncture. Where this disjuncture exists 
only those with considerable epistemic authority have the strength to force a fit. This 
ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚŽ ƌĞǁĂƌĚ Žƌ ĚĞŶǇ  “ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŵĞ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚ ? ƚŽ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ
and individuals was wielded by the scientists and journalists in the Piltdown debate. 
:ƵƐƚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂů ďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĂŶ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
context in which they are drawn, so too is the human-ĂŶŝŵĂů ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ P WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
79 
 
humanity is located not in its physical remains, but in its cultural standing. This 
boundary drawing is done not out of a concern for more accurately reflecting nature 
and our relations to it, but rather to support racist ideas of white superiority, and 
nationalistic concerns that Piltdown itself should provide England with an ancient 
history to match those of imperial rivals France and Germany. 
 Finally, we are reminded that at the close of this testing episode the binary 
model of human-animal relations remains in place. As with the science-culture 
boundary, the binary model of human-animal is exceedingly resilient, even when it is 
mobilized in contextually dependent discourses which implicitly rely on a more 
complex configuration, such as the trinary one present here. When considering why 
this is, it must be remembered that altering our models of the boundary would come 
with considerable practical and philosophical costs, not least because it would 
threaten the dominance of humans which is implicit in the binary model as it stands. 
Additionally, an apparent lack of awareness during the Piltdown episode - on the 
part of scientists and journalists alike - of the role cultural construction plays in 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŵƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďŝŶĂƌǇ ŵŽĚĞů
into more complex configurations to be done so in an unspoken manner. In this way, 
 “<ĂĨĨŝƌƐ ? ?  “ƵƐŚŵĞŶ ? ?  “ďŽƌŝŐŝŶĞƐ ? ?  “/ŶĚŝĂŶƐ ? ?  “dŽƌƌĞƐ ^ƚƌĂŝƚ /ƐůĂŶĚĞƌƐ ? ?
 “dĂƐŵĂŶŝĂŶƐ ? Q Ăůů ĂƌĞ ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝǌĞĚ ? ƉƵƐŚĞĚ ĐůŽƐĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌůĂŶĚ ? ǁŚŝůƐƚ
Piltdown  W half ape, but fully English  W is welcomed in with open arms. 
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Chapter 5: Bringing Bones to Life: Why Science Made Piltdown 
Man Human 
 
1. Introduction 
In chapter four I sought to question why Piltdown Man came to be declared human 
by scientists and journalists alike, given its contradictory characteristics, but the 
ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝƐ ŽŶ ǁŚĂƚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĨŽƌŵ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ƚŽŽŬ ? dŚĞ
ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇĚŝĚŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚ ŽĨƚŚĞůĂďĞůůŝŶŐŽĨŝƚĂƐ ‘ŵĂŶ ?Žƌ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?ďƵƚ
also of narratives that, if you will, put flesh on the bones of its humanness. Piltdown 
was brought to life not by cranial measurements and jaw x-rays, but by the stories 
told, and images drawn, of how this figure lived out its existence. 
Where though did this work take place, and how was it evidenced? When 
ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐůŝĨĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ǁŚǇǁĂƐĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŝŵĂŐĞƵƐĞĚ ?/Ŷ
asking these questions I hope to find answers to questions about the relationship 
between the knowledge claims of science and of popular culture  when dealing with 
such contested figures as Piltdown; to what degree are they independent of one 
another, and where there is dependence in what direction does it flow? To what 
degree do these claims originate from within science, and how much influence do 
ideas external to science have? The boundaries in question here are then those 
ĚƌĂǁŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ? 
The relationship between evidence and conclusion can be tenuous in a 
science such as palaeoanthropology, which must operate with fragmentary data that 
is dwarfed by the scales of time and space for which it speaks. Here the greatest 
ingenuity is required to extract the maximum information from the most meagre of 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?/ƚ ŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĂĨŽƐŝů ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇĨƌŽŵƐƵĐŚ
limited material, but the focus of this chapter - on the realisation in some form of 
narrative of this posited humanity - requires an even greater leap from evidence to 
conclusion. 
81 
 
 
[Fossils] constitute primary evidence for the history of life, but each fossil is 
an infinitesimal dot, lost in a fathomless sea of time, whose relationship with 
other fossils and organisms living in the present day is obscure (Gee 2000:1-
2). 
 
Gee argues that the fossil evidence is so limited, and the time scales so vast, that no 
attempt should be made to create narratives around these figures, as to do so would 
be to disregard the empirical requirements of science.  
hƐŝŶŐ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŽƌŬŽŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?/ĂŝŵƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ
whilst such narratives were constructed around Piltdown, they were presented as 
 ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚ ? ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƐƐ ŵĞĚŝĂ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂǇ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ
sidesƚĞƉ ƚŚĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƉƵƌĞ ? ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ21 within the science media, 
whilst their ideas about how Piltdown might have lived were supported by the 
authority of science. They could then engage the public with the more relevant (to 
non-experts) questions raised by the discovery with all the status conferred by the 
ůĂďĞů  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ? ? ďƵƚ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ŵĞĚŝĂ ?
such as peer review, referencing, and empirical theorising. When scientists did 
engage the public via popular science, the claims they made may have been labelled 
 ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ? ? ďƵƚ ƌĞůŝĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ  ‘ĨŽůŬ ?22 knowledge that 
comprises popular culture, and that the public themselves used. By analysing the 
                                                     
21
  ‘WƵƌĞ ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞǁŝůůŚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚďĞĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵishing from popularised science. 
This label is only applied reflexively however, as this work will aim to demonstrate how difficult it is to 
maintain any clear distinction between the two. 
22
  ‘&ŽůŬ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝƐƵƐĞĚŚĞƌĞƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĂƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞǁŚŝĐŚŵŝght be more frequently referred 
ƚŽ ĂƐ  ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƐĞŶƐĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ĞƌŐĞƌ ĂŶĚ >ƵĐŬŵĂŶŶ ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ŵŽƌĞ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇpar 
excellence QƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇůŝĨĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
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discourses around Piltdown I hope to show that the traditional binary understanding 
of pure science and popular culture masks what is a far more complicated picture, in 
which the relationship between evidence, scientist and public is far from clear.  
 I will attempt to highlight this by compariŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
humanness in the science and popular media, and considering what drove the 
production of the images of how this figure lived. The argument will be made that 
the pure-popular distinction fails to reflect substantive differences in the texts 
analysed. Style, content and authorship all failed to clearly distinguish one from the 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůĂďĞů  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ǁĂƐ ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ďŽƚŚ ĨŽƌĂ ? &Žƌ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ǁĂƐ Ă
vital resource in engaging the public. The only stable distinction was that this label 
was only given any meaning within the popular media, where narratives allowed an 
exploration of the notions underpinning the claim. This fact is used to critique the 
ƉƵƌĞ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ŵŽĚĞů ?Ɛ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƵƐĞĨƵů ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŝƐ ƐŽůĞůǇ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ of 
science. I will then support this further by looking at wider examples of how missing 
ůŝŶŬĨŝŐƵƌĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĚ ?ƉĂǇŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘DĂŶƚŚĞ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ?
ƌĞƉĞƌƚŽŝƌĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ?Ɛ ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ
development during the middle of the 20
th
 century. I will use these examples to 
propose that the boundaries between scientific and non-scientific conceptions of 
missing link figures are far less clear-cut than the pure-popular model would suggest, 
and that popular science, like the missing link, acts as a trinary space, protecting the 
binary in which it stands. 
 
2. The Pure-Popular Model 
,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŚĞ  ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůǇĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ QƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂůŝǌĞĚŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƵƌĞ ?genuine scientific knowledge against 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? ,Ğ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞƐ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ
conceptual grounds on which this distinction rests, and the simplicity of the model 
ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?dŚĞŵŽĚĞů ?ƐŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƵƐĂŐĞŝƐĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĨĂct that the vague distinction 
between pure and popularised science protects the epistemic authority of scientists, 
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ĂƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĞŶŐĂŐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƚŚĞǇ ŽŶůǇ ĚŽ ƐŽ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ‘ĚŝƐƚŽƌƚĞĚ ? Žƌ
 ‘ƐŝŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ?dŚĞǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ allows scientists to 
 ‘ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĞ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŶĞĞĚƐ ŝŶ ĂŶǇ ŐŝǀĞŶ
context (Gieryn 1983, 1999). By engaging with the public via popular science, 
scientists can ensure that where their own knowledge claims meet those of wider 
culture, it is only on a playing surface that favours themselves.  
Popular science is then a buffer zone protecting science from external 
challenges; the public cannot engage with, or challenge, science directly, only a 
supposedly inferior version of it. However, at the same time that it acts to protect 
pure science, popular science also allows for a dialogue between scientists and the 
public, even if it is a relationship skewed towards the former. In this sense popular 
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĂĐƚƐ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ  ?^ƚĂƌ ĂŶĚ 'ƌŝĞƐĞŵĞƌ
2000:131), which is to say it is a network of objects whose meaning differs between 
the different groups (i.e. scientists, journalists, lay-persons) who conceptualise them. 
As the meeting ground for these disparate groups, it forms the locus of this chapter. 
 Although there is no precise distinction between pure and popular science 
(indeed, this ambiguity allows for boundary-working), generally speaking the 
distinction follows the medium in which claims are published: professional science 
media (i.e. science journals) contains pure science, mass media contains popular 
science. Using the Piltdown episode I will demonstrate that such a distinction largely 
fails to reflect any substantive differences in the texts produced around this 
discovery. The distinction in practice allowed scientists to discuss non-scientific 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘,ŽŵŽƐĂƉŝĞŶƐ ?) with the authority of science but 
without the evidential requirements. Rather than reinforce the dichotomy I seek to 
ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞďǇƵƚŝůŝƐŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ƉƵƌĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
following analysis I will refer to the medium in which any claim was published (e.g. 
science/mass media), whilst showing how agents worked the boundaries of science 
around this distinction. 
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 It should be stated that my aim here is not to prove the existence of the 
binary model of pure/popular science in the minds of the agents involved, and that 
for evidence of this I am content to rely on work by of others (e.g. Whitley (1985), 
Mellor (2003)). However, there is some evidence that the idea of popular science 
being an inferior distortion was present in the minds of scientists during the 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ^ƉĞŶĐĞƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉ ŶĚĞŶĐĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ the 
scientists involved in the Piltdown discovery reveals a letter from George Barrow 
 ?'ĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ƵƌǀĞǇŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ )ƚŽ ?^ ?tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ  ‘/ĐŽŶŐƌĂƚƵůĂƚĞ
you on the delivery of your paper which was so totally free from the newspaper style 
of ƚŚĞ  “ĂƌŵĐŚĂŝƌ ? ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ? Ă ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ^ŝƌ ZĂǇ >ĂŶŬĞƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ23 prominent 
 ‘^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ &ƌŽŵ Ŷ ĂƐǇ ŚĂŝƌ ? ĐŽůƵŵŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂŝůǇ dĞůĞŐƌĂƉŚ ? ůƐŽ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
considerable time it took to become a member of the Royal Society, prominent 
Piltdown scientist Arthur <ĞŝƚŚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŝŶŚŝƐĂƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ‘WĞƌŚĂƉƐ/ŚĂĚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ
too many lectures of a semi-popular sort to be counted a serious man of science by 
ƚŚĞ ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƵĐŚ ǁŽƌŬ ǁĂƐĨƌŽǁŶĞĚ ƵƉŽŶ ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ŚŝƐ
colleges. 
To evidence the authority which scientists utilised during the debate one only 
has to consider the fact that throughout the entire newspaper coverage the only 
visible agents (other than Piltdown itself) were scientists. The sole exception is the 
two occasions when journalists appeaƌĞĚ ĂƐ ŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌ  ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ ? ?  ‘ŝŶ
ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ ? ?Express  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? )Žƌ ‘ŝŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ ? ?Guardian 23.11.12:11) 
scientists. Furthermore, on the debate held between scientists on the relative merits 
ŽĨ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ĂŶĚ <ĞŝƚŚ ?Ɛ ƌŝǀĂů ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝons of Piltdown Man24, the Guardian 
                                                     
23
 Sir Ray Lankester was a zoologist and former head of the Natural History Museum (1898-1907). 
24
 Woodward and Keith created differing reconstructions of the Piltdown figure  W ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ƐŚĂĚĂ
skull capacity of just over 1000 c.c., intermediate between modern humans and modern non-human 
primates, and was given the taxonomic laďĞů ‘Eoanthropus ? ? ‘ĚĂǁŶŵĂŶ ? ) ?<ĞŝƚŚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŐĂǀĞĂ
capacity of 1500 c.c., slightly larger than modern humans, and was placed in the species  ?,ŽŵŽ ? (as 
ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ĂƌĞ ) ? dŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽŶůǇ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ Ě ƐŽŵĞ ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĂǁƐŽŶ-
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ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ‘ƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƵƐǁŚŽ ?ǁŝƚŚůĞƐƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ŵĂǇŚĂǀĞĨĞůƚƌĞĂĚǇƚŽŐŽƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂŬĞ
for homo or eoanthropus [sic], as the case may be, had perhaps better keep our 
ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐƚŽŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? 
 In Britain both pure and popular science was quick to declare the Piltdown 
figure human. What would this label mean for a figure such as Piltdown though, who 
may have had a considerably smaller brain than ourselves, and may have lacked 
attributes that many would consider key to humanness, such as language
25
? Given 
the very limited evidence available, it is perhaps unsurprising that scientists during 
the episode chose not to engage explicitly with such questions within the pure 
science realm of journals and conferences. I use thĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ?ŚĞƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ
course scientists did engage with these issues the moment they declared Piltdown to 
be human, it is just that they did not attempt to justify the claim within the science 
ŵĞĚŝĂ ? /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇƌĞŵĂŝŶĞd unproblematised and (largely) 
unjustified. In the original Dawson & Woodward (1913) paper both authors label the 
ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?ĞǀĞŶǁŚŝůƐƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƉĞ-like appearance of the jaw. No 
justification is given beyond the appearance of the fragmented skull. 
Scientists did, however, deal with some of the issues raised in the mass 
media, via narratives about how Piltdown might have lived. This suggests that they 
ǁĞƌĞŬĞĞŶƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ĂŶĚƐĂǁWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
declared humanity as an opportunity for engaging wider interest, or that they 
themselves, as scientists and fellow humans, were intrigued by the issue and saw the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Woodward paper (and the first mass media coverage) by which time Piltdown had already been 
declared human, so cannot be said to have played a part in the awarding of humanity to Piltdown. 
25
 No clear consensus existed as to whether Piltdown was capable of developed speech, but the 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĚŽƵďƚŽĨŵĂŶǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚǁĂƐŶŽƚĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽƐǁĂǇƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵůĂďĞůůŝŶŐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?
' ^ŵŝƚŚ  ?Ă ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ĂŶĚ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ŵŽƐƚ ǀŽĐĂů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌ )ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĐĂƉĂďůĞ ŽĨ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ
some form of speech (1913). However, both Keith (1914) and Woodward (in conversation with the 
Express 23.12.12:1) believed it did not have such capabilities. 
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mass media as a creative space where they could develop their ideas free of the 
constraints of the science media (Cassidy 2006, Felt 2000). Most likely both factors 
played a part. 
 
3. Testing the Distinction 
3.1 Examples of Clear Difference 
dŚĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞǁŚŽůůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂ ?
ĂǁƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ƉĂƉĞƌ avoids the subject entirely, discussing 
instead the terrain in which the bones were discovered, the flints and animal 
ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ƐŝƚƵ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĂƚŽŵŝĐĂů ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƐƐŝůƐ ? /Ŷ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ
analysis of the find we have then what we might consider the stereotypical features 
of a scientific text: impersonal, empirically focused, full of technical language and 
highly detailed. For example; 
 
The horizontal portion, or body of the mandibular ramus, measures only 
about 27 mm. in depth behind, but must have become a little deeper 
forwards. External to the first and second molars there is the usual prominent 
oblique ledge (b.) for one of the origins of the buccinator muscle; but this is 
the only feature visible on the outer face, a large flake of bone behind the 
position of the mental foremen having been lost when the anterior part was 
broken (Dawson and Woodward 1913:131). 
 
dŚŝƐ ƐƚǇůĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?  ?^ŚĂƉŝŶ ĂŶĚ ^ĐŚĂĨĨĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ) ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ŽǇůĞ ?Ɛ
hugely influential experimental programme of the 17
th
 century. In maximising 
circumstantial detail whilst minimising the presence of the author, this approach was 
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽŽǇůĞ ?ƐƚĂƐŬŽĨĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐƌĞůŝĂďůĞ ‘ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŽĨĨĂĐƚ ? ?ĂŶĚĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŬĞǇƚŽ
the creation of what we know today as science.  
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As detĂŝůĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ĂǁƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ƉĂƉĞƌ ĚŽĞƐ
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ƐŽŵĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ  ‘ŵĂŶ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĂƉĞ ? ?
concluding that Piltdown was, phylogenetically, close enough to modern Homo 
sapiens to be labelled human. However, tŚĞŝƌ ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ĐŚŝŵĞƌŝĐ
ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ŝƐ ƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚ ďǇ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĂŶ ŶĞǁ ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ
ŐƌŽƵƉ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŽ ƉůĂĐĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ P  ‘Eoanthropus ?  ? dŚŝƐ ůĞĨƚ ŝƚ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽƵƌ ŽǁŶ
species Homo, and yet Eoanthropus ? ůŝƚĞƌĂů ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽn  W  ‘ĚĂǁŶŵĂŶ ?  W leaves little 
ĚŽƵďƚ ƚŽ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ ƐĂǁ ƚŚŝƐ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ? dŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ĂǀŽŝĚ ĂŶǇ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ
what such humanness might have entailed though  W there is no consideration of how 
this creature might have lived, or what capabilities made it human (aside from the 
fact that it had a relatively large
26
 skull), and how these related to our own 
capabilities as modern humans. 
 The text of some of the newspaper coverage is very different. Even though it 
was published a month before the official announcement, and presumably had very 
ĨĞǁĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐƚŽŐŽŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞĐůĂŝŵƐ 
 
It was the age when the cave bear, the woolly-haired rhinoceros, and the 
mammoth roamed over Europe, and man maintained a strenuous struggle 
ĨŽƌĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ Q Palaeolithic man was a river-draft hunter, and the Sussex skull 
was found in an old river bed. It is open to surmise that he met with his death 
while following his prey (21.11.12:8). 
 
                                                     
26
 tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ DĂŶ ŚĂĚ Ă ůĂƌŐĞ ƐŬƵůů ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ŶŽŶ-human primates. It 
was considerably smaller than a modern human skull however. 
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W.P. Pycraft
27
, writing in the Illustrated London News, considers how Piltdown might 
have lived in more detail: 
 
now a word or two as to his probable appearance and mode of life, and the 
creatures which he chased, and was occasionally, in turn, chased by. As to his 
personal appearance one would not like to dogmatise, but, with the help of 
Mr. Forestier, I have been enabled to make what is probably a near 
approximation to the truth. He was a man of low stature, very muscular, and 
had not yet attained that graceful poise of the body which is so characteristic 
of the human race to-day. But he was by no means lacking in intelligence. 
Living in a genial climate amid a luxurious vegetation and surrounded by an 
abundance of game, he may be said to have led a life of comparative ease. Of 
clothing he had no need; nor was there any reason to bother much about 
ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ĨŽƌƐĂĨĞƚǇ ?ƐƐĂŬĞ ?ŚĞŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚ
to devise some kind of shelter by night. Elephants and rhinoceros of species 
long since extinct roamed in herds all round him. These and the 
hippopotamus no doubt he killed for food, and, besides, he must have 
hunted a species of horse long since extinct, while the lion, bear, and sabre-
tooth tiger afforded him plenty of opportunities for hairbreadth escapes. He 
had probably inherited the use of fire from his forbears, and this useful ally 
served to harden the ends of his wooden spears, and perhaps to cook his 
food (28.12.12:958). 
 
The Express, suggesting that the find was a female (see below for discussion), gives a 
similar account of the possible circumstances in which Piltdown lived: 
                                                     
27
 William Plane Pycraft was a zoologist and author of natural history books. He also worked as an 
assistant to Lankester both before and during his time at the Natural History Museum. 
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tŽŵĂŶ tŚŽ ŽƵůĚEŽƚ dĂůŬ ? ŶĐĞƐƚƌĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶŐůŝƐŚ ZĂĐĞ dŽĚĂǇ ?  “DŝƐƐŝŶŐ
>ŝŶŬ ? ?
A race of men who could not talk, who roamed about England before even the 
first of the several known glacial ages, who lived on roots and shellfish and wild 
fruit, and dodged the mastodon, the hippopotamus and the sabre-toothed 
tiger  W such is the astonishing link in the story of the origin of man which 
ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  “^ƵƐƐĞǆ ƐŬƵůů ?
(20.12.12:1). 
 
Also, from the same paper three days later: 
 
Through the dark forests of our land there roamed, many hundreds of 
thousands of years ago, a strange, hairy ape-like creature, a female member 
of a curious race, from whom all other animals shrank. She was a new type, 
possessing a new cunning, and an amazing power over the other denizens of 
the forest, for she could do what they could not  W use implements, and clothe 
ŚĞƌƐĞůĨŝŶƐŬŝŶƐ Q 
This ancestress of the human race in England had some resemblance to a 
chimpanzee, walking with a shuffling gait. Her body was probably covered 
with hair. She could not speak, but as she ambled along she uttered strange 
noises. 
When she was hungry she dug roots and vegetables from the ground and 
devoured them just as they were. Living among the rocks, the only protection 
she possessed from the cold was a skin, rudely fashioned in the form of a 
cloak. When she hunted she used no dogs to help here track her prey; she 
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and her companions followed their quarry and killed it with a stone spear or 
hatchet (23.12.12:1). 
 
The claims made here clearly go beyond the scope of those made in Dawson 
ĂŶĚ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ƉĂƉĞƌ ? ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƐƐ ŵĞĚŝĂ ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ŝƐ ĂƐ ŶĞŐůĞĐƚĨƵů ŽĨ
ũƵƐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇĂƐƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŵĞĚŝĂŝƐ ? it does at least engage with its 
humanness to the degree that it considers how this figure might have lived. Utilised 
as an unjustified, unexplicated category, as it is in the science media, humanity is an 
essentially meaningless label. Whatever the failings of the mass media imaginings of 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶĂƚůĞĂƐƚďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽŐŝǀĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌĚ ?ZĂŶŐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ĨĂŶĐŝĨƵů  ? ‘ŚĞŵĂǇďĞ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŽŚĂǀĞ ůĞĚĂ ůŝĨĞŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ
ĞĂƐĞ ? )ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨĂƌĐŝĐĂů  ? ‘ĂƐƚƌĂŶŐĞ  ?ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ? QĨƌŽŵǁŚŽŵĂůů ƚŚĞƌĂŶŝŵĂůƐƐŚƌĂŶŬ ? ) ?
these claims have at best tenuous relations to the evidence uncovered, but give the 
human status of this creature meaning, by investing it with a narrative to which we 
might relate. 
 
3.2 Between the Extremes 
The differences between the content of Dawson and WoŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ
mass media coverage reproduced above are very clear, but it is not the aim of this 
chapter to argue that there is no difference between the science that appears in 
science media and that which appears in mass media. As noted above, the empirical 
requirements for popularised science are less, there is no formalised system of 
referencing, and readers are not presumed to have an expertise of the area.  
The focus instead is to show how the binary model of pure/popular science is 
inadequate for modelling the science-culture relationship, for a number of reasons. 
The first of these is of a practical nature - that it is impossible to clearly demarcate 
pure science from popular science in any substantive terms. The above examples 
show that clear differences of content and style are present at the extremes, but the 
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cases inbetween are far less clear cut. A paper delivered by Keith at the Winter 
Session in Medicine, 1913 (reproduced in the Lancet (1913)), in which he discusses 
Piltdown in the conƚĞǆƚŽĨƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŽƌŝŐŝŶŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶƌĂĐĞƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?ŚĞůƉƐ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚŝƐ ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ ‘dŚĞtŽƌůĚ ?ƐĂƌƉĞƚŽĨ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ?<ĞŝƚŚƵŶǀĞŝůƐ
ĂŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƚŚĂƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽƉŽĞƚƌǇƚŚĂŶƉƵƌĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ZĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
 ‘ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?for a moment, what is so striking about the following is the 
florid language used, a style that Boyle himself dismissed as equivalent to painting 
 ‘ƚŚĞĞǇĞ-ŐůĂƐƐŽĨĂƚĞůĞƐĐŽƉĞ ? ?^ŚĂƉŝŶĂŶĚ^ĐŚĂĨĨĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
 
As the western seaboard of Europe passes by and our own country comes in 
sight we shall suppose we are near enough to perceive that the human carpet 
along our Western coast is not quite of the same texture as that which covers 
the lands sloping down to the North Sea. When Europe itself comes under 
our gaze the pattern of the human carpet begins to change, and by the time 
the Far East has risen under the morning sun we shall admit, I think, that the 
change has become decided. A pall of smoke, the wreckage of a battle-field, 
the demarcation of new frontiers reveal to us one of the processes at work in 
modifying the pattern of our carpet. When we turn our eyes southwards and 
view Africa across the Mediterranean there is at first no marked degree of 
change  W not until the great forest region beyond the Sahara comes in sight. 
A glance from Northern Europe to Central Africa reveals the extremes in the 
ĞĂƌƚŚ ?Ɛ ĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ  Wnot the extremes of material  W merely of 
pattern or design; European and African seem to be products of the same 
loom (Keith 1913:1050). 
 
/Ŷ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ / ŚĂǀĞ ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ Ă ƐĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
paper authored by Dawson and himself as a classic example of what might be 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƉƵƌĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƚĞǆƚ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚŽĨĂǁƐŽŶ ?ƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ- primarily the 
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opening paragraphs  W features a first person narrative that admits a far greater role 
to the author than one might expect from such material: 
 
Several years ago I was walking along a farm-road close to Piltdown Common, 
Fletching (Sussex), when I noticed that the road had been mended with some 
peculiar brown flints not usual in the district. On enquiry I was astonished to 
learn that they were dug from a gravel bed on the farm, and shortly 
afterwards I visited the place, where two labourers were at work digging the 
gravel for small repairs to the roads. As this excavation was situated about 4 
miles north of the limit where the occurrence of flints overlying the Wealden 
strata is recorded, I was much interested, and made a close examination of 
the bed. I asked the workmen if they had found bones or other fossils there. 
As they did not appear to have noticed anything of the sort, I urged them to 
preserve anything that they might find (Dawson & Woodward 1913:117). 
 
In comparison, sections of the coverage from the Times, the Guardian and the 
Illustrated London News match any of the science media coverage for technical 
content and language. From the Times- 
 
Both behind and in front he [Dr. Smith Woodward] correctly identified the 
internal groove for the upper longitudinal blood-sinus which marked the 
middle line of the roof of the skull; and the reason why his adjustment of the 
occiput was not exact at first was that on the hinder part of the parietal 
region of the skull-roof he noticed a longitudinal ridge, which he supposed to 
be truly median, while the extraordinarily unsymmetrical development of the 
brain seemed to have pushed the longitudinal sinus at that part slightly out of 
its normal place. The change, however, only opened the top part of the skull 
behind to an extent of three-quarters of an inch, and there were 
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compensations elsewhere through the necessary readjustments, so the total 
brain capacity remained nearly the same as that he originally stated 
(17.09.13:10). 
 
Similarly, from the Guardian: 
 
He [Woodward] said that the skull (which unfortunately lacks the bone of the 
face) exhibits all the essential features of the genus Homo, with a brain 
capacity of not less than 1,070cc., but possibly a little more. It measures 
about 190mm. in length from the glabella to the inion by 150mm. in width at 
the widest part of the parietal region, and the bones are remarkably thick, 
the average thickness of the frontals and parietals being 10 mm. while an 
exceptional thickness of 12 mm. is reached at one corner (19.12.12:9). 
 
The Illustrated London News features detailed technical drawings and photographs 
ŽĨtŽŽĚǁĂƌĚĂŶĚ<ĞŝƚŚ ?ƐƌŝǀĂůƐŬƵůůƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) P 
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 Attempting to draw a clear separation of pure and popular science on 
grounds of the medium in which claims are published is then erroneous as it does 
not reflect consistent substantive differences in the texts. Additionally, there is no 
clear distinction in regards to authorship. Of the thirty-nine items of mass media 
coverage that featured in the study, eleven were letters written by scientists. Of the 
remaining twenty-eight articles, five were written by scientists, and two of the 
remainder were interviews with scientists. Of the other twenty-one articles, seven 
ǁĞƌĞŵĞƌĞůǇŶĞǁƐ ‘ƐŶŝƉƉĞƚƐ ?ŽĨƚǁŽŚƵŶĚƌĞĚǁŽƌĚƐŽƌůĞss. Much of the mass media 
coverage came, then, directly from the pens or indirectly from the mouths of 
scientists. Even what is arguably the most populist piece to feature in the study, the 
Express (23.12.12:1) article quoted above, is attributed to Woodward despite being 
written by a journalist -  ‘dŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŽƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ƵƐƐĞǆ ƐŬƵůů ?
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drawn on Saturday by Dr. Smith Woodward, of the South Kensington Natural History 
DƵƐĞƵŵ ?ŝŶĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂŶ “ǆƉƌĞƐƐ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? 
  There is then no clear, stable difference between the style of the claims 
presented in science media and conferences and those made in the mass media. In 
the Piltdown case the binary model masks the fact that there is often just as much 
variety of style within the newspapers and journals as there is between them. Many 
ŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĞŽƵƚůĂŶĚŝƐŚĐůĂŝŵƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐůŝĨĞĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵ
scientists rather than journalists, so authorship is also an unsuitable dividing 
principle. Regarding the content of the claims made, I have showed that some of the 
mass media coverage is just as richly detailed and technical as the most dense 
science coverage.  
 
4. Science as Producer, Science as Consumer 
The one stable difference that does remain then in the Piltdown episode between 
the science media and mass media coverage is the fact that in the former no 
ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?/ƚŝƐŵǇĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĞŶƚŚĂƚ
ŽŶůǇŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƌĞĂůŵǁĂƐĂŶǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŵĂĚĞƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂnness with 
any meaning. 
 This leads us to a further element of the binary model that I wish to take 
issue with, which concerns the conceptual implications of it. Such a model assumes 
that science is the sole source of knowledge, and that once produced in the pure 
science realm, such knowledge flows in a one-way manner into the popular realm 
where it is consumed by the general public. The only influence allowed by non-
science knowledge in the model is a negative, distorting one. 
Such a model may be more applicable to some branches of science than 
others. In palaeoanthropology I believe such an assumption can be highly 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ? dŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƚŚĞŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ĚĞďĂƚĞǁĂƐ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ
ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? ? ?ŽƌŵŽƌĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ‘ǁŚĂƚŝƐŝƚƚŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐƚŚŝ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ?dŚŽƵŐŚ
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it may have been more explicitly so in the mass media, the case was the same in the 
science literature, except that much of the debate was conducted around proxies of 
humanness, such as brain size and speech capabilities. 
 The awarding of sole epistemic authority to science is problematic in both its 
ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŝƚƐŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?dŚĞďŝŶĂƌǇŵŽĚĞů ?ƐĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂĐǇ
in tackling the question of humanness fails to recognise the difficulties that science 
faces in engaging with such a messy, contested category. Whilst science offers the 
possibility of helping us understand the characteristics of humans, the degrees to 
which these characteristics are unique, and the evolutionary processes that drove 
their development, the scientifically-ƚĞƐƚĂďůĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐĂHomo sapiens ? ?
ĐĂŶǀĞƌǇĞĂƐŝůǇďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ǁŚĂƚŝƐŝƚto be ĂŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ?^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ
its epistemic authority  W its empiricism  W is of limited use in tackling the latter, and 
this is before we take the meagre evidence that palaeoanthropology relies upon into 
account. Science may help us understand the qualities and capabilities of humans, 
but this does not tell us about the experience of being human
28
. Such a question is 
resolutely a subjective, emotive issue, one that is inevitably personal to all humans. 
As such it is inevitably a culturally constructed concept, which can be informed, but 
not determined, by science. In the case before us, the distinction between the two 
questions can be seen in the introduction to this chapter: cranial measurements and 
jaw x-rays on the one hand, images of a fearless, spear-welding warrior on the other. 
dŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŵĂŬĞƐ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ŵĞƌŐ Ě ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ
 ‘ǁŚĂƚŝƐmy understanding of being ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?, for scientists and journalists alike. 
                                                     
28
 Recognising the distinction between the qualities and capabilities of humans, and the experience of 
being human remains important today, in the light of claims such as that made on a recent UK 
ƚĞůĞǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŚŽǁĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘tŚĂƚDĂŬĞƐhƐ,ƵŵĂŶ ? ? ?WƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇƌƌŵĂŶĚ>ĞƌŽŝŽĨ/ŵƉĞƌŝĂůŽůůĞŐĞ
London, the answer provided by the show was merely to identify the location of some genes believed 
to be important in the evolution of humans. 
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 It would be easy to separate these two questions into pure and popular 
science, however as I shall show the picture is more complicated than that, and 
scientists engaged with both questions equally, despite their formal expertise only 
ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? ŽůůŝŶƐ ĂŶĚ ǀĂŶƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ĐĂůů ĨŽƌ Ă  ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ ǁĂǀĞ ŽĨ
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ P ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ŚĂƐ ĂƐ ĂŶ Ăŝŵ ƚŚĞ ǁŝƐŚ ƚŽ
ĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞ Ă ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ ŽĨ  “ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌǇ ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?  W being 
ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƐƚƵĚǇĂĨŝĞůĚĂƐĂƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƵƐƵĂůůǇƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ) ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽŽĨ “ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂů
ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?- that is the expertise of those that interact directly with a field. To borrow 
ĂŶĂŶĂůŽŐǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽn between art critics, 
and the artists themselves (p.244). Whilst only the former might be expected to have 
ƚŽ ĨŽƌŵĂů ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ? ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŐŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĞŵ ƚŽŽ Ă
knowledge worthy of recognition.  
Applying this to Piltdown, we can say that the scientists involved had 
contributory expertise in respect of the first question, and interactional expertise in 
respect of the second. The problem is that every human  W scientist, journalist or 
layperson  W might well be said to have interacƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ‘ǁŚĂƚ
is my understanding of being human?. It was scientists who monopolised the debate 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ďǇ ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ?ĚĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ) ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŽ ĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ Ă
Homo sapiens ? ? ?ƚŽƚŚŝƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇ had no greater expertise than 
ƚŚĞŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌŝĐĂů ‘ŵĂŶŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĞĞƚ ? ?
 A consideration of the hunter images present in the media narrations of 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ůŝĨĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ ĂďŽǀĞ ĐĂŶĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚ ǁŚĞŶ ĚĞĂůŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ
that carry such far-ranging cultural resonances, science does not operate in a 
vacuum, upstream of wider culture, but instead operates right in the thick of the 
contested boundary zones that we are considering. The river metaphor assumed in 
'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-work  W of upstream scientific knowledge 
production flowing downstream to cultural consumption  W is better replaced here by 
a lake, its banks populated by the multitude of organisations and individuals   W 
natural scientists, social scientists, philosophers, theists, laypersons etcetera - with a 
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stake in the concept of humanness, drawing from, and adding to, the body of 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐtŚŝƚůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐĂǇƐ ? ‘dŚĞĐůŽƐĞƌƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĨŝ ůĚƐĂƌĞƚŽĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ
ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ Q ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬ ĨƌŽŵ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŬŶowledge 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽďĞ ?  ?Ɖ ?  ? ) ?zŽƵĐĂŶŶŽƚŐĞƚŵƵĐŚĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ
than the subject of humanness. I will now use a discussion of the hunter imagining to 
support this picture. 
 
5. Narrating Humanness 
5.1 The Mighty Hunter 
The media excerpts given above play on the heroic images -  ‘ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐĂŶĞǁ
ĐƵŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?  ‘ ?ǁŚŽ ?ĚŽĚŐĞĚƚŚĞŵĂƐƚŽĚŽŶ ? ?  ‘ŚĂŝƌďƌĞĂĚƚŚĞƐĐĂƉĞƐ ? ?  ‘ŵĞƚǁŝƚŚŚŝƐĚĞĂƚŚ
ǁŚŝůĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŚŝƐƉƌĞǇ ?- ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ŝŶ  ‘DĂŶƚŚĞ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵ ŝƚƐĞůĨ
only came to prominence after the Piltdown episode, however the themes it plays 
on were already common in popular culture, as these quotes attest, and was present 
in scientific literature by the late 1800s (see below). Man the Hunter was 
ĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĞĂƌůǇŚuman development during the middle of 
the 20
th
 century. It placed male aggression and technological mastery as the driving 
forces behind human development. Although the Express ?Ɛ  ‘EĞǁtŽŵĂŶ ?ĂŶŐůĞŽŶ
Piltdown subverts the patriarchal element of the Man the Hunter template to some 
ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ?  ‘ƐŚĞ ? ŝƐ Ɛƚŝůů ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ĂƐ ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĨƌŽŵ  ‘Ă ƌĂĐĞ ŽĨ ŵĞŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ
themes of Man the Hunter discourses (hunting large beasts; constant dangers; 
utilisation of technology) are present. This subversion highlights the contextual 
nature of such imaginings (see below). 
It should be noted that the existence of hunting in early human behaviour is 
not unique to the Man the Hunter thesis, what is unique however is the suggestion 
that it was the hunting adaptation that was crucial in making us human. In the words 
of anthropologist Sherwood Washburn, one of the most prominent advocates of the 
theory: 
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In a very real sense our intellect, interests, emotions, and basic social life  W all 
are evolutionary products of the success of the hunting adaptation 
(Washburn & Lancaster 1968:293). 
 
Although the image was already present in science in the late 19
th
 century 
 ?ƐĞĞ ďĞůŽǁ ) ? ,ĂƌĂǁĂǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ DĂŶ ƚŚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞůĞǀĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
orthodoxy in the 1950s was a product of tĂƐŚďƵƌŶ ?ƐƚŝŵĞŝŶƚŚĞĂĨƚĞƌŵĂƚŚŽĨtŽƌůĚ
War II, at the height of the Cold War. Haraway views Man the Hunter as a prototype 
ŽĨ  ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ŵĂŶ ? ? ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ hE ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? hŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĂŶ
Rights. Universal man was a replacement for the orŝŐŝŶĂůƐƵďũĞĐƚ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂŶ ? ?
since international man invoked the potentially thorny issue of human rights 
requiring citizenship of a nation state. Universal ŵĂŶ ǁĂƐ ĨĞůƚ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ŵŽƌĞ ĞĂƐŝůǇ
ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? ƌĐŚaic figures like Man the 
Hunter too offer a chance to escape from the complications of history, by allowing 
history to be reconfigured according to personal taste. For Haraway, Man the Hunter 
was the result of Western Cold-War scientists moulding these proto-humans into 
something like their own image: 
 
What it meant to be universal man and to be human generically turns out to 
look very much like what it meant to be western scientific men, especially in 
ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ Q DĂŶ ƚŚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ĞŵďŽĚŝĞd a socially 
positioned code for deciphering what it meant to be human  W in the western 
sense of unmarked, universal, species being -  after World War II (pp.186-
187). 
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Pre-historical figures like Piltdown are receptive to such abstractions, and so are 
open to being shaped by cultural discourses, such as that of the heroic, 
technologically-enhanced hunter. The Illustrated London News (28:12:12: iv-v) 
carried a large image of the figure, showing Piltdown Man striding purposefully 
across a lush landscape, a spear grasped in one hand, and a sharpened stone tool in 
the other, heading determinedly in the direction of a roaring hippo-like beast. 
Perhaps the best example from the Piltdown episode of how fragmentary evidence 
was contorted to fit such a picture comes from an Express article (23.12.12:1). The 
following is quoted in the article directly from Woodward himself, which is important 
as it shows that the hunter imaginings were not merely journalistic distortions of 
 ‘ƉƵƌĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
The thickness of the skull suggests outdoor life, and the teeth are ground 
down in a way that human teeth are not usually ground; they indicate a root and 
vegetable diet, mixed with dust and sand, accidentally introduced. The roots would 
be eaten just as they were taken from the soil, without washing or cooking. This race 
probably had no knowledge of fire. 
The stone implements found by the skull were rude in design, and were 
employed in preparing skins, also in cutting wood. 
It is pretty certain that this was a race of wandering hunters. They had no 
domestic animals, for no bones of any have been found (23.12.12:1). 
 
tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŵŽƐƚ ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ  W  ‘/ƚ ŝƐ ƉƌĞƚƚǇ
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ Ă ƌĂĐĞ ŽĨ ǁĂŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ ŚƵŶƚĞƌƐ ?  Wseems to contradict all the 
evidĞŶĐĞŚĞŚŝŵƐĞůĨŐŝǀĞƐ ?dŚĞǁĞĂƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞĞƚŚƐƵŐĞƐƚƐĂ  ‘ƌŽŽƚĂŶĚǀĞŐĞƚĂďůĞ
ĚŝĞƚ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨŚƵŶƚŝŶŐǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ?ŽƌĨŝƌĞƚŽĐŽŽŬŵĞĂƚ ?ĂŶĚŶŽĂŶŝŵĂů
bones were found. One might suggest from such evidence that the figure was 
primarily a herbivore (perhaps even a fully committed vegetarian?) but this would 
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ŚĂƌĚůǇ ďĞ ĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ĨŽƌ  ‘Ă ŶĞǁ ƚǇƉĞ ? ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ Ă ŶĞǁ ĐƵŶŶŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ ĂŶ
ĂŵĂǌŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĚĞŶŝǌĞŶƐŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĞƐƚ ?  ?ĨŝƌƐƚƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ
article). Instead this was a memďĞƌŽĨĂƌĂĐĞ ‘ĨƌŽŵǁŚŽŵĂůůŽƚŚĞƌĂŶŝŵĂůƐƐŚƌƵŶŬ ?
(ibid. ) ?ZĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŽtŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ŽŶĞ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚŶĞĞĚ ƚŽďĞĂŶĂŶĂƚŽŵŝƐƚ ƚŽ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ‘dŚĞƚŚŝĐŬŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŬƵůůƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŽƵƚĚŽŽƌ
ůŝĨĞ ? ?tŚĂƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌŝƐƚŚĂƚĂƉƌĞ-formulated image of Piltdown, based upon culturally-
specific ideas of humanness, is leading the interpretation of evidence. Another 
example comes from the Guardian, which states: 
 
Palaeolithic man was a river-draft hunter, and the Sussex skull was found in 
an old river bed. It is open to surmise that he met with his death while 
following his prey (21.11.12:8). 
 
Again, the conclusion  W ƚŚĂƚWŝůƚĚŽǁŶǁĂƐ ‘ĂƌŝǀĞƌ-ĚƌĂĨƚŚƵŶƚĞƌ ? Wleads the evidence. 
The location of the skull might well suggest that the figure drowned whilst crossing 
the river, or was washed into it by a flood perhaps, rather than being taken as 
evidence of a mortal struggle with some beast or other along its banks.  
Elsewhere in the news media coverage numerous exotic beasts are invoked 
against whŝĐŚ ŽƵƌ ďƌĂǀĞ ŚƵŶƚĞƌ ŵŝŐŚƚ ƉƌŽǀĞ ŚŝƐ ŵĞƚƚůĞ P  ‘ƚŚĞ ǁŽŽůůǇ-haired 
ƌŚŝŶŽĐĞƌŽƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŵŵŽƚŚ ?  ?Guardian  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ŵĂƐƚŽĚŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ
hippopotamus and the sabre-ƚŽŽƚŚĞĚƚŝŐĞƌ ? ?Express  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? ‘ƚŚĞůŝŽŶ ?ďĞĂƌ ?ĂŶĚ
sabre-ƚŽŽƚŚƚŝŐĞƌ ? ?Illustrated  London News 28.12.12:958). 
 
5.2 The New Woman 
Returning to the Express article of December 23
rd
, 1913, one can demonstrate an 
important element of the Man the Hunter discourse which should not be ignored. 
Although there is much in common between the images Haraway discusses and 
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those present at Piltdown, they are also distinctions. Persistent themes running 
through the hunter discourse are mixed up with features relevant to the particular 
socio-historical context in which any particular account is written. The title of the 
Express ƉŝĞĐĞƐƵďǀĞƌƚƐƚŚĞ ‘DĂŶ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞďǇůŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇƚŽƚŚĞ
woman's suffrage movement of the time. In the original Dawson and Woodward 
paper, the latter suggests that the Piltdown figure may have been a female 
(1913:138), a claim that was ignored by all the newspapers except the Express, 
presumably because it did not fit with the celebratory mighty hunter image. The 
Express was deeply critical of the suffragettes
29
, and drew a parallel between them 
and a barely human Piltdown by entitling the article  
 
The New Woman (200,000 Years Ago). She Could Not Cook. She Could Not Talk. 
She Could Not Wash. She Could Not Light A Fire (23.12.12:1).  
 
 ‘EĞǁǁŽŵĂŶ ?ǁĂƐĂĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƵƐĞĚƉĂƌůĂŶĐĞĨŽƌƐƵĨĨƌĂŐĞƚƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞ
to cook, wash, or light a fire was presumably intended to reflect upon their own 
refusal to carry out domestic chores traditionally required of women. Compared with 
the reverent tone of much of the coverage elsewhere in the mass media, the 
ǆƉƌĞƐƐ ? has a clear element of mockery. The Illustrated London News ?ŵŝŐŚƚǇŚƵŶƚĞƌ
ůŝǀĞĚ ŝŶ  ‘Ă ŐĞŶŝĂů ĐůŝŵĂƚĞ ĂŵŝĚ Ă ůƵǆƵƌŝŽƵƐ ǀĞŐĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ďǇ ĂŶ
ĂďƵŶĚĂŶĐĞŽĨŐĂŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞŐĂŵĞƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞůŝǀĞĚǁĞƌĞƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚ
ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂďůĞ P ‘ůĞƉŚĂŶƚƐĂŶĚƌŚŝŶŽceros of species long since extinct roamed in herds 
ĂůůƌŽƵŶĚŚŝŵ ?dŚĞƐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŚŝƉƉŽƉŽƚĂŵƵƐŶŽĚŽƵďƚŚĞŬŝůůĞĚĨŽƌĨŽŽĚ ? ?ibid.).  
                                                     
29
 For evidence of the Express ? ƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƵĨĨƌĂŐĞƚƚĞƐ ? ƐĞĞ ƚŚĞĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ
 ‘^ƵĨĨƌĂŐĞƚƚĞ DĂĚŶĞƐƐ  WMoĚĞƌŶ ƉŝĚĞŵŝĐ ŽĨ DĞŶƚĂů ŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? ^ĞĞ ůŝĨĨŽƌĚ  ? ? ? ?  ) ĨŽƌ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
discussion of the Express ?ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵĨĨƌĂŐĞƚƚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ ? 
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In contrast to this lavish landscape, the Express ? ‘EĞǁtŽŵĂŶ ?ŝŶŚĂďŝƚĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞ
ĚĂƌŬĨŽƌĞƐƚƐŽĨŽƵƌ ůĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?ŚĞƌƉƌĞǇƚŚĞĚĞĐŝĚĞĚůǇŵŽƌĞŵƵŶĚĂŶĞ ‘ƌŽŽƚƐ
ĂŶĚƐŚĞůůĨŝƐŚĂŶĚǁŝůĚĨƌƵŝƚ ? ?ibid.). Instead of hunting ƚŚĞŚŝƉƉŽƉŽƚĂŵƵƐ ?ƐŚĞ ‘dodged 
the mastodon, the hippopotamus and the sabre-ƚŽŽƚŚĞĚƚŝŐĞƌ ? ?ibid. my italics). The 
Illustrated London News describes the hunter tŚƵƐ P  ‘Ă ŵĂŶ ŽĨ ůŽǁ ƐƚĂƚƵƌĞ ? ǀĞƌǇ
muscular, and had not yet attained that graceful poise of the body which is so 
characteristic of the human race to-day. But he was by no means lacking in 
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? ŐĂŝŶ ? ƚŚĞExpress has a less impressivĞ ŝŵĂŐĞ P   ‘Ă
strange, hairy ape-ůŝŬĞ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ Q ,Ğƌ ďŽĚǇ ǁĂƐ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŚĂŝƌ ? ^ŚĞ
ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚƐƉĞĂŬ ?ďƵƚĂƐƐŚĞĂŵďůĞĚĂůŽŶŐƐŚĞƵƚƚĞƌĞĚƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŶŽŝƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?
The hairiness of the New Woman belies her lack of femininity, an image that is 
reinforced by the ǆƉƌĞƐƐ ? pictorial reconstruction of the figure, strikingly different 
from one taken from the Illustrated London News. 
   
  The Mighty Hunter   The New Woman 
      Taken from The Illustrated London  Taken from The Express 23.12.12 
        News 28.12.12  
 
 In chapter four, I identify the powerful influence of nationalism in shaping the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƌĞƐƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐ ? particular angle on the figure, it 
too shows patriotic persuasions, and so does not simply denigrate the find. In fact 
ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ŝƐŚĂŝůĞĚĂƐĂŶ  ‘ĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ ŝŶƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶŽĨŵĂŶ ?ĂŶĚ
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ĐůĂŝŵĞĚĂƐ ‘ŶĐĞƐƚƌĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚZĂĐĞdŽ-ĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?ƚŝŐŚƚƌŽƉĞŝƐǁĂůŬĞĚ
between outright ridicule of the figure, and the celebratory tone seen in coverage 
elsewhere: despite, then, her dubious qualities she was still an exceptional creature 
 W  ‘^ŚĞǁĂƐĂŶĞǁƚǇƉĞ ?ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐĂŶĞǁĐƵŶŶŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĂŶĂŵĂǌŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
ŽǀĞƌĚĞŶŝǌĞŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌĞƐƚ ?ĨŽƌƐŚĞĐŽƵůĚĚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ ? ? ? ? ?12.12:1). The 
lesson to be learned from this is that the hunting discourse is never simply one thing, 
but is better thought of as a template to which might be attached disparate 
elements depending on the situation in which it is applied. These disparate elements 
are particular social currents of that specific time and place, as the missing link is an 
imagining of our own past, not its. 
 
5.3 Contextualising the Hunter 
Ăƌƚŵŝůů ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )ŽǁŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŚƵŶƚŝŶŐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ
that many scientific imaginings of Man the Hunter were not celebrations, but rather 
misanthropic warnings derived from the horrors of World War II. One such imaging 
comes from Raymond Dart, the discoverer of Australopithecus in 1923. In his early 
papers on the find, Dart declared this early hominan to be a scavenger who seemed 
more commonly to be the hunted rather than the hunter: 
 
[Australopithecus] had evolved an intelligence (to find and subsist upon new 
types of food and to avoid the dangers and enemies of the open plain) as well 
as a bodily structure (for sudden and swift bipedal movement, to elude 
capture) (1926:317). 
 
 By the 1950s however, emboldened by further discoveries in which 
Australopithecus had been found in the locale of big game remains which Dart 
believed to have been fashioned into weapons, Dart was claiming his discovery as a 
deadly hunter, whose skills drove his human development  W  ‘ ?Australopithecus] was 
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ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƚĂŬŝŶŐĚŽŵŝŶŝŽŶŽǀĞƌĞǀĞƌǇďĞĂƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ QĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇĐƌĞĞƉŝŶŐ
thing thĂƚ ĐƌĞĞƉĞƚŚ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌƚŚ Q dŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ĨŽŽĚ ƐƵƉƉůǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďƌĞĐĐŝĂ-makers 
ǁĂƐǀĞŶŝƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?/ĨƚŚŝƐƐŽƵŶĚƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĐĞůĞďƌĂƚŽƌǇ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂƌƚ
used elsewhere in arguing that the hunting adaptation drove the development of 
humans was far from so: 
 
The creatures that have been slain and the atrocities that have been 
committed in the name of religion from Carthage to Mexico, the hecatombs 
of animals that have been sacrificed from the altars of antiquity to the 
abattoirs of every modern city, proclaim the persistently blood-stained 
ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŽĨŵĂŶ ?,ĞŚĂƐĞŝƚŚĞƌĚĞĐŝŵĂƚĞĚĂŶĚĞƌĂĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĞĂƌƚŚ ?ƐĂŶŝŵĂůƐ
or led them as domesticated pets to his slaughterhouses. The loathsome 
cruelty of mankind to man is the inescapable byproduct of his blood lust; this 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ ŝƐ ĞǆƉůŝĐĂďůĞ ŽŶůǇ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
carnivorous and cannibalistic origin (Dart & Craig 1959). 
 
Writing in the aftermath of WWII Dart saw a link between the barbarous events of 
his own time and the posited hunting behaviour of Australopithecus - ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĂƌƚ ?Ɛ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŵĂŶ ? PŶŽƚĂĐĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?
but a lament. In contrast, the Piltdown coverage seems to be of the former, but then 
this was prior to the horrors of the 20
th
 ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌůĚ ǁĂƌƐ ? ĂŶĚďĞƐŝĚĞƐ ? ƌŝƚŝƐŚ
scientists and journalists lauded the figure for no greater reason than that he was 
found in their own backyard (chp.4). 
 
5.4 The Birth and Death of the Hunter 
 Whatever the particular emphasis of any example of Man the Hunter discourse, 
it should be noted that both Haraway and Cartmill locate non-empiric, cultural 
factors as the impetus for it. Both authors give a role to scientific evidence in the 
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embracing of the Man the Hunter thesis by the science community from the 1950s 
through to the 1970s, but these too are tied up with cultural factors. Cartmill points 
out that the hunting adaptation had been suggested in the science literature as early 
ĂƐŚĂƌůĞƐDŽƌƌŝƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŽƌŬ ?WĂƌƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁĂƐ not accepted by the 
establishment until the 1950s, he suggests, is that the Man the Hunter thesis was 
strongly Darwinist at a time when such ideas were unpopular
30
, and it was only after 
the neo-Darwinist revival of the 1930s that a receptive environment was present.  
Where folk knowledge melded with science knowledge again was in dealing 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ ŵŽĚĞů ƵŶĚĞƌĐƵƚ ŝĚĞĂƐ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƵŶŝƋƵĞŶĞƐƐ ďǇ
suggesting a continuum between all animals, including ourselves. In chapter four I 
show how contempŽƌĂƌǇ ŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐ  ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ƵƐĞĚ ďǇ ǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐ Ɛ ƚŽ
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĂƌǁŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵ ? ďǇ ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ĂƐ ĂŶ
intermediate link between human and animal during the Piltdown episode, allowing 
a bridge across the binary without threatening the uniqueness of white Europeans.  
In the post-colonial, post-Holocaust era of the 1950s, this traditional link 
between animals and humans was no longer acceptable. In an era of universal man, 
a marked adaptive shift was necessary to provide grounds upon which Darwinists 
could clearly delineate human from beast, for which the hunting adaptation was 
perfectly suited, being apparently a trait unique to hominans, fitting both the 
scientific and the cultural mood of the time. 
The fall from grace of Man the Hunter yet again attests to the mixing of 
scientific and cultural discourses that takes place in such human-animal boundary 
debates. By the 1970s it was clear from primatology studies that chimps practiced 
group hunting  W no longer considered a unique behaviour to humans, hunting was 
unable to explain our unique developments. Additionally, the evidence Dart drew on 
                                                     
30
 Cartmill quotes Ernst Mayr on this point  W  “hƉƚŽƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇĂůůƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌďŽŽŬƐ
on eǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ Q ǁĞƌĞ ŵŽƌĞ Žƌ ůĞƐƐ ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ĂŶƚŝ-Darwinian. Amongst non-biologists Darwinism was 
ĞǀĞŶůĞƐƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
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to justify his claims  W ƚŚĞ ďŽŶĞ  ‘ƚŽŽůƐ ? ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĐŝŶŝƚǇ ŽĨAustralopithecus 
remains  W were later shown to be just like the remains of prey left by big cats and 
hyenas (Brain 1981).  
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?ƚŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĨŽƐƐŝůŝƐĞĚ ‘ƐŵŽŬŝŶŐŐƵŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚŬŝůů
the Man the Hunter thesis on their own. Just as damaging were attacks from those 
who failed to see their own experience of humanity catered for by the thesis. 
DŽƌŐĂŶ ?ƐThe Descent of Woman (1972) tackled Man the Hunter with a critique of its 
patriarchal construction of human origins that found little or no place for females: 
 
Most of the books forget about her for most of the time. They drag her 
onstage rather suddenly for the obligatory chapter on Sex and Reproduction, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƐĂǇ P ‘ůůƌŝŐŚƚůŽǀĞ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶŐŽŶŽǁ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞǇŐĞƚŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞĂů
meaty stuff about the Mighty Hunter with his lovely new weapons (pp.9-10). 
 
SiŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ĨŽƌŵĞƌƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐŽĨtĂƐŚďƵƌŶƐƵĐŚĂƐŝŚůŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? )ƵƐĞĚĂ  ‘tŽŵĂŶƚŚĞ
'ĂƚŚĞƌĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞDĂŶƚŚĞ,ƵŶƚĞƌ P 
 
dŚĞƵƐƵĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŵŽƐƚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƉƌĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŝƐ “tŚĂƚǁĞƌĞ
the women and children doing while the males were out ŚƵŶƚŝŶŐ ? ?,ĞƌĞ/ĂƐŬ
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? “,ŽǁĚŝĚŚƵŵĂŶŵĂůĞƐĞǀŽůǀĞƐŽĂƐƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞĨĞŵĂůĞƌŽůĞ ? ?
(1978:5). 
 
Others meanwhile attacked its militarist implications (Boulding 1968), or saw it as an 
attempt at absolving us from blame for our actions by pinning the responsibility on 
our evolutionary heritage (Eldredge & Tattersall 1982). Scientists still search today 
for exclusive evolutionary pressures which might explain humans as unique, however 
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they are likely to evoke more prosaic explanations such as large group size driving 
social development (e.g. Dunbar 2004) or the adoption of an agrarian lifestyle (e.g. 
Mithen 2006)  W what we might called the Mighty Socialite and Mighty Farmer. 
Within science at least, Man the Hunter is no more, but the impossibility of 
separating science from culture in respect of such a symbolic a figure as early human 
remains a pertinent lesson for tackling the binary pure-popular model. 
 
 ?Ǥ ?Ǯǯ 
As a final example both of the role of non-scientific factors in the treatment of 
these figures, and also of the need to appreciate the context in which any particular 
GLVFRYHU\ WDNHV SODFH 6RPPHU¶V  DQDO\VLV RI WKH WUHDWPHQW RI D 1HDQGHUWKDO
discovery in France provides an interesting comparison regarding how these figures 
are reconstructed in the popular imagination. Sommer shows how politics and religion 
shaped understandings of the figure, which was uncovered at La Chappelle-aux-Saints 
in 1908. In contrast with my own work, which finds a singular image of Piltdown 
propagating (at least within the British media), Sommer finds that heterogeneous 
images spread across the French newspaper coverage of the Neanderthal specimen - 
some claiming the creature a savage brute divorced from humanity, whilst others saw 
it as domesticated precursor to themselves.  
, VXJJHVW WKDW WKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ WKHVH WZR ILJXUHV¶ WUHDWPHQW ZDV
primarily due to the prominent role of the Catholic Church in the Neanderthal 
discovery. The find was uncovered by three priests, and the scientist given the 
remains, Marcellin Boule, was selected on the grounds that he was likely to be more 
VHQVLWLYH WR WKH &KXUFK¶V DQWL-Darwinian 31  stance than the more radical and 
                                                     
31
 dŚĞĂƚŚŽůŝĐŚƵƌĐŚ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝƐŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ ?/ƚŚĂƐ
never officially ruled out the possibility that humans and other animals have evolved from other forms 
ŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?/ƚĚŽĞƐŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƚĂŬĞƵŵďƌĂŐĞĂƚĂƌǁŝŶ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞĂŶǇƐƵƉĞƌŶĂƚƵƌĂůĨŽƌĐĞĨƌŽŵ
the process by positing purely mechanistic processes driving evolutionary change (Johnston 
www.catholic.net). 
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DQWLFOHULFDO (FROH G¶$QWKURSRORJLH %RXOH IRXQG KLPVHOI DQG KLV GLVFRYHU\ ZHGJed 
between a progressive evolutionist mainstream press on the one hand, and a defensive 
reactionary Catholic Church on the other. Sommer argues that Boule structured his 
account of Neanderthal in such a way as to accommodate both opposing viewpoints- 
 
The ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƉĂƉĞƌƐĐŽƵůĚƌĞĂĚŽƵůĞ ?ƐďƌƵƚŝƐŚƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶĂƐƐǇŵďŽůŝǌŝŶŐ
sub-humanity, therefore bringing Neanderthal into harmony with a non-
literal reading of the biblical Genesis Q KŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ ? ŵŽƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
newspapers aligned with the dominant neo-Lamarckian discourse and could 
ƌĞĂĚ ŽƵůĞ ?Ɛ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŽŶ EĞĂŶĚĞƌƚŚĂů ĂƐ ĂŶĂƚŽŵŝĐĂů ůŝŶŬ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
Pithecanthropus ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ? ?ŽƌWĂůĂĞŽůŝƚŚŝĐŚƵŵĂŶƌĂĐĞƐ )ĂƐĂƚƌƵĞ
missing-link (p.231). 
 
/ƚ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽĨ ^ŽŵŵĞƌ ?Ɛwork (which 
specifically compared religious and mainstream news outlets) makes any direct 
comparison of the reception given to Piltdown and the Chappelle-aux-Saints 
Neanderthal difficult. One point that can be made though is that Woodward and 
Dawson did noƚĨĂĐĞŽƵůĞ ?ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ?ĂŶĚƐŽĐŽƵůĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌ
the image of the figure. Sommer suggests that in trying to keep everyone happy 
Boule gave a rather ambiguous status to the Neanderthal find and did not involve 
himself prominently in its popular imaginings, with the result that within the 
mainstream media the image of the figure as a brute took on a life of its own, or, 
more accurately, took on a life given to it by journalists. By the time Boule attempted 
to recover some control of the fiŐƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞŶĞǁƐŵĞĚŝĂ ?ƐďƌƵƚĞŝŵĂŐĞ ?
it was too late - the idea had stuck in the popular consciousness.  
In the Piltdown case however the scientists involved did not need to balance 
the desires of opposing groups, and so continued to play a proactive role in shaping 
the figure in the public realm. As a result it seems as though the French journalists in 
the Chappelle-aux-Saints case dominated the popular science far more so than their 
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British colleagues did during the Piltdown episode, where only the ǆƉƌĞƐƐ ?New 
Woman demonstrated a clear independence from the scientists involved. The lesson 
ŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŵĂǇ ďĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
universal. The unique circumstances of the Chappelle-aux-Saints find gave the 
Catholic Church enough leverage over the construction of the figure to limit the 
input of the principal investigating scientist, creating a vacuum which journalists 
filled - a variation on, I would suggest, the more common model found in the 
Piltdown episode. 
 
6. Popular Science and Palaeoanthropology 
'ĞĞ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƵĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ?Ɛ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?
scientists should refrain from attempting to form any sort of narrative around 
hominin remains- 
 
the evolution of Man is said to have been driven by improvements in posture, 
ďƌĂŝŶƐŝǌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚĂŶĚĂŶĚĞǇĞ QƵƚƐƵĐŚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ
are subjective. They can never be tested by experiment, so they are 
unscientific. They rely for their acceptability not on scientific test, but on 
assertion and the authority of their presentation (2000:5). 
 
Instead, he argues, palaeoanthropology should limit itself purely to cladistic 
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ? ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ? 'ŝǀĞŶ ŵǇ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂďŽǀĞ
there is much to be said ĨŽƌ'ĞĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚĂƐ ůŽŶŐĂƐǁĞƌĞŵĂŝŶǁĞĚĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
pure-popular model. His main complaint may lie with the dearth of evidence 
available for such claims, whilst my own focuses on the unacknowledged role of 
wider cultural knowledge, but both suggest the same conclusion. 
Placing an embargo on such science is easier said than done however. 
ĞĐĂƵƐĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ůŝŬĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ŽĨĨĞƌ ƵƉ ǁŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?
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stories, asking scientists to avoid such meta-questions is no minor request: these are 
issues that are hugely beguiling to both scientists and laypersons alike. Few non-
experts would be content to limit discussions to the exact cranial capacity of 
Piltdown, when they could consider instead how a figure that may have had a 
capacity for intelligence equal to our own, but was seemingly unable to speak, would 
have lived in a world populated by sabre-toothed tigers and the like.  
The evidence from Piltdown suggests that scientists (fellow humans too lets 
not forget!) themselves were drawn to such matters. Much of the Illustrated London 
News ?ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞŶĂďŽǀĞ ?ǁĂƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶďǇt ?WWǇĐƌĂĨƚ ?ĂǌŽŽůŽŐŝƐƚ
and associate of Woodward. As we have already seen, Woodward himself was the 
inspiration for the Express ?ƚĂůĞŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐůŝĨĞ  ‘ĚŽĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƐƚŽĚŽŶ ? ?,ŝƐŐƌĞĂƚ
rival in the debate, Arthur Keith, similarly engaged in bringing these figures to life, 
telling the Guardian during the Piltdown coverage that the Galley Hill man
32
 ǁĂƐ ‘ƐŽ
modern in build that we might meet him on the streets of London to-day and pass 
Śŝŵ ďǇ ƵŶŶŽƚŝĐĞĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?  ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƐŝůĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ
scientists on these topics would not guarantee the silence of others in the public 
ƌĞĂůŵ ? ĂƐ ^ŽŵŵĞƌ ?Ɛ EĞĂŶĚĞƌƚŚĂů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ĂƚƚĞƐƚƐ ? 'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĂ  ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ and US 
scientists are currently engaged in a struggle with proponents of creationism and 
other theologically informed claims on human origins, such a self-imposed silence 
ĐŽƵůĚďĞŚƵŐĞůǇĚĂŵĂŐŝŶŐƚŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵ ? 
Finally, the argument made by both Cassidy (2006) and Felt (2000), that the 
public realm  W in the form of the mass media  W provides a useful creative space in 
which scientists can develop ideas and reach across disciplinary boundaries, should 
be remembered. Such an embargo could, then, damage science politically - in the 
loss of cultural authority; materially - in the loss of resources that would likely follow 
the loss of authority; and intellectually - in denying scientists an open space in which 
                                                     
32
 Galley Hill man, discovered in 1888, was then thought to be the oldest remains found in Britain prior 
to the find at Piltdown. 
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to test out their ideas. For the non-creationists amongst us, it would also be 
damaging to wider culture. 
It should be noted that that within the palaeoanthropological community 
there is an awareness of what would appear as violations of archetypal pure science. 
>ĂŶĚĂƵ ?ƐNarratives of Human Evolution (1991) contends that investigations of 
human origins have consistently recycled a narrative structure similar to that 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ŝŶ WƌŽƉƉ ?Ɛ ĐůĂƐƐŝĐMorphology of the Folktale (1968). Just as Propp 
identified recurring units of narrative in the folktales he studied, Landau identifies 
repeated events in accounts of human evolution, such as terrestriality, bipedalism, 
encephalization and civilization (p.6), and then draws parallels between these and 
WƌŽƉƉ ?ƐƵŶŝƚƐǁŚĞƌĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞŚĞƌŽ experiences a change of situation, must 
leave his home, undergoes testing challenges, and is eventually transformed.  
Landau argues that by recognising the role of story-telling in what they do, 
palaeoanthropologist will be better equipped to create new theories. A similar 
argument is advanced by Stoczkowski (2002), but here it is not the structure of 
evolutionary accounts which is recycled, but the components driving evolution 
(bipedalism, language etcetera), going right back to texts from antiquity. 
Bowler (2001) refutes both these claims, arguing that the authors fail to 
ground their evidence in their historical contexts, and that apparently similar motifs 
had very different meanings in their specific time period. Bowler acknowledges that 
elements of evolutionary accounts do appear repeatedly, but sees these  W using an 
evolutionary metaphor  W as homoplaises, rather than homologies33. In other words, 
evolutionary debates tend to fluctuate between a few set positions not because 
current scholars are returning to previous work, but because something pushes them 
                                                     
33
 Homology refers to similarity due to shared origins, whereas homoplasy refers to similarity due to 
convergent or parallel evolution.  
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ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŝŵĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŝŵĞ ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ŽǁůĞƌ ƐĞĞƐ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
limitations of the conceptual frameworks we use: 
 
In effect, the alternatives are built into the very nature of the problem: if you 
have doubts about monophyly, for whatever reason, you have to jump to the 
alternative of polyphyly. This is exactly the characteristic that Gould identifies 
ŝŶ ŚŝƐ  ‘ĞƚĞƌŶĂů ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ? P ƚŚĞǇ ŬĞĞƉ ƌĞƐƵƌĨĂĐŝŶŐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ǁĞ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ
about the question except in terms of certain basic alternatives. It is like a 
dialectic that have become stuck in a groove, thesis and antithesis bouncing 
backwards and forwards because no synthesis is possible (1991:18). 
 
 In these debates we see an awareness of the point that I am making here, 
that the knowledge flow in palaeoanthropology cannot simply be understood by 
upstream science production and downstream culture consumption. Landau sees 
the science as being unwittingly structured by story-telling conventions, for 
Stoczkowski there is a reliance on the resurrection of historical ideas, whilst Bowler 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶŽŶůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĐůĂŝŵƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ibid. p11). All three authors aim to improve science by getting 
scientists to recognise non-scientific factors in their work. 
 
7. Binaries/Trinaries 
ŐĞŶƚƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ďŝŶĂƌŝĞƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨŽƌŵ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĨŽĐƵƐ  Whuman-
animal and science-culture  W have notably similar solutions for protecting their 
dualisms. Whilst apparently remaining wedded to the idea of a clear binary, a more 
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƚƌŝŶĂƌǇ ŝƐ ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐůǇ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?
(Bauman 1991). For Bauman, third categories are an inevitable outcome of the non-
fit between the contiguous natural world and the dichotomising human mind that 
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seeks to understand it. When a case appears that does not concur with popular 
binaries the result is a third category that straddles the division. 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ůŝŵŝŶĂů ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ŝƐ ƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚ
during the episode as an absolute, as it is in popular culture generally: humans have 
humanity, non-human animals do not. The existence of figures such as Piltdown 
transgress the artificial divisions we impose upon nature however. The sole 
justification given for declaring Piltdown human was its skull capacity. The team that 
discovered it gave it a skull of approximately 1000 c.c., roughly intermediate 
between modern humans and modern non-human primates. If anything, this implies 
that Piltdown would have been semi-human. What could such a category mean 
though in a system of absolutes? Such a question was never asked, and certainly 
never answered, explicitly at least.  The resolution of this disjuncture can be seen in 
chapter four, in which I argue that the boundary remained explicitly a dichotomy of 
human-animal but was implicitly mobilised in the debate as a trinary of White 
European/Non-White Savage & Piltdown/Animal. 
Similarly, a third category appears in the science-culture division, in the form 
of popular science. Having provoked the debate by unambiguously declaring 
Piltdown human (itself a decision based on no more scientific a criteria than 
nationalism), pure science was left protected in its self-constructed enclave of the 
science media, whilst its proponents ventured out to wow the public in the mass 
media. This engagement took place under the guise of popular science, at a safe 
ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ŝƚƐ ƉƵƌĞ ďƌĞƚŚƌĞŶ ? ,ĞƌĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƐŚŝĞůĚĞĚ ďǇ ƉƵƌĞ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
authority, and yet wielded the very same folk knowledge as the lay public they 
engaged. It was such folk knowledge that they relied upon in trying to bridge the 
ǀŽŝĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐĐŚŝŵĞƌŝĐƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŽƵƌŽǁŶĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵŽƵƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
Where my own trinaries ĚŝǀĞƌŐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ĂƵŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŝƐ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇƌĞǀĞĂůŝƚ
for the sham that it is, and so imperil the entire edifice. In my own work however, 
trinaries act to protect the dichŽƚŽŵǇ ? Ɛ ŝŶ ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
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science  W the third category - allows the scientist to utilise the benefits of science 
when engaging with the public, without placing science itself in the firing line. 
Instead, the public can only challenge popular science, which if threatened can be 
discarded by the scientist as merely a distortion of pure science, much like the lizard 
might sacrifice its tail to escape from danger. Likewise, the human-animal binary is 
protected by a metaphorical (and in a seŶƐĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂů )  ‘ŶŽ-ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ůĂŶĚ ? ŽĨ ŶŽŶ-white 
savage and Piltdown Man. Piltdown Man is positioned here so that his existence 
offers no threat to the existing binary.  
In both cases, the trinary allows a middle ground where tensions between 
the world and our divisions of it might be resolved or, perhaps more accurately, 
avoided. 
 
8. Conclusion 
dŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ Ăŝŵ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ƐĞĞŬ ĂŶ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
humanness was constructed and why it took the particular forms that it did. This in 
turn allowed a consideration of the link between the knowledge claims made of 
Piltdown in the science and popular realms. The material studied showed that any 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐǁĂƐƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌƌĞĂůŵ ?
True to the empirical requirements of their discipline, palaeontologists declined any 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ? dŚĞǇ
discussed skull capacities, reconstructions of the jaw, the possibility of tool use  W all 
those subjects illuminated by the physical remains uncovered.  
tŚĞƌĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ƐƚĞƉƉĞĚ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ƉƵƌĞ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ĚŽŵĂŝŶ ǁĂƐ ŝŶ
ůĂďĞůůŝŶŐ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?- a concept far too nebulous, and far too burdened by 
cultural imaginings, to be evidenced by nothing more than a handful of skull 
ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐ ?^ĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐƚƵĐŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵŽƌĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ‘Homo ? Wa 
ƚĞƌŵŵŽƌĞĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĨƌŽŵĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇƵƐĂŐĞƚŚĂŶ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?ĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞůĞƐƐĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚ
 W but its very abstraction would limit its appeal to a general audience. In declaring 
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WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ƚŚĞǇ ƐŚŝĨƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ
popular culture concepts, an act that made their claims relevant to it. This boundary-
shifting act went unrecognised by those involved however. The result was that 
PŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇǁĂƐ ‘ďůĂĐŬďŽǆĞĚ ? ?>ĂƚŽƵƌ ? ? ? ? )ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? 
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ŝŶƚŚĞĞƉŝƐŽĚĞƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞŶŽǀĞůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
which might resolve these tensions, it is perhaps no surprise that popular science  W 
that is to say the mass media coverage of the find  W was no more reflexive in its 
utilisation of humanness. Here too humanity was granted to Piltdown with no 
justification other than that the skull, although small, appeared anatomically like that 
of a modern Homo sapiens. As we saw however, the popular science did at least 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽŐŝǀĞWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ  WŝĨŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐ
then at least exploring it. This though left popularisers (both scientists and 
journalists) with the unenviable task of attĞŵƉƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
contradictory characteristics with a dichotomous view of the human-animal 
boundary. Their solution was to create the trinary detailed above which placed 
Piltdown with indigenous groups, somewhere between human and animal. 
ThĞƌĂĐŝƐŵĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚŝƐƚƌŝŶĂƌǇǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŽŶůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ
reception. The Express ?  ‘EĞǁtŽŵĂŶ ?ĂŶŐůĞ ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŐĞŶĚĞƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ
on the unfortunate muse, and is also perhaps unique in the entire episode as 
demonstrating a consciŽƵƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽƐŚĂƉĞWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ?
Elsewhere, for example in the repeated comparisons between Piltdown's 
capabilities and those of indigenous groups, it appears as though the protagonists 
(scientists and journalists alike) are unaware of the political dimensions to their 
imaginings: that Aborigines were inferior to white Europeans was simply accepted 
knowledge  W to the protagonists it was natural fact rather than imperial hubris. The 
Express on the other hand was clearly not simply following conventional wisdom 
when it implied a link between a proto-human and 20
th
 ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ
ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ ?dŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶǀŝƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘EĞǁtŽŵĂŶ ?ůĂďĞůǁĂƐƚŚĞŶƚŚĞŽŶůǇƚŝŵĞ
in the science and popular coverage of Piltdown during 1912-1913 that a reflexive 
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awĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ǁĂƐ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ  W and was  W 
shaped by contemporary discourses. Whilst the Express ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐƉŝŶǁĂƐŶŽ ůĞƐƐ
repugnant for it, this unfortunate example is arguably the closest the debate came to 
realising that WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇǁĂƐůĞƐƐĂǁŝŶĚŽǁŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƐƚƚŚĂŶĂ
reflection of 20
th
 century social categorisations. 
 What does this tell us of the relationship between science and the mass 
media at this time? At times in the discussion above I have spoken of science and the 
media as though they were clearly separate entities, as the pure-popular model 
would suggest. However, the most prominent lesson from the affair was that in 
respect of knowledge claims any clear separation is exceedingly difficult, and that 
the pure-popular model of the relationship between science and wider culture 
masks a far more complicated reality. The trinary of pure science/popular 
science/popular culture was invoked not to better map the relations between 
science and wider culture, but rather to protect the former from the latter. 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐƌĞĨƌĂŝŶĞĚĨƌŽŵĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐŽŶWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞ
science realm, they were happy to do so in the popular realm, where they provided 
some of the most sensationalist material, either directly or in interview with 
journalists. This material relied far more upon preconceived folk knowledge than it 
ĚŝĚƵƉŽŶĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ? ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?/ƚŝƐĂƐŵŝůĂƌĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚůĞĂĚƐ,ĂƌĂǁĂǇ
ƚŽ ƐƚĂƚĞ  “^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŝƐ ĂďŽǀĞ Ăůů Ă Ɛtory-telling practice in the sense of 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?/ƚŵŝŐŚƚǁĞůů
ďĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŽŽ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ƚŽ ŐƌĂď ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁƐ ŵĞĚŝĂ ?Ɛ  Wand 
ŚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ?Ɛ  Wattention was as important as any scientific evidence in the 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĚĞĐůĂƌĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ŚƵŵĂŶ P WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ƚŚĞ  “ďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚƐ ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ǁĂƐ Ă ĨĂƌ
ŵŽƌĞ ƐĂůĂĐŝŽƵƐ ƐƚŽƌǇ ƚŚĂŶ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ƚŚĞ  “ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ĂƉĞ ?  ?Express 12.08.13:1). Its is 
easy to see figures like Woodward and Keith as the Robert WinstoŶ ?ƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƚŝŵĞ ?
Lord Winston, as scientist and television personality, has presented numerous shows 
ĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĞƐ  ‘tĂůŬŝŶŐtŝƚŚĂǀĞŵĞŶ ? ?
which used advanced animatronics and CGI to give an account of human history. The 
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ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ? ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ĂŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽŶĞ ? ĂƐ ǁĞ ƐŚĂůů ƐĞĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǆƚ
ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨHomo floresiensis. 
 DĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ?ƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶǇĨŽƌŵŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ
humanness left the way open for journalists to manipulate the discovery according 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ƌĂƌĞůǇ
appeared evidence that they were aware of this freedom. Instead, most coverage 
relied on regurgitating accepted ideas of white superiority, and propagating images 
ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ŽǀĞƌ ŽƚŚĞƌ ůŝĨĞ ǀŝĂ ŚĞƌŽŝĐ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŽĨ Ă ŵŝŐŚƚǇ
hunter. There is, regardless, nothing to suggest that had any explicit debate taken 
place in the science literature, it would have been any freer of the sexism, 
nationalism and racism that tainted the popular coverage of Piltdown. In fact in what 
discussion did take place the latter two were just as prevalent in the science 
coverage.  
 The picture of science and the media we are left with then is one in which 
scientists utilised their considerable authority to dominate the public discussion of 
Piltdown, and yet relied primarily upon the very same cultural ideas as the journalists 
involved to make sense of Piltdown. Although considerable skill was exercised in the 
anatomical reconstruction work of Woodward, Keith and others, this was of only 
limited relevance to the issues which were focused on within the popular realm - 
whether Piltdown was human, and what this meant. On these issues scientist drew 
their knowledge from the dominant popular discourses of the day. The boundary 
between science and the media then was every bit as blurred as the boundary 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇĂŶĚŽƵƌŽǁŶǁĂƐ ? 
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1. Introduction 
The discovery on Flores - one of the larger islands of the chain that makes up 
Indonesia - of the remains of two small-bodied hominines was announced to the 
world at joint conferences in London and Sydney on the 27
th
 October 2004. The 
events were hosted by the journal Nature, which carried two papers on the find in its 
issue released the following day. The discovery consisted of a near-complete skull 
and jaw, together with the right leg and the left side of the pelvis (Brown et al. 
2004:1055). Most of the rest of the skeleton consisted of fragments. The discoverers 
argued that the evidence was strong enough to declare the find the type specimen 
of a new species, that they labelled Homo floresiensis. Remarkably, not only was this 
figure just 3ft high with a brain no bigger than a chimp, and yet showing evidence of 
complex human-like behaviours, but it was also still alive less than 15,000 years ago. 
The type specimen itself was called LB1, after the location of the find  W Liang Bua. 
The left side of the jaw of a second individual, LB2, was also discovered. 
The announcement received huge attention from the popular news media, 
and all seven newspapers featured in the study carried articles on the find in their 
28
th
 October editions. Two broadsheets, the Guardian and Daily Telegraph, even 
devoted front page space to it. Perhaps more remarkably, all three tabloids in the 
study covered the story, despite having little regular science coverage. The attention 
given demonstrates that the discovery, like that at Piltdown, had wide-ranging 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŽŽŬ ŝƚ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ ǁĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĐĂůů  ‘ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞ
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?  Wthe everyday science of the mundane and uncontroversial that goes 
largely unnoticed by the media and wider public.  
dŚĂƚŵĞĚŝĂŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶƚŚĞ&ůŽƌĞƐ ?ĞƉŝƐŽĚĞǁĂƐŵĂƌŬĞĚůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƐƵĐŚ
science  W the great majority of science  W is a reflection not only of its unexpectedness 
and its importance to science, but also of the numerous connections that could be 
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made between it and non-ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƌĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ůŝǀĞƐ  WŝƚǁĂƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇĂ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ƐƚŽƌǇ ? ůů ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ŽĨ ůŝŶŬĂŐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ŽĨ > ?  W to the 
popular fictional Hobbit character; to a reimagined and recontextualised 21
st
  
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ DĂŶ ƚŚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘>ŽƐƚ tŽƌůĚ ? ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇ ŐĞŶƌĞ ŽĨ ĨĂƌ-away lands of 
mystery and danger; to the way we conceptualise humanity and our relationship 
with nature; to the animal rights debate. Such was the heady excitement brought by 
the discovery that the episode even witnessed respected scientists pondering 
whether the mythic beasts that cryptozoology concerns itself with might actually 
exist after all (Nature 27.08.04:online), and a (perhaps less respected) journalist 
declaring that   
 
after exploring regions where no scientist had ever set foot, I have to agree 
that yes, Hobbits could well be alive and well. Somewhere. (Daily Mail 
06.08.04:12). 
 
 Like Piltdown then, Flores offers the opportunity to study the relationship 
between science and non-science culture at a time when the usual demarcations 
between the two were tested by the level of public interest in the story. In order to 
investigate this relationship, the coverage of the find by popular news media, and 
inter- and intra-specialist science media between October 2004 and June 2007 was 
analysed. The news media sample was made up of four UK broadsheets  W the 
Guardian (including its Sunday sister, the Observer), Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and 
Times  W and three tabloids  W the Sun, Express and Mirror. The four inter-specialist 
science media were Nature, New Scientist, Science, and Scientific American. Finally, 
the seventeen peer-reviewed science journal papers that had been published on the 
discovery were also studied. 
 Having focused ŝŶ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ĨŝǀĞ ŽŶ ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ŚĞƌĞ / ǁŝůů ďĞŐŝŶ ďǇ
considering models of science communication more widely, before using a 
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chronological study of the knowledge claims that were made regarding LB1 to find 
out where such claims originated, and the routes they took from there. This will 
ƌĞǀĞĂůƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůƐƚƐŽŵĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐĨŽůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞƌŽƵƚĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚďǇƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?
 ‘ĐĂŶŽŶŝĐĂů ? ŵŽĚĞůƐ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽƚŚĞƌ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ďǇƉĂƐƐĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƌŽƵƚĞ
altogether, and made their claims directly to the popular realm. I will then analyse in 
detail how the discovery was discussed within the three forms of media to study the 
processes of change the story underwent as it moved between fora. Three 
repertoires in particular were crucial in how the find was made sense of by non-
specialist audiences -  ‘>ŽƐƚ tŽƌůĚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚŽďďŝƚ ? ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŶŽǁ
ĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ  ‘DĂŶ ƚŚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? ? dŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ďŽƚŚ ŚĞƌĞ ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ĨŽƵƌ
ďƌŽĂĚůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŵĂŶŶĞƌŝn which 
the Flores discovery was made sense of will be used to critique the uni-directional 
ĨůŽǁ ŽĨ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ŝŶ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵ ŵŽĚĞůƐ ůŝŬĞ ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ? &ŝŶĂůůǇ ?
elements will be identified which only existed outside of intraspecialist science 
media. Using all this gathered data, I will then proceed to outline my own model of 
science communication. 
 
2. Science communication models 
Popular science journals draw heavily on popular metaphors and images when 
framing much of the science they cover (Petersen 1999), and science and science 
fiction have been found to have a dialectical relationship (Haraway 1992). Despite 
this, Bucchi (1996) has argued that routine science does often follow the 
 ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŵŽĚĞůǁŚĞƌĞ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŽŶůǇŵŽǀĞƐ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ƚŚe domain of science 
and into the public domain once it has become relatively stable and uncontroversial. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů Žƌ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐ ĐĂŶ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶ  ‘ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? /Ŷ ƐƵĐŚ ĐĂƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌƵŵ ŝŶ which scientific 
debate takes place can move out of the scientific journals and university 
departments and into the public realm. Cassidy (2005) finds that such was the case 
in the 1990s with evolutionary psychology. Here controversial claims such as there 
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being an evolutionary basis for rape cut across social and political concerns and 
resulted in public debate featuring both scientists and non-scientists. Through a 
citation study, Cassidy finds evidence that not only did debate within popular culture 
encourage the debate within science, but also that popular science books were 
influential on later discussions within science.  
Among other things, such cases raise the issue of controversial versus routine 
science. Mellor (2003) makes the point that studies of science-popular culture 
interaction often focus on episodes of controversial science, and fail to acknowledge 
that the bulk of scientific output follows closer to the popularization model than that 
found by Cassidy. In my own work, the human-animal boundary occupies such a 
powerfully symbolic site that it could only be described as controversial science. 
Whilst acknowledging that the treatment of such science is likely to be different from 
the bulk of scientific claims, the relative impact that human-animal boundary science 
has on popular culture because it spans so many symbolic domains makes it all the 
more worthy of analysis: 
 
for citizens who want to take part in the democratic process of a 
technological society, all the science they need to know about is controversial 
(Collins and Pinch 1998:3). 
 
The same reasons that make human-animal boundary science non-routine make it of 
great interest to popular culture, and the media specifically, as such cases  ‘ĨŝƚǁĞůů
with media news values such as meaningfulŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞƚŽĚĂŝůǇůŝĨĞ ? ?ĂƐƐŝĚǇ
2005:136). 
In my previous chapter on the boundaries between science and popular 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ/ƵƐĞĚƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶŵĂŶƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
pure/popular model of science communication. HŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ
that this commonly used dichotomous model was operated by practitioners as a tool 
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ǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĂƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ?ĐŚŽŝŶŐ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ
river metaphor (1999:ix) for science communication, Hilgartner suggested that it 
ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĚĂƐĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
 ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ  ?Ɖ ? ? ?-529). The crucial distinction in 
,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ŵŽĚĞů ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŶŽ ĐůĞĂƌ ůŝŶĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĚƌĂǁŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ĂŶĚŵǇŽǁŶĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWŝůƚĚŽǁŶĐĂƐĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚŝƐ ? 
 dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƌŝǀĞƌ ?ŵŽĚĞůƚŚĂƚ /ǁŝƐŚƚŽƚĂŬĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ
with, which will form the basis of this chapter. Although it is not made explicitly 
clear, HilgartnĞƌ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?ƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ )ǀŝƐƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽĂƐƐƵŵĞĂŽŶĞ-way 
flow of knowledge from the science realm to the popular realm. In contrast, I wish to 
argue that, in the case of palaeoanthropology at least, a uni-directional flow of 
knowledge cannot be assumed. Instead, that the creation of figures such as LB1 
relies on an exchange of knowledge claims from various sources, including both 
science and popular culture. Before I proceed to make this argument, it is 
worthwhile to consider the various attempts that have been made to chart the 
relationship between scientific and popular knowledge. 
 ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌŝǀĞƌ ŵŽĚĞů ǁĂƐ Ă ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌĞ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇ
ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ? ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? dŚĞ ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ
model, prĞƐĞŶƚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞZŽǇĂů^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚThe Public Understanding 
of Science (Bodmer 1985), views any tensions present between science and the 
public as being simply the result of public ignorance. Building public trust in science 
is then a matter of educating the public better. The idea of a public deficit of 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŝƐ ĂŶ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?  ‘ĐĂŶŽŶŝĐĂů ?ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ
underpins it. This posits a clear, meaningful distinction between the entities of 
 ‘ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ? ? ǁŚĞre the latter are simply passive consumers whose 
attitude to science merely reflects their level of scientific literacy. If visualised, this 
ǁŽƵůĚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ůŝŬĞ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ƐŝŵƉůĞ ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĐŚĂƌƚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ĂďŽǆ ŵĂƌŬĞĚ  ‘^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?
ĨĞĞĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŽĂďŽǆŵĂƌŬĞĚ ‘WŽƉƵůĂƌƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ?ǀŝĂĂƚŚŝƌĚďŽǆ ‘WŽƉƵůĂƌ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?tŚŝůƐƚ
Hilgartner challenges the boundaries between these categories, in suggesting a one-
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way flow of knowledge his river model does not directly challenge the categories 
themselves. 
 ƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶDŽƐĐŽǀŝĐŝ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? 1998) identification of the processes by which 
ƵŶĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? >ŝĞǀƌŽƵǁ
(1990) too suggests a one-way flow of knowledge, yet argues that the popularized 
science that appears within the public realm is shaped by the values and beliefs of 
ƚŚĂƚƉƵďůŝĐĚƵƌŝŶŐĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ‘ĂŶĐŚŽƌŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ? P 
 
Representations [of scientific knowledge claims] are generated by a dual 
process of anchoring (classifying an unfamiliar phenomenon into a set of 
categories) and objectifying (converting the unfamiliar and abstract 
phenomenon into a familiar and concrete phenomenon by developing an 
image of it) (p.5). 
 
dŽ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ƚŚŝƐ ǁŝƚŚ 'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ ƌŝǀĞƌ ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ? ǁĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ŚĞƌĞ Ă ƌŝǀĞƌ ƚŚĂƚ
flows into a tidal deltĂ ? ƐŽ ǁŚŝůƐƚ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ  ‘ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ? ŝƚƐ ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ
consumption becomes a two-way process, where knowledge can travel in different 
directions at different times. 
 Lewenstein (1995) goes further, and suggests that linear models of scientific 
communicatiŽŶ ďĞ ƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚ ďǇ  ‘Ă ĐŝƌĐůĞ Žƌ Ă ƐƉŚĞƌĞ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? ƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůĚ ĨƵƐŝŽŶ
saga as a case study. This is not quite as radical as it might at first sound however - 
>ĞǁĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŝƐ ŽŶ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ^Ž
then, whilst the public realm (in the form of the mass media) played an active role in 
the dissemination of knowledge regarding cold fusion  W for both scientists and non-
scientists alike  W it did not necessarily have any impact on the actual content of any 
knowledge claims made:  
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the media played a role in helping researchers exchange data, though with 
unclear results on the process of the research itself (p.428). 
 
dŚŝƐ ƵŶďŽƵŶĚĞĚ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ  ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ?  ?Ɖ  ? ? ? ) ŝƐ ŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ĂŶ
important demonstration of the active role that forums traditionally viewed as non-
scientific can play in scientific controversies. 
 ůŽƐĞƌƚŽŵǇŽǁŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ůŝĞƐƵĐĐŚŝ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?tŚŝůƐƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞǇŽĨĨĞƌŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐĂŶŽŶŝĐĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ƵĐĐŚŝŝƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ?
ŵŽĚĞůƐ ůŝŬĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌ ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŽŽ ŚĞĂǀŝůǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŝƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚƚŽ ‘ĂŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ŵŽŶŽůŝƚŚŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ
taken-for-ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚŝƐ ?ƵĐĐŚŝĐŽŶ ƵƌƐƚhat much 
regular science does move in a one way process of diffusion from the esoteric 
 ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞũŽƵƌŶĂůƐ )ƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂ ) ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐĂŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ
term for this. However, in times of scientific controversies, when boundaries are in 
flux - perhaps because a new branch of science is trying to become established - 
scientists can circumvent the standard route, and proceed straight to public forums, 
ŝŶ ĐĂƐĞƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƵĐĐŚŝ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐ ĂƐ  ‘ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ) ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? )  ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ
Cloitre and Shinn (1985:31-60). During such episodes the content of scientific 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĐůĂŝŵƐĐĂŶďĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇĨŽƌƵŵƐŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ? P
 
I suggest that communication of science at the popular level may influence 
core scientific practice in many more different and subtle ways than simple 
support and reinforcement. As already shown, it can foster the inclusion or 
ƚŚĞĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŽƌƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚĐĂŶ
make room for new interpretations or confer a different status on existing 
models by linking them to other public issues and themes. The popular stage 
can in this sense provide an open space where stimuli, ideas and information 
may be merged and exchanged among different actors and across disciplinary 
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fields, in the absence of the constraints and conventions which bind scientific 
work and communication at the specialist level (p.386). 
 
To what degree though could the Flores episode be said to fit the accounts 
given above? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the chronological 
trajectory of the discovery, noting its appearance in intraspecialist, interspecialist, 
and popular media. In this way, particular knowledge claims can be traced back to 
their source. 
 
3. Timeline of the Story  
As already stated, following the opening press conferences on the 27
th
 October 
2004, all the newspapers in the study covered the story, as did all the interspecialist 
journals. Just over a week later, floresiensis was in the news again: the Daily Mail 
(6.11.04) carried a story from a reporter, Richard Shears, who had travelled to Flores 
Island in search of a living hobbit. It is testament to the credibility of science that this 
search was conducted in complete seriousness, when a week earlier such material 
could only have been published on April Fools day. 
 Obviously, other scientists too had access to such credibility however, and 
from them dissenting voices quickly appeared. On the 31
st
 October a 
palaeopathologist, Maciej Henneberg, had a letter published in the Adelaide Sunday 
Mail, in which he dismissed the skeleton discovered as a being merely that of a 
microcephalic Homo sapiens. Then, on 5
th
 EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ?dĞƵŬƵ:ĂĐŽď ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚ
ŬŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ?  ?Science 6.3.98:1482) in Indonesia, chaired a press 
conference where he too disputed the idea that the find represented a new species 
of Homo. Science (12.11.04) reported both these claims, and the Guardian (7.11.04) 
the latter. 
Over the next month both Science (26.11.04) and New Scientist (11.12.04) 
reported a new twist to the story  W Jacob had taken ownership of the remains to 
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carry out his own analysis, without the consent of most of the original team. In 
December 2004, the journal Before Farming published short arguments from three 
dissenters, including Henneberg, with responses from Brown and Morwood. 
However, these arguments were not peer-reviewed, the editor stating: 
 
Some might see this as a glorified chat room, but the issues raised by each of 
the contributors here are current, valid until proven otherwise and need a 
public airing (Barham 2004:1). 
 
Brown and Morwood themselves were critical of this process in their response to 
,ĞŶŶĞďĞƌŐ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ  ‘dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĂŶ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ƉŽŽƌůǇ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝůů
ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ?ƉŝĞĐĞŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ĂŶĚĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞn published in a substantial peer 
ƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ ũŽƵƌŶĂů ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?dŚĞ ůĂĐŬŽĨƉĞĞƌ-ƌĞǀŝĞǁĂůƐŽ ůŝŬĞůǇĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?Ɛ
failure to leave any wider impression on the debate, going unreported by the 
interspecialist and popular media.  
In January 2005, Flores returned to the newspapers, when the Guardian 
reported that Jacob planned to study a pygmy population living on Flores for 
evidence of similarities to LB1. In March 2005, a paper by Falk et al appeared in 
Science arguing that a virtual endocast
34
 of floresiensis ? ƐŬƵůů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐůĂŝŵ
that it was a new species. This prompted coverage across all popular and 
interspecialist media, with the exception of the Sun and Express ?dŚĞƐĐĞƉƚŝĐƐ ?ƌŝǀĂů
claims were also widely reported at the same time. On the 10
th
 March another 
scientist, Robert Martin, wrote an article published in the Guardian in which he too 
refuted the new species interpretation. 
                                                     
34
 Ŷ ‘ĞŶĚŽĐĂƐƚ ?ŝƐĂĐĂƐƚƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶƐŝĚĞŽĨĂƐŬƵůů ? ‘sŝƌƚƵĂů ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐĂƐƚǁĂƐ
created inside a computer, using lasers to take measurements from the skull. 
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 In May, both the Daily Telegraph (3.5.05) and Daily Mail (7.5.05) reported 
:ĂĐŽď ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ? :ĂĐŽď ?Ɛclaims were included in a piece in which 
intrepid reporter Richard Shears returned once more to Flores Island to meet the 
ůŽĐĂů ƉǇŐŵǇ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ :ĂĐŽď ŚĂĚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ? dŚĞ ƉŝĞĐĞ ǁĂƐ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘/ ?ǀĞ
&ŽƵŶĚdŚĞ,ŽďďŝƚƐ ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞǁĂƐ slightly more circumspect:  
 
As I shook tiny hands and said goodbye, I felt I'd been touched by history. Very, 
very old history, recounted by very, very small people who may, just may, be 
ĚĞƐĐĞŶĚĞĚĨƌŽŵĂ,Žďďŝƚ ? ?ibid. p.34). 
 
(Perhaps unsurprisingly for those versed with the Daily Mail, anthropologist Gregory 
Forth (2006) reports that he later spoke to many of those interviewed by Shears, and 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘&ŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉĂƌƚ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ QǁĞƌĞƌĂƚŚĞƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚǁĂƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ
ŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƚĂďůŽŝĚ ? ?Ɖ ? ?3)).  
The publication in October of a new paper from the original team (Morwood 
et al. 2005), on the discovery of remains of nine more individuals, prompted further 
coverage from the Sun, Times, and Guardian (all 12.10.05). 
 On the 19
th
 May 2006, the first peer-reviewed paper from the critics of Homo 
floresiensis appeared, over 18 months after the first dissent had appeared in the 
news media. Martin et al argued that LB1 was a microcephalic human, not a new 
species. A paper from Jacob et al did not appear until 23
rd
 August 2006. By now only 
the Times, Guardian and Daily Telegraph were reporting events. A second paper by 
Martin et al, published 9
th
 October, went entirely unreported. It appeared as though 
the news media had lost interest in the dispute, although a new paper by Falk et al 
(2007), again supporting the new species claim, was reported in the Times and Daily 
Telegraph (30.1.07). 
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 What is most notable from this timeline is the degree to which the story of 
Homo floresiensis follows the route outlined ŝŶ ƵĐĐŚŝ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ
science communication. Although much of the news coverage was prompted by 
claims appearing in peer-reviewed journal media, the arguments of dissenters to the 
new species claim were notable in their bypassing of regular channels. Teuku Jacob 
announced his criticisms at a press conference, whilst others like Henneberg and 
Martin published directly in the news media with their own claims. Peer reviewed 
papers did not follow from them for some considerable time.  
Bucchi (p.382-383) suggests such episodes are most likely in cases where 
scientific boundaries are in dispute - for example when a new field is in its infancy - 
and public support is engaged as a means of proving the worth of a new boundary 
configuration. They can also occur when a shift of paradigm is sought. The Flores 
case was indeed debated between the supporters of two different evolutionary 
paradigms
35 ?dŚĞĚŝƐƐĞŶƚĞƌƐ ?ŵŽǀĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƌĞĂůŵĐŽƵůĚďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƐƵĐŚ
terms, of seeking public support for their paradigm, but significantly they did not 
frame their arguments along these lines. Additionally, palaeoanthropology is a 
mature discipline, and the differences between the two evolutionary paradigms 
long-standing and well recognised, so this was not an attempt to demarcate a new 
field. Alongside with these incentives to deviation, Bucchi ĂůƐŽƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
ĂŝŵƐĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚƐĐĂŶďĞƉƵƌƐƵĞĚ ? ?ibid. p379), and Flores appears such an example.  
Here the spur towards deviation is more likely to have been the combination 
of two more prosaic factors: the many news-worthy elements of the original claims 
which ensured that they were widely reported; and the discontinuity between the 
                                                     
35
 The most prominent dissenters, such and Jacob and Henneberg, supported the otherwise 
ƵŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ‘ŵƵůƚŝƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ?ŵŽĚĞůŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ Homo sapiens evolved throughout its 
entire habitat, whilst the team of Morwood & Brown followed the dominant Recent African Origin 
ŵŽĚĞů ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌůǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵƚŽĨĨƌŝĐĂ ?ŵŽĚĞů ) ?ǁŚĞƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚǁĂƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐĞĞ^ƚƌŝŶŐĞƌ ?
Andrews 2005:140-143 for more detailed description of the models). 
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near-instantaneous nature of modern news cycles, and the long, drawn-out process 
of peer review. This second factor meant that dissenters were left with the stark 
choice of either i) following the approved route of science communication, and 
remaining publicly silent for a considerable period of time, or ii) deviating from the 
approve route, and engaging their rivals immediately, whilst their peer reviewed 
response was processed. The reduced news media coverage given to the first peer-
ƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ ĚŝƐƐĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ  ? ? ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ůĂƚĞƌ  ?DĂƌƚŝŶ Ğƚ Ăů ?Ɛ ƉĂƉĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ǁĂƐ
reported by three newspapers, as opposed to all seven who reported the original 
ĐůĂŝŵƐ ) ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ũƵƐƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŚĂƐƚĞ ? ĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƚŚŝƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ƚĞĂŵ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ
extensive use of the popular media via press conferences, interviews
36
, television 
shows
37
 and, later, books (Morwood & van Oosterzee 2007), there is evidence that, 
ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƐĞŶƚĞƌƐ ? ĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ďǇƉĂƐƐŝŶŐŽĨĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚƌŽƵƚĞƐ ?KŶĞƐƵĐŚĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇDŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ƌŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ,ĞŶŶĞďĞƌŐ ?ƐBefore Farming piece reproduced above. Another comes 
from journalist Deborah Smith, who relates a conversation she had with Peter Brown 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ĞŶŶĞďĞƌŐ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ> ? P
 
/ ƌĂŶŐ WĞƚĞƌ ƌŽǁŶ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ĂŶĚ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ĨĂŶƚĂƐƚŝĐ Q ŚĞũƵƐƚ Śŝƚ ŵĞ ǁŝƚŚ
this huge spray  W  “ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŝůů-ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? ƚŚĞƐĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ
ƐƉĞĐŝŵĞŶ ? ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ ďĞĞŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚĞ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƌĞŶ ?ƚ ƉĞĞƌ
ƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵǇŝƚĂůŝĐƐ ) ? 
 
                                                     
36
 Morwood states that just one member of the Flores team  W Peter Brown  W conducted over 100 
interviews in just the first three days following the press conferences (Morwood & van Oosterzee 
2007:186). 
37
 The Flores team co-operated with a National Geographic film crew even before the discovery was 
announced. The resulting film was shown on the National Geographic ds ĐŚĂŶŶĞů ? ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘dŝŶǇ
,ƵŵĂŶƐ PdŚĞ “,ŽďďŝƚƐ ?ŽĨ&ůŽƌĞƐ ? ? 
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This supports the argument attributed to Lewenstein (Gregory & Miller 1998:82), 
ƚŚĂƚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐŽĨƚĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞŽƚŚĞƌƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚĂĐƚŝŶŐƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? dŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ &ůŽƌĞƐ ƐƚŽƌǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ƚĞĂŵ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŚĂĚ
ensured that the episode was very much centred within the public, rather than 
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ?ƐƉŚĞƌĞďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĚŝƐƐĞŶƚĞƌƐ ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ?dŚĞǇǁĞƌĞůĞĨƚƉůĂǇŝŶŐĐĂƚĐŚ-up. 
The deviated route which they took did not move the story into the public realm - it 
was already there - ďƵƚ ŝƚ ĚŝĚ ŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵƐ ďĞŐĂŶ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂting 
 ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĨůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĨƌŽŵŵŽƌĞůŽĨƚǇĐůŝŵĞƐ ? 
The arguments of the dissenters were not the only elements of the Flores 
story that originated in the public realm however, and so the deviation model does 
not explain events in their entirety. In the following section I shall show not only 
ŚŽǁ ? ůŝŬĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ? ŵƵĐŚ ŽĨ &ůŽƌĞƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇ ŶŽŶ-scientific 
culture, but also how many elements of the discovery only existed within public 
discussions. I will refer to these laƚƚĞƌĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ďĞŝŶŐ
science which takes place - which originates - outside the recognised forums of 
academic departments, peer-reviewed journals, conferences etcetera. More will be 
said when I come to discuss such material, but first to those texts that demonstrate a 
dual heritage, being a blending of science and wider culture  W ƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?
 
4. Popular Science 
As with Piltdown, the discussion of Flores man within the popular media was very 
different from that within the intraspecialist journal media. The sixteen peer-
reviewed journal articles included in the study discuss the anatomy of the discovery, 
its geological context, and the stone tools and other animal remains found in situ. 
One of the two original papers (Morwood et al. 2004) cites the stegodon remains 
found in the vicinity as evidence that they were being hunted by Homo floresiensis, 
ďƵƚŶŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞŽƌďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŝƐŐŝǀĞŶŝŶĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ?dŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌŵĞĚŝĂ ?ƐĐŽǀĞrage of the figure is markedly different, reflecting 
ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ĚŝǀĞƌƐĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ŽƌĞ
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empirical facts taken from the intraspecialist media are given  W location, age, 
dimensions etcetera  W but greater efforts are ĞǆƉĞŶĚĞĚ ŝŶŶĂƌƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?
existence, giving it meaning by placing it within a framework of culturally relevant 
signifiers. As might be expected, the interspecialist media combined elements of 
both popular and intraspecialist media, often using a popular style in the opening 
paragraphs, then in the body of the text providing greater technical detail, and less 
explanation of techniques and systems of classification, than the mainstream media 
coverage. Analysis in detail of two key narratives used in the discussion of LB1 will 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ?  ?>ŝĞǀƌŽƵǁ  ? ? ? ? ) ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ
popular culture occurred. 
 
4.1 Return of the Hunter 
The first of these narratives is a familiar one - the Man the Hunter trope. 
However, differences in the actual realisation of the Hunter template compared to 
the Piltdown case demonstrates clearly how it is flexible and open to adaptation. The 
ŝŵĂŐĞƐŐŝǀĞŶŽĨƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ůŝĨĞƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚŽƐĞŐŝǀĞŶŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
ninety-eight years earlier, with the common elements of hunting, technology, and 
terrifying beasts present again: 
 
On the island of Flores in the Malay Archipelago, scientists have found 
remains of a race of three-foot high humans who hunted pony-sized 
elephants and rats as big as dogs and who battled dragons with saliva laced 
with deadly bacteria. (Observer 31.10.04:21) 
 
a previously unknown species of HUMANS who lived in a lost world stalked by 
giant rats and mutant elephants. (The Sun 28.10.04) 
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they used fire, made sophisticated stone tools, and hunted stegodon - a 
primitive type of elephant - and giant rats. (Daily Telegraph 28.10.04:01) 
 
:ƵƐƚ ĂƐ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ůŝĨĞ ǁĂƐ ŶĂƌƌĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŵŽŶƐƚĞƌƐ ŐŝǀĞŶ Ă ƐĞŵŝ-
mythic quality by their absence from our contemporary woƌůĚ ? &ůŽƌĞƐ ? ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ
repeatedly built around bizarre adversaries  W huge rats, tiny elephants, and 
 “ĚƌĂŐŽŶƐ ? W  i.e. large lizards related to the Komodo dragon (Varanus komodoensis). 
Despite these constants, there are deviations from the Man the Hunter template. 
These contemporary twists have at least two sources. The first of these is simply the 
particular physical characteristics of the discovery  W &ůŽƌĞƐ ? ĚŝŵŝŶƵƚŝǀĞ ƐƚĂƚƵƌĞ
provided a paradoxically vertiginous hurdle to clear for any scientists or journalist 
hoping to present the figure in the Mighty Hunter mould. Creating a three foot high 
fearsome warrior would be no mean feat. The mass media turns this challenge into 
ĂŶĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂŶĚŵĂŬĞƐŐƌĞĂƚƉůĂǇŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐ&ůŽƌĞƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƌĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ 
fellow occupants of its island: 
 
d, ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ŽĨ Ă ĚŝŵŝŶƵƚŝǀĞ ĐŽƵƐŝŶ ŽĨ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ DĂŶ  Q ? ? ůƐŽ ŬŶŽǁŶ
affectionately as "Flo", it hunted pygmy elephants the size of ponies and giant 
rats as large as golden retrievers, while trying to avoid huge Komodo dragons 
and other predatory lizards that are extinct. (Times 28.10.04:6). 
 
A story of tiny Hobbit-like creatures battling giant, slavering dragons, of forest 
folk living in a tropical lost world, hunting miniature elephants and rats the 
size of retrievers (Daily Mail 28:10:04:24). 
 
dŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ŵĞĚŝĂ ƚŽŽ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚ ŝŶŚĂďŝƚĂŶƚƐ ? ŶŽǀĞů ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ĞůŝĐŝƚ
interest: 
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They may have been tiny, but the hobbits of the Indonesian island of Flores 
are still the focus of the biggest controversy in anthropology (Nature 
1.06.04:559). 
 
SOME 13,000 years ago, on a tropical island at the heart of the Indonesian 
archipelago, an extraordinary group of dwarf-sized people lived alongside 
dwarf elephants and giant lizards. (New Scientist 30.08.04:8) 
 
It is notable that even within the intraspecialist coverage, there is evidence that the 
ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞƌ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĚ ǁĞƌĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞ ? DŽƌǁŽŽĚ Ğů Ăů ? ?Ɛ
 ? ? ? ? ? ) ƉĂƉĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŝƚƐ ƚĞǆƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ƐŵĂůů ĨĂƵŶĂů ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ
those of fish, frog, snake, torƚŽŝƐĞ ? ǀĂƌĂŶŝĚƐ ? ďŝƌĚƐ ? ƌŽĚĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ďĂƚƐ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞ
ƉĂƉĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ůŝŵŝƚƐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ƚŽ ŽŶůǇ ƚǁŽ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ P  ‘ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ
deposits contain stone artefacts and animal remains, including Komodo dragon and 
an endemic, dwarfed species of StegodoŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ). This suggests that the appeal to 
readers of the more unusual fauna was not limited to the popular realm. 
Returning to the popular and interspecialist media, other labels attached to 
ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ  ‘ŵŝŶŝ-ŵĞŶ ?  ?ibid. ) ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ŚĞŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ Ă ƚŚƌĞĞ-year-ŽůĚ ĐŚŝůĚ ?  ?Daily 
Telegraph  ? ? P ? ? P ? ? P ? ) ?  ‘ƚŽĚĚůĞƌ-ƐŝǌĞĚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ?  ?ibid ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ŚĂůĨ-pint 
ŚƵŵĂŶ ?  ?Sci American 02.05:62) ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶŽ ďŝŐŐĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ Ă ĚǁĂƌĨ ?  ?The Express 
28:10:04:17). The Times ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƚŽŽůƐ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ƐŝƚƵĂƐ  ‘ƚŽǇ-ƐŝǌĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?.04:6). 
dŚĞ ŝŵĂŐĞ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞŶ ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ƵƚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? ƚŚĂŶ DŝŐŚƚǇ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ďĞƐƚ ďǇ ĂƌƚŝƐƚ WĞƚĞƌ ^ĐŚŽƵƚĞŶ ?Ɛ ŝĐŽŶŝĐ ŝŵĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ƐŚŽǁŶ
below. Originally commissioned jointly by National Geographic and the University of 
Wollongong ƚĞĂŵĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĞŝŵĂŐĞǁĂƐǁŝĚĞůǇƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ
in the mass media. Notably, although it features a weapon-wielding figure engaged 
ŝŶŚƵŶƚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐŝŶ&ŽƌĞƐƚŝĞƌ ?ƐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶŝŵĂŐĞ ?Illustrated London News 28.12.12: iv,v), 
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the creature itself is markedly less imposing and is drawn post- rather than pre- 
hunt, in a relatively relaxed state.  
 
     
    ^ĐŚŽƵƚĞŶ ?ƐƵƚĞ,ƵŶƚĞƌ              &ŽƌĞƐƚŝĞƌ ?ƐDŝŐŚƚǇ,ƵŶƚĞƌ 
   (www.studioshouten.com.au)       (Illustrated London News 28.12.12: iv,v) 
 
dŚĞŐƌŝŵĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨ&ŽƌĞƐƚŝĞƌ ?ƐĨŝŐƵƌĞŝƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚŝŶ^ĐŚŽƵƚĞŶ ?ƐďǇ
a somewhat beatific grin. The sizeable spear carried by Piltdown dwarfs the small 
ĐůƵďŚĞůĚďǇ&ůŽƌĞƐ ?/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƌŽǁŶĞƚĂů ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌ Wlike that of Dawson 
 ?tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ WĚĞĐůĂƌĞƐƚŚĞƐŬĞůĞƚŽŶƚŽďĞŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇĨĞŵĂůĞ ?^ĐŚŽƵƚĞŶ ?Ɛ,ƵŶƚĞƌ W
ůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚŽĨ&ŽƌĞƐƚŝĞƌ ?Ɛ Wis a male (see chp. seven). This repetition also flags up a note 
of difference, one that purely reflects changing cultural tastes  W although both 
ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ŶĂŬĞĚ ? WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ DĂŶ ?Ɛ ŵŽĚĞƐƚǇ ŝƐ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ďǇ Ă ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůůǇ
ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŚŝŐŚ ? &ůŽƌĞƐ DĂŶ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇ ŚĂƐ ŶŽ ƐƵĐŚ ƋƵĂůŵƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ  ‘ĨƵůů-
ĨƌŽŶƚĂů ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝŶ ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁĞůĐŽŵŝŶŐ ĐŚĂƌŵ ? ƚŚĞ ƉŚĂůůƵƐ
itself is rather non-confrontational in appearance. 
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 ?Ǥ ?	Ǯǯ 
The appealing image created of LB1 is reinforced by the most widely-repeated 
label attached to the find  W  ‘,Žďďŝƚ ? ? ƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůůǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĐƚŝŽŶĂů ǁŽƌŬŽĨ
J.R.R. Tolkien, the hobbits were a diminutive sub-species of human. Despite the 
ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇŽĨdŽůŬŝĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? ŝƚ ŝƐWĞƚĞƌ :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚLord of the Rings 
films that have cemented the Hobbit character widely within the contemporary 
consciousness. An often overlooked element of TolkieŶ ?ƐĨĂŶƚĂƐǇǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƐĞƚŽŶ
our own Earth, deep within pre-history: 
 
ŚĞ ĚŝĚ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ Ă ŶĞǁ  “ŵǇƚŚŽůŽŐǇ ?  ?Žƌ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ŵǇƚŚŝĐĂů ŵŽĚĞ ŽĨ
thinking) not just suitable but deeply appealing for our time (Thomas 
2006:83). 
 
It is a pleasing irony that his work - creating an origins story suitable for 
contemporary interests - ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽƚĞůůƚŚĞƚĂůĞŽĨŽŶĞŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ
links. 
dŚĞŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐƵƉŽŶ&ůŽƌĞƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ
of the anatomy of the recovered remains, but was rather the conscious selection of a 
 ‘ŶĞǁƐǁŽƌƚŚǇ ? ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ? > ? ?Ɛ ŚĞŝŐŚƚ ? ŝŶ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŝƚƐ ĨĂŶƚĂƐƚŝĐĂů ĨĞůůŽǁ ŝƐůĂŶĚĞƌƐ ?
made a link with Hobbits easy, yet this link was not simply a matter of shared 
narrative elements. The connection of the discovery to a well known contemporary 
story allowed the overlaying of LB1 with a pre-constructed character and set of 
ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?/ƚ ŝƐŶŽƚĐŽŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚĂůƚŚĂƚdŽůŬŝĞŶ ?Ɛ,ŽďďŝƚƐǁĞƌĞƉůƵĐŬǇƵŶĚĞƌĚŽŐƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
unlikely heroes of the Lord of the Rings. The narrating of LB1 was overwhelming 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇƚŽƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĐŽŶĚĞƐĐĞŶĚŝŶŐŝŶŝƚƐ ‘ĐƵƚĞŶŝŶŐ ? ?ĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŚŝĐŚĚŝĚ
not go unremarked upon in the coverage given: 
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Until just 12,000 years ago, there was a species of little people walking 
around who would have only come up to our waist. Finally they were wiped 
out, possibly following encounters with the much larger Homo sapiens who, 
it's feared, may have patronised them to death (Guardian 29.10.04:25). 
 
> ? ?Ɛ ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĂŝĚĞĚ ŝŶ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƚhe story 
newsworthy  W they introduced a note of novelty, the importance of which cannot be 
overstated for a business concerned with creating new news. They also, of course, 
ĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ,ŽďďŝƚůŝŶŬĂƚĂƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶdŽůŬŝĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁĂƐĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐůǇƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ?
TŚŝƐ ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŶĞǁ ĂŶĚ ŽůĚ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ĚŽǀĞƚĂŝůƐ ǁĞůů ǁŝƚŚ 'ĂůƚƵŶŐ ĂŶĚ ZƵŐĞ ?Ɛ
(1981) seminal analysis of what makes certain information newsworthy: 
 
The idea is simply that is not enough for an event to be culturally meaningful 
and consonant with what is expected -- this defines only a vast set of possible 
ŶĞǁƐ ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ Q ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚwithin the meaningful and the 
consonant that is brought to one's attention, and by "unexpected" we simply 
mean essentially two things: unexpected or rare (p55. AuthoƌƐ ?ŽǁŶŝƚĂůŝĐƐ ) ? 
 
The notion, as advanced by the canonical pure/popular model of science, 
that the mass media coverage simply regurgitates the claims of scientists, can be 
ƌĞĨƵƚĞĚďǇĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽĨ&ůŽƌĞƐ ?ŚĞŝŐŚƚǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚĐůĂŝŵŵĂĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ
find. Several groups of dissenting scientists (e.g. Henneberg 31.08.04, Jacob et al. 
2006, Martin et al. 2006) declared that Flores was not a new species at all, but simply 
a modern Homo sapiens suffering from microcephaly. Whilst this claim was reported, 
it was entirely ignored in popular imaginings of the creature. No where did anyone 
attempt to narrate a character who suffered from mental retardation. The mass 
ŵĞĚŝĂ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŝŶ Ă ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƐƚ ƐƚǇůĞ ? ďƵƚ
actively chose eůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ> ? ?ƐƐŝǌĞ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ
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popular classification of LB1 was a coconstruction of nature and society, not the 
determining of one by the other (Bowker & Star 2000:61). 
It might be expected that the dressing of LB1 in the garb of a popular culture 
icon like the hobbit was the work of journalists. In fact the original connection was 
made by the scientists who discovered LB1, long before it appeared in the media 
(and so long before scientists took the route of deviation, see below). Peter Brown 
was against its use, but Morwood and the rest of the team had no such doubts: 
 
ƐŝƚƚƌĂŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌǁĂƐŽƵƚŽĨWĞƚĞƌ ?ƐŚĂŶĚƐ ?ŵǇǇŽƵŶŐĞƌ/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂŶ
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐůŝŬĞĚƚŚĞŶĂŵĞ “,Žďďŝƚ ?ĂŶĚŚĂĚďĞŐƵŶƚŽƵƐĞŝƚĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƚĞly for 
> ? ? “,Žďďŝƚ ?ƐƚƵĐŬ ?DŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ǀĂŶKŽƐƚĞƌǌĞĞ ? ? ? ? P ? ?  ) ? 
 
Such was the appeal of the hobbit connection that the team even considered naming 
the species Homo hobbitus (ibid. pp151- ? ? ? ) ? ƌŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ
highlights again the distain that many scientists hold for any actions that might 
weaken the boundary between scientific and popular culture: 
 
As the referees note, the lunatic fringe are going to have a field day with the 
Flores midget. The last thing I am willing to do is pour fuel on that particular 
ĨŝƌĞ ?dŚŝƐŝƐǁŚĂƚĂŶǇƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽŚŽďďŝƚƐŽƌŵŝĚŐĞƚƐǁŽƵůĚĚŽ ? Q ?ĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ
would not help you and Bert [Roberts] get a job. Everyone would think you 
had gone nutty (Brown in ibid p.152). 
 
The attachment of the Hobbit character to the discovery was not the only use 
ŽĨ ĨŝĐƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ŝŶ ƌĞĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘>ŽƐƚtŽƌůĚ ?
ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇŐĞŶƌĞŝƐĂůƐŽĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?&ŝƌƐƚŵĂĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝŶ,ĂŐŐĂƌĚ ?Ɛ<ŝŶŐ^ŽůŽŵŽŶ ?ƐDŝŶĞƐ 
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 ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽƚŚĞƌŶŽƚĂďůĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞ<ŝƉůŝŶŐ ?ƐThe Man Who Would Be King (1888) 
ĂŶĚ ŽŶĂŶ ŽǇůĞ ?ƐThe Lost World (1912). More recently the genre has 
demonstrated its enduring popularity in the success of the King Kong film and its 
ƌĞŵĂŬĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ :ƵƌĂƐƐŝĐ WĂƌŬ ƚƌŝůŽŐǇ  ?ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘>ŽƐƚ
WorůĚ ? ) ? /ŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ ďǇ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŽĨ ǁŚŝƚĞ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƌƐ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ƵŶĐŚĂƌƚĞĚ ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
Africa, South America and Asia, the genre became popular at a time when the 
mysteries of the world seemed to have been largely laid bare by Victorian science 
and industry, and succeeded in satisfying a yearning for the thrill of the unknown. In 
the words of Conan Doyle himself: 
 
There had been a time when the world was full of blank spaces, and in which 
a man of imagination might be able to give free scope to his fancy. But [...] 
these spaces were rapidly being filled up; and the question was where the 
romance writer was to turn to (in Daziell 2002). 
 
This yearning for the mystery of the unknown is echoed in the floresiensis coverage: 
 
We think of our modern world as being totally explored, every inch trampled 
under the boots of countless surveyors, naturalists and map-makers (Daily 
Mail 28.10.04:24). 
 
 ďƌŝĞĨ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽŶĂŶ ŽǇůĞ ?Ɛ ŶŽǀĞů ĂůůŽǁƐŽŶĞ ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů
motifs common to the genre, and present in the mass media coverage of Flores. A 
ŵĂǀĞƌŝĐŬ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ? WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ ŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƌ  ?ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ? ĨŝƚƚŝŶŐůǇ ? ĂƐ  ‘Ă ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞ
ĐĂǀĞŵĂŶŝŶĂůŽƵŶŐĞƐƵŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ) ?ůĞĂĚƐĂƐŵĂůůƉĂƌƚǇŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĞǆƉůŽƌĞƌƐ
into the dense jungle of the Amazon in search of a fabled plateau. Having scaled the 
great cliffs that had kept this land isolated from the outside world since time 
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immemorial, the explorers enter a forested country populated by all manner of 
beasts long extinct elsewhere. Living amongst the forms of numerous dinosaurs are 
two hominan populations, one of archaic ape men, and the other of modern 
humans, in the form of a native tribe that had sought refuge on the plateau. These 
elements - the discovery of fantastical, far-away lands; ancient human populations; 
mythical beasts  W are prominent throughout the Flores coverage. 
Nature ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐƐ ƌĞůĞĂƐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ? ƐĞŶƚ ŽƵƚ ƚŽ ŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌƐ ŽŶ  ? ?th 
October (later than usual due to fears that excited journalists would break the 
ĞŵďĂƌŐŽŽŶƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇ )ĚŝĚŝƚƐĞůĨŵĂŬĞƚŚĞ ‘>ŽƐƚtŽƌůĚ ?ůŝŶŬ P 
 
As a form of dwarf human, the new species fits right in with the bizarre 
extinct fauna of Flores, which until recently was a kind of Lost World 
(25.08.04). 
 
The popular media took on this connection with gusto. All seven newspapers in the 
studǇ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĂĚũĞĐƚŝǀĞ  ‘ƌĞŵŽƚĞ ? ŝŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚŽĨ &ůŽƌĞƐ ? ĂƐ ĚŝĚNature,  
Science, and New Scientist. This itself is telling of the Euro-centric Lost World mindset 
with which Flores was interpreted  W after all, the island is not remote for its 
3,500,000
38
 inhabitants. The Sun ĞǀĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚĂƐ  ‘ĚĞƐĞƌƚĞĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
The Telegraph ĂĚŽƉƚƐƚŚĞǀŽŝĐĞŽĨĂsŝĐƚŽƌŝĂŶŶĂƌƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŽĨĂ ‘ůŽƐƚǁŽƌůĚĞĂƐƚ
ŽĨ :ĂǀĂ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞObserver ŽĨ  ‘Ă ƐƚƌŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐ ƚƌŽƉŝĐĂů ŝƐůĂŶĚƐ ?
(31.10.04:21). Often the Lost World analogies are made explicitly, as in the Nature 
press release: 
 
                                                     
38
 Figure of 3,500,000 inhabitants of Flores taken from Jacob et al. (2006:13422) 
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Flores until recently was a kind of lost world. It was home to a range of 
archaic creatures extinct elsewhere, often morphed into dwarves or giant 
forms (The Sun 28.10.04). 
 
a breathtaking journey into a lost world of mystery, suspicion and myth (Daily 
Mail 6.11.04). 
 
When the first human colonists arrived on the island of Flores in eastern 
Indonesia a few thousand years ago, they had no idea that they were 
treading on the remains of a lost world (Nature 27.08.04:online). 
 
As with the Hobbit discourse, the parallels between the Lost World trope and the 
Flores discovery are not hard to see, but again the link reflects more than a 
coincidence of elements  W it also serves a particular interpretation of events. 
Namely, Flores Island is some form of idyllic haven, cut-off from a world subjugated 
by modern humans. This interpretation leads us to the second inspiration for the 
contemporary reimagining of the Man the Hunter template that I mentioned above. 
This inspiration is the current of misanthropy within post-modernism that Franklin 
(1999) identifies in our changing relationship with animals. As he states: 
 
In the late twentieth century a generalized misanthropy has set in: according 
to this view humans are a destructive, pestilent species, mad and out of 
control. By contrast, animals are essentially good, balanced and sane (p3). 
 
Along similar lines, Arnold (1996) states 
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a sense of human beings as the guardians and destroyers of nature has only 
recently dawned upon us, and with it an awesome sense of our responsibility 
for the past destruction and the future survival of other species (p4). 
 
tĞŚĂǀĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐĞĞŶƚŚŝƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƌƚ ?Ɛ  ?Ăƌƚ  ?ƌĂŝŐ  ? ? )ďůŽŽĚ-soaked Man the 
Hunter, in which he grieves over a vision of humanness that revels in the slaughter of 
fellow humans and animals alike. Whilst the Lost World imaginings of Flores are less 
visceral, they do echo the notion that it is modern humans who are the Hunter. In 
thĞ ,Žďďŝƚ ůĂďĞů ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ^ĐŚŽƵƚĞŶ ?Ɛ ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ? > ? ?Ɛ ŚƵŶƚŝŶŐ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŚĂƐ ĂŶ
ĞŶĚĞĂƌŝŶŐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁŚĞŶŝƚƐƐƚĂƚƵƌĞŝƐ ũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
ŚƵŐĞ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ  ‘ĚƌĂŐŽŶƐ ? ? Ɛ 'ĂƌƚŚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ dŽůŬŝĞŶ ?Ɛ ŚŽďďŝƚ  ‘&ƌŽĚŽ ?
ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ‘,Ğŝs heroic precisely because he is a little man taking on an outsized burden 
ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ŐŽŽĚ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ŵǇ ŝƚĂůŝĐƐ ) ? dŚŝƐ ŚŽďďŝƚ ŝƐ Ă ƉůƵĐŬǇ ƵŶĚĞƌĚŽŐ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
than the domineering killer seen in the Piltdown coverage, of which we were told 
 
Elephants and rhiŶŽĐĞƌŽƐ Q ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŚŝƉƉŽƉŽƚĂŵƵƐ ŶŽ ĚŽƵďƚ ŚĞ ŬŝůůĞĚ ĨŽƌ
food, and, besides, he must have hunted a species of horse long since extinct 
(Ill. London News 28.12.12:958).  
 
Instead, in the twenty-first century version of the Hunter template, the killer has 
become us: 
 
Many of these [species of hominin] may have been exterminated by Homo 
sapiens, which is also suspected of genocide in the demise of Homo erectus 
and Neanderthal Man (Times 28.10.04:6). 
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Discovering a tribe of these people [extant Homo floresiensis], though 
unlikely, would be a major boost for evolutionary science. However, it would 
most probably be a total disaster for Homo floresiensis. The eradication of 
the Tasmanian aborigine in the 19th century is a grim but fitting example 
(Guardian 31.10.04:21). 
[The division of human body lice into two species] could only have happened 
through some act of primal genocide when Homo erectus met Homo sapiens 
ƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞ ŝŶ ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ ^ŝďĞƌŝĂ  ? Q ? ƚŚĞ ůŝĐĞ ŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞ ĨƌŽŵ ǀĞƌǇ ĨƌĞƐŚ
corpses and it is hard to suppose that they had died peacefully just before the 
intruders turned up (Guardian.co.uk 01.11.04). 
 
<ĞĞƉŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ >ŽƐƚ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶĂůŽŐǇ ? > ? ?Ɛ ŚŽŵĞ ǁĂƐ ĂŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚ WĂƌĂĚŝƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ
remained unchanged whilst modern humans spread across the globe. 
 
Their Eden remained undisturbed while modern humans colonised the world 
(Mirror 28.10.04:24). 
 
We swept all before us. There was probably no deliberate conquest, just a 
steady outgunning by spear and arrow of precious resources from rival 
ďƌĞĞĚƐ ? Q ?ƐĂĨĞ ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ůŽƐƚǁŽƌůĚ ?the Hobbits lived on, undisturbed by the 
rise and rise of Homo sapiens (Daily Mail 28.10.04:25) 
 
This theme is present too in the interspecialist media  
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We know that full-sized H. sapiens reached Australia and New Guinea 
through Indonesia by 46,000 years ago, that most of the large mammals of 
Australia then promptly went extinct (probably in part exterminated by H. 
sapiens), and that the first arrival of behaviourally modern H. sapiens on all 
other islands and continents in the world was accompanied by similar waves 
of extinction/extermination. We also know that humans have exterminated 
competing humans even more assiduously than they have exterminated large 
nonhuman mammals. How could the micropygmies have survived the 
onslaught of H. sapiens? (Science 17.12.04:2048). 
 
H. floresiensis may have coexisted with modern humans for tens of 
thousands of years. How the two populations interacted remains a mystery. 
H. sapiens might have outcompeted H. floresiensis for food and other 
resources, and this could have played a part in the demise of the smaller 
species. But it is just as likely that H. floresiensis was killed off by a volcanic 
eruption on the island that occurred around 12,000 years ago. (New Scientist 
30.08.04:08) 
 
In another example of how recurring motifs can convey very different 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ŝŶ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƚŝŵĞƐ ? ŽŶĂŶ ŽǇůĞ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Lost World aid the 
modern human inhabitants of the plateau in annihilating the ape men, and so 
ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƚŚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? dŚĞ ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ĂƉĞ ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ĞǆƚŝŶĐƚŝon is 
related reminds the reader though that this tale was published in the same year - 
1912 - that the Piltdown hunter was brought to life. There is then no lament for their 
destruction: 
 
Thirty or forty [ape men] died where they stood. The others, screaming and 
ĐůĂǁŝŶŐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚƌƵƐƚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞĐŝƉŝĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ǁĞŶƚ ŚƵƌƚůŝŶŐ ĚŽǁŶ  ? Q ?  ?d ?ŚĞ
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reign of man was assured for ever in Maple White Land. The males were 
exterminated, Ape Town was destroyed, the females and young were driven 
away to live in bondage, and the long rivalry of untold centuries had reached 
its bloody end (1995 [1912]:154). 
 
The Hobbit and Lost World discourses then not only comply with some of the 
scientific claims made  W Ğ ?Ő ?> ? ?ƐĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ?&ůŽƌĞƐ ?ĨůŽƌĂĂŶĚĨĂƵŶĂ ?ŝƚƐŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ
isolation (at least from Europe) - ďƵƚĂůƐŽƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
discovery in a manner that reflects wider contemporary understandings of humans, 
and the human-animal boundary. There is, however, a tension between the two 
discourses that reflects the complex, multi-faceted nature of our understandings of 
the boundary. The Hobbit theme encourages us to empathise with LB1, and to 
connect with its almost-humanness. In a strong sense then it is a clear 
demonstration of anthropocentric speciesism  - the Hobbit is the hero of this tale, 
not the dragon. In contrast, a contemporary reading of the Lost World theme leads 
us to see modern humans as the encroacher, which ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐƚŽĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ> ? ?ƐůƵƐŚ
idyll. The seed of this idea is present in the original Lost World texts which, after all, 
concerned the search for a world untouched by modernity. Here though the driver of 
ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞĨĞĂƌŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞ
see exercised without apology in the slaughter of the ape men, but quite the 
opposite: the search for the adventures that might come with conquering such an 
untamed place. In the years between its usage in the original texts and the 
treatment of Flores though, this seed has grown to dominate the diorama. For 
Flores, contact with modern humans does not bring adventure so much as 
destruction. It is a strongly misanthropic vision. 
The popular interpretation of LB1 is built then within the scaffold of two 
fictional creations. This is not to say though that it was entirely disassociated from 
the scientific claims made, but rather it was co-constructed. The mass media took 
ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? > ? ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚƵƌĞ ? ŵŝƐ-sized fauna), but made 
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sense of them by placing them into systems of meaning taken from fiction. Just as in 
the Piltdown case then, bringing LB1 to life involved a blending of science and 
ŶŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?tĞĐĂŶƐĞĞƚŚŝƐĂƐĂĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? )
the dualisms of nature and culture that Haraway identifies and embraces. However, 
Haraway focuses more on the shared processes of  creating both science and fiction - 
discussing both as acts of storytelling - rather than specifically the use of fiction to 
make sense of scientific knowledge claims. A closer analogy can be made with the 
use of metaphor in mainstream science coverage: 
 
ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ ĂƌĞ Q ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ ŝŶ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ǁĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶ ĂƌĞĂ ŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ Žƌ
perception that is unknown to the common readers is being reconceptualised 
in terms of a more concrete, familiar area (Calsamiglia & Van Dijk 2004:378). 
 
dŚŝƐ ďƌŝŶŐƐ ƵƐ ďĂĐŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ >ŝĞǀƌŽƵǁ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐ ? ŽĨ  ‘ĂŶĐŚŽƌŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ? ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ
them: 
 
in order for an idea to become the center of an issue culture, in order for it to 
become popularized, it must somehow fit into the values or beliefs of the 
larger culture that fosters it (p.9). 
 
In the present study anchoring refers to the process by which missing links are made 
to fit within the animal/human binary of popular culture. I shall focus on this process 
in the following chapter. What we are concerned with here is objectifying - the 
creation of narratives around LB1 that act to cement its conceptually unstable status 
somewhere close to human, but not quite, by giving this status meaning to a wide 
readership. This is the role that hunters and hobbits played in the process. The 
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ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘DĂŶ ƚŚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ďƵŝůƚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ
repertoires around Piltdown man and LB1 reflect the fact that such stories are 
always more of a mirror to contemporary ideas, rather than a window to the past. It 
ŝƐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ŝĚĞĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ? ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ŵƵƐƚ ĂƉƉĞĂů ƚŽ ŝĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ
position is to be fixed securely. 
 
5. Public Science 
There are elements of the Flores episode that were not only primarily influenced by 
popular - rather than empirical science  W knowledge claims, but which only took 
ƉůĂĐĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ŵĞĚŝĂ ? dŚĞƐĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ / ǁŝůů ĐĂůů  ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĐonsist largely of the philosophical implications of the discovery, 
though this is not to say that some of them were not concerned with very practical 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ> ? ?ƐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂŶŝŵĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?dƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂŶŽŶŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞůƐ
might be content to ůĂďĞů ƚŚĞƐĞ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ  ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ
solely within the public realm, but as I showed in chapter five, this label tells us more 
about the boundary-working actions of scientists than it does about the content of a 
particular discourse. Such a label connotes an inferior status to such knowledge, a 
status which is distinctly unwarranted. This material may not have the hard physical 
evidence that supports the anatomical reconstructions and carbon dating which 
comprise much of the intraspecialist science discourse, but restricting ourselves to 
such physical evidence would leave a great deal unsaid. It was partly on this basis 
ƚŚĂƚ / ĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚ 'ĞĞ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƵĐŚ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĐůĂĚŝƐƚŝĐ
analyses (chp. five), although his criticism was of narratives of how these figures 
lived their lives, rather than the philosophical questions of what these figures mean 
to how we live our own lives (though I would question whether the two can be 
separated). Finally, it is also worth noting that scientists themselves (Henry Gee  W 
who himself warned against creating narratives around missing links (chp.1 , sec. 3)  W  
included) were heavily involved in these discussions. 
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Such debates were not present in the coverage of the three tabloids included 
in the study, but within the four broadsheets analysed twelve of the thirty-eight 
articles on the discovery were partly, or wholly, concerned with these questions. 
Within the interspecialist media such articles were rare, but present, making up 
three of the forty full sized articles (i.e. not counting short news briefs). One of these 
was a column by Gee in Nature: 
 
[Flores] could change our view of ourselves in a fundamental way. As far as 
we know, Homo sapiens is the only species of human that yet lives on the 
planet. It is very easy to take this solitary estate (and our consequent 
separateness from the rest of the animal world) for granted, so much has it 
become ingrained in our philosophy, ethics and religion, even our science. ? Q ? 
Until now. If it turns out that the diversity of human beings was always high, 
remained high until very recently and might not be entirely extinguished, we 
are entitled to question the security of some of our deepest beliefs. Will the 
real image of God please stand up? (27.08.04:online). 
 
/ƚ ŝƐǁŽƌƚŚŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƉŝĞĐĞ ?ƐƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ
fully referenced. A similarly-themed article appears in New Scientist ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘ĞŶƚ
ƚŽKƵƌWƌŝĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?/ŶScience, Jared Diamond39 ?ƐƌĞĨůĞctions on the discovery 
focus more on narrative elements than philosophical ones: 
 
At last comes the question that all of us full-sized sapiens wanted to ask but 
ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ ĚĂƌĞ P ŝĚ ĨƵůů-sized sapiens have sex with micropygmies? The 
difference in body size would not have been an insuperable obstacle: Some 
                                                     
39
 Jared Diamond is a professor of evolutionary biology and author. 
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individual modern humans have sex with children or with domestic animals 
no larger than the micropygmies. I suspect that the answer is the same as the 
answer to the question of whether we modern humans have sex with 
ĐŚŝŵƉĂŶǌĞĞƐ ? tĞ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ĐŚŝŵƉƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŽŽ ƵŶůŝŬĞŚƵŵĂŶƐ ƚŽ ĂƉƉĞĂů
sexually to most of us, and because chimps are much too strong, 
unpredictable, and dangerous to make sex a safe proposition for any 
individual humans who might find them sexually attractive. Ditto for H. 
erectus, even when dwarfed (17.12.04:2048). 
 
Here too though Diamond considers the implications for our own world view: 
 
/ŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐůŝŬĞƚŚŝƐŽŶĞ ?/ ?ǀĞĨŽƵŶĚŝƚƵƐĞĨƵůƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨĂŐƌĞĞŶ
extraterrestrial friend visiting Earth from the Andromeda Nebula. My friend 
ƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚ ? “KŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶ ?ǇŽƵŚƵŵĂŶƐĂƌĞƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐŽĨǇŽƵƌŝŶŐƌĂŝŶĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ-
centric biases. You already know that large mammals colonizing remote small 
islands tend to evolve into isolated populations of dwaƌĨƐ  ? ? ? ? ? tŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ƐŽ
ĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŝŶŐ ? ^ŝŶĐĞ ǁŚĞŶ ĂƌĞŶ ?ƚŚƵŵĂŶƐ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ?ibid. 
p.2047) 
 
Again, this article is fully referenced. 
Henry Gee is prominent too in the news media (as a Nature editor he was 
one of the presenters of the London press conference announcing the discovery), 
telling the Daily Mail  ‘/ƚ ƌĂŝƐĞƐ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƵŶŝƋƵĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨŚƵŵĂŶ ůŝŶĞĂŐĞ - 
which is the foundation of our society and our religions' (28.08.04:24-25); the Daily 
Telegraph  ‘>ĞŐĞŶĚƐ ŽĨ  ?ǁŝůĚ ŵĞŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽŽĚƐ", the "Orang Pendek" in Sumatra, 
giants, and other fabled creatures could be a word-of-mouth record of an 
ĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŝŶŐĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨŚƵŵĂŶ ĨŽƌŵƐƚŚĂƚ ůŝǀĞĚŽŶƵŶƚŝů ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? ĂŶĚ
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The Times  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĚĞŶƐĞůǇ ƉĂĐŬĞĚ ƚǁŝŐƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞĞnd of our family 
ƚƌĞĞ ?ǁŝůů ?ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŽďĞŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? 
Gee was by no means the only scientist to purvey such ideas in the press. 
Chris Stringer
40
 tells the Guardian: 
 
I think a lot of people thought that humans were somehow different; that we 
had this all embracing culture and this unifying adaptation, that meant that 
human evolution progressed in a somewhat different way, because of our 
technology and the way we probably vainly think we are partly controlling 
the world, now. So people project backwards and think humans are 
somehow special. The evidence shows us that our evolution was as complex 
and as undirected, I suppose, as that of any other species we have studied 
(19.05.05:8). 
 
Charles Lockwood
41
 states in another Guardian ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ P ‘dŚŝƐĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇŝƐĂǁŽŶĚĞƌĨƵů
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŵĂŶǇ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ǁĂǇƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ ?
(31.08.04:21), and in the same piece Yoel Rak
42
 is quoted as saying  
 
We have got to get rid of the idea that because there is only one species of 
human being today, this has always been true. For most of our evolution the 
opposite was probably true. Think of that scene in Star Wars - in the bar 
                                                     
40
 Dr Chris Stringer is head of human origins at the Natural History Museum, and co-author of The 
Complete World of Human Evolution (2005). 
41
 Dr Charles Lockwood is a biological anthropologist at University College London. 
42
 Dr Yoel Rak is a palaeontologist at Tel Aviv University. 
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where you see all kinds of aliens playing and drinking and talking together. 
That image gives a better flavour of our evolutionary past (ibid.). 
 
Scientists played a prominent role in these discussions then. 
 
6. Modelling Science Communication 
An important argument to make at this point is that the processes of popular and 
ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂƌĞŶŽƚ  ‘ĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ďƵƚdeveloping it. Not only are scientists 
themselves just as involved in the popular science of LB1 as journalists are, but the 
discourses they construct expand on the core empirical evidence and, by building 
linkages between LB1 and already understood themes, allow it to be absorbed into 
popular culture. The act of popularizing science is simultaneously an act of creating 
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ P  “WŽƉƵůĂƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŬŝŶŐŽĨƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŽĨ
the sharing of it. Thus, sciĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ǁŚŽ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝǌĞ ĂƌĞ ĚŽŝŶŐ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ?
 ?'ƌĞŐŽƌǇ ?DŝůůĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞƐ ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ?ĂŶĚ
in the case of palaeoanthropological discoveries like Homo floresiensis there is a 
great deal of it. Such claims takes ƉůĂĐĞĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞĨŽƌĂ
(i.e. intraspecialist peer-reviewed papers, university departments and conferences) 
because they cannot take place within them. This may be simply for logistical 
reasons, as in the case of the Flores dŝƐƐĞŶƚĞƌƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵƐ- the eighteen months 
required for a peer-reviewed response to be published arguably left them with little 
choice but to make their arguments in the public sphere. Often though it is because 
the arguments themselves, although beguiling to scientists as much as public, are 
simply deemed unsuitable for coverage within a discipline that sets great store in its 
empiricism. These cases show how interspecialist and popular news media provide 
spaces in which scientists can creatively explore the wider implications of their 
claims (Felt 2000, Cassidy 2006). 
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What does the Flores case show in regards to models of science 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŶ ?,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŵŽĚĞůŝƐĂƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĂƐŝƚǁĂƐŝŶƚŚĞ
Piltdown episode for describing the lack of any clear division between scientific and 
popular media, whether in terms of style, content or language. In its idioms of 
 ‘ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŝƚŝƐƵŶƐƵŝƚĞĚ
however to explaining the degree to which the creation of knowledge around 
missing link figures was the result of a process of exchange between science and 
ǁŝĚĞƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ĂƐƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ>ŽƐƚtŽƌůĚƚƌŽƉĞ ?ƵĐĐŚŝ ?ƐĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ
route certainly covers aspects of the debate, in regards to how the diƐƐĞŶƚĞƌƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐ
bypassed the usual stages of scientific knowledge production, by going directly to 
the popular media, but not all of the scientific claims followed this route  W the 
ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƚĞĂŵ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐǁĞƌĞƉĞĞƌƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞpopular 
ƉƌĞƐƐ ? >ŝĞǀƌŽƵǁ ?Ɛ ĚƵĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝƐ ƚĞůůŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ǁĂƐ ŵĂĚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ
through the use of narratives, but in her own work  W using a continuum model like 
,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ- ƚŚŝƐŽŶůǇŽĐĐƵƌƐ ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ?dŚĞŚŽďďŝƚůĂďĞůŚŽǁĞǀĞƌŝƐĂĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ
example of how, during the Flores episode, popular culture ideas were circulating 
within science before any steps were made to engage the public. Whilst this label 
ŵŝŐŚƚ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ƚŚĞ DŽƌǁŽŽĚ  ? ƌŽǁŶ ƚĞĂŵ ?Ɛ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ŝƚ
certainly cannot be separated from the environment in which this data was 
interpreted and explicated in the narratives and debates which followed (including 
ƚŚŽƐĞĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ?ƐĞĞŶĞǆƚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ) ?'ŽŝŶŐďĞǇŽŶĚ
this, there are elements of the debate around Flores that only existed in the 
ŝŶƚĞƌƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ĂŶĚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ŵĞĚŝĂ ? ƚŚŽƐĞ  ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ
philosophical, conceptual implications of the find, and these too pose difficulties for 
models of science communication. 
Several analyses of scientific communication, outlined above, are revealing of 
elements of the Flores episode. None of them, however, truly captures the degree to 
which the knowledge claims and discourses created around LB1 were a hybrid of 
science culture and popular ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝĚĞĂƐ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚũƵƐƚ ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ?ďƵƚĂƚĂůŵŽƐƚ
ĂůůƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĞƉŝƐŽĚĞ ?dŚĞ ‘ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ?^ŚĂƉŝŶĂŶĚ^ĐŚĂĨĨĞƌ ? ? ? ? )ƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚ
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by scientists in their peer-reviewed work excels at removing any hint of external, 
non-empirical influence, and certainly one is hard-press to find such influences in 
Brown et al. (2004) and Morwood et al. (2004) (though hints are present, as in 
DŽƌǁŽŽĚĞƚĂů ?ƐƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŝƐůĂŶĚĨĂƵŶĂƚŽƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ) ?
However, to see these papers as isoůĂƚĞĚ ?  ‘ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŝƐƚŽ
ignore how the scientists digging at Liang Bua cave christened their discovery the 
 ‘ŚŽďďŝƚ ?43; to ignore the Nature press release announcing the Brown & Morwood 
ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ Ă  ‘>ŽƐƚ tŽƌůĚ ? ? ƚŽ ŝŐŶŽƌĞ ,ĞŶƌǇ 'ĞĞ ?Ɛ ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ-
published Nature ĐŽůƵŵŶĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘&ůŽƌĞƐ ?'ŽĚ ?ĂŶĚƌǇƉƚŽǌŽŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? PŽŶůŝŶĞ ) ?
Both Nerlich (2003) and Millburn (2004) identify a similar process  W of popular 
culture influencing science  W in reproductive technology and nano technology 
respectively:  
 
The mythologized order of precedence is therefore reversed, for it becomes 
evident that speculations of nanotech were freely circulating in the discourse 
ŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĨŝĐƚŝŽŶůŽŶŐďĞĨŽƌĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ‘ŐƌĂďďĞĚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂ ? ?/ĨǁĞƌĞĂůůǇ want to 
locate an origin to nanotechnology, it is not to [scientist Richard] Feynman 
that we must look, but to science fiction (Milburn 2004:123). 
 
Recognising these influences is important not only in moral terms, but practical too: 
the failure to recognise the value of external influence can lead to mistrust of the 
ŬŝŶĚ tǇŶŶĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƐŚĞĞƉ
farmers. 
                                                     
43
  “zŽƵǁŽŶƚŚĞĂƌWĞƚĞƌ ?ƌŽǁŶ ?ƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŚŽďďŝƚƐ ?ŚĞ ?Ɛǀ ƌǇŵƵĐŚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚŽďďŝƚƐ ?ƵƚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ?
all the people that had been digging it up - Peter never came to the field with us  W ǁĞ ?ĚĂůǁĂǇƐďĞĞŶ
ĐĂůůŝŶŐŝƚƚŚĞŚŽďďŝƚ ? - Bert Roberts, of the original Flores team, on the hobbit label (17.04.07). 
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The Flores episode may be very far removed from routine, everyday science, 
and so it is perhaps not surprising that models of science communication struggle to 
accommodate it. This merely reflects the heterogeneity of science, and the need for 
models to be flexible enough to accommodate the multiple routes taken, and 
processes undergone, of knowledge claims in their journeys back and forth between 
the many sites that are collectively termed culture. 
 
one requires precisely to avoid imposing (as the canonical and the continuity 
models sought) a general pre-determined outcome to the process of public 
discussion of scientific issues. Efforts should instead be devoted to describing 
it in terms of an open-ended negotiation of ideas and related interests 
(Bucchi 1996:384). 
 
 dŚĞ ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ŽĨ Ă ƌŝǀĞƌ ŝŶ ĨůŽǁ ? ŽĨ  ‘ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ƐĐŝĞŶĐ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌconsumption, is not without its truths. Much regular science 
may indeed follow a similar path, and the uplands are certainly a much more 
sparsely populated place than the crowded lands downstream. It is, nevertheless, a 
very constraining metaphor if we are ƚŽ ŝŶĚƵůŐĞ ŝŶ Ă ƐƉŽƚ ŽĨ  ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĐĂƌƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?
(Gieryn 1999), and we would do better to take a more holistic perspective, to draw 
out the view to see full process of  the hydrologic cycle, and not just a subsection of 
it. Here water does not simply materialise upstream
44
, before flowing downstream 
and disappearing into the oceans. Instead, through evapotranspiration and then 
                                                     
44
 It is important to underscore this point. It has been suggested by some readers of this work that the 
model used  fails to escape from one of the flaws of the continuum model: that knowledge production 
still 'begins' upstream. The disagreement stems, I suggest, from differing understandings of the 
hydrological model on which the metaphor is based (a warning of the limits of metaphorical 
explanation perhaps). In the author's own conception, there is no one beginning or end, but rather a 
cycle where knowledge is constantly recontextualised and evolving. 
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precipitation, the water continually circulates, following regular patterns, but always 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ĨƌĞĂŬ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ?Ɛ the water moves downstream the river 
may cut back on itself in many places. Additionally, water will not always flow along 
ƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƌŝǀĞƌĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ ?ďƵƚĐĂŶĂůƐŽ ‘ĚĞǀŝĂƚĞ ?ĂůŽŶŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉĂƚŚƐ- perhaps 
feeding into bedrock to reappear downstream as a spring. Continual processes of 
upheaval and erosion change structures of land, and hence patterns of flow, over 
time. This was evident in the enhanced literary technology deployed during the LB1 
debate where, in contrast to Piltdown, the stylistic differences between 
intraspecialist and mainstream media were much clearer. This temporal dimension 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐDĞůůŽƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? )ŽĨ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĐĂƌƚŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ  W 
that they fail to reveal change over time. 
There are three key elements to this cycle metaphor then that build upon 
that of the river metaphor. Firstly, that though knowledge claims may generally be 
seen to flow from science out into wider society, there is also a feedback 
mechanism, whereby popular culture informs science with its own ideas and beliefs. 
/ŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ>ŝĞǀƌŽƵǁ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĞĐĂŶƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌǁĞŐŽĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ
the greater the process of exchange becomes between an ever growing number of 
influences, both through the meandering of the river cutting back and forth, and the 
eventual presence of tidal deltas, where the direction of flow changes repeatedly.  
Secondly, that no two episodes can be assumed the same, that although 
there are regular patterns, there is also an inherent contextual instability both within 
single time frames, and across multiple frames. Most science, certainly routine 
science, might appear closer to traditional images of communication: something 
nearer to a ruler-straight, concrete-lined storm drain than the more organic picture 
above. When science is non-routine however, as it is here, it is disproportionately 
influential, and such accounts need recognition.  
Finally, retaining the lesson of the continuum model: although we can define 
multiple regions and processes, these are only ever a taxonomic abstraction, and 
few, if any, clear demarcations exist, as is the case in nature. Such a metaphor would 
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provide a more telling picture of science-nonscience culture relations, than those 
outlined above. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The Flores episode demonstrates the multifaceted nature of the knowledge created 
around scientific discoveries that catch the attention of the popular media and the 
public. No single figure or culture had monopoly over the construction of LB1, 
instead the figure was a hybrid of science culture and nonscience culture, scientists 
and journalists. There were many others whose input was crucial too, like graphic 
artist Peter Schouten, who may have only produced one image of Homo floresiensis, 
but it was one that spoke as strongly as any 1,000 words written about this creature, 
and was recycled endlessly in the popular coverage. Other artists too had a role, as 
the find was amplified through the literary work of Tolkien and Conan Doyle among 
others. Finally, the nebulous amalgam of ideas and beliefs that constitute popular 
culture, and the general public that embody them, were fundamental. 
Homo floresiensis appeared to the world simultaneously in both 
intraspecialist, interspecialist, and popular media in a minutely planned operation 
that itself ŝƐƚĞůůŝŶŐŽĨŚŽǁƐƵĐŚ ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐĂƌĞĨĂƌĨ ŽŵďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ
property of any one domain, scientific or not. An already shot National Geographic 
film was on the way, and a book was to follow. The science journal coverage kept 
true to its empiric conventions, and so limited its discussion to the physical data 
uncovered in Liang Bua cave. As with Piltdown however, it was the stories told and 
images drawn in the interspecialist and popular media that brought the figure to life, 
and gave the find a relevance beyond the small subset of culture that is 
ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ?dŚŝƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů/ǁĂƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƚŽůĂďĞů ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚ
it primarily expanded on the empirical claims of the find. That the claims expanded 
upon were selectively chosen reflects though that this was not merely a passive 
process, but the active construction of a figure that would attract widespread 
interest. Other material was a step further removed from the intraspecialist claims, 
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not attempting to interpret them for a wider audience, but rather considering their 
implications for areas the intraspecialist media did not even touch on. Such material 
/ůĂďĞůůĞĚ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
I believe such entities should be spoken of in celebratory tones, for they are 
just as worthy of respect and study as the empirical claims of the intraspecialist 
media. However, whilst empirical material itself is certainly not immune to the 
influences of ideology, popular and public science are by necessity open to 
contemporary currents of ideas, as it is these that they must appeal to and reflect. 
This is not problematic per say, but if these imaginings are treated as being no 
different from empirical data, then there is the potential for them to carry greater 
persuasive force than they perhaps should. In case this warning is latched upon as 
ƉƌŽŽĨƚŚĂƚƉŽƉƵůĂƌĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐŝŶƐŽŵĞǁĂǇŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌƚŽĂ ‘ƉƵƌĞ ?ďƌĞƚŚƌĞŶ ?ŝƚ
most be noted that the most obvious example of ideology leading empirical evidence 
in the two case studies is that of Man the Hunter, a figure whose original 
configuration  W empirical evidence and all - was promoted by scientists themselves. 
The picture we are left with is one which refuses to rest easy with the 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ŝŵĂŐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂŶŽŶŝĐĂů ŵŽĚĞů ?Ɛ ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĐŚĂƌƚ ? Žƌ ƚŚe continuum 
ŵŽĚĞů ?ƐƌŝǀĞƌ ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚĂŬŝŶŐŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵďŽƚŚƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ?ĂŶĚ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ
 ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĐĂƌƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? Ă ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀ  ? ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ? ŚǇĚƌŽůŽŐŝĐ
cycle is suggested. This aims to incorporate the lessons of the continuum model, 
whilst building upon it, by incorporating systems of feedback between science and 
wider culture, and introducing an inherent instability, signalling that no two episodes 
will be identical. No greater example of the worth of metaphors and allusions in our 
attempts to order and make sense of our world need be made than the story of how 
 ‘Homo floresiensis ?ďĞĐĂŵĞ ‘ƚŚĞ&ůŽƌĞƐŚŽďďŝƚ ? ? 
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Chapter 7: Ǯǯǣ ?-Animal Binary 
 
1. Introduction 
To say that the existence of a creature like LB1 came as a surprise to experts in the 
palaeoanthropological field would be a somewhat casual understatement. An 
informal arms race quickly developed, with scientists competing to out-exclaim one 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?WĞƚĞƌƌŽǁŶ ?ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ?ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ “/
ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ůĞƐƐ ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚ ŝĨ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ŚĂĚ ƵŶĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ĂŶ ĂůŝĞŶ ?  ?Guardian 
28.08.04:4), and told Nature  “DǇ ũĂǁ ĚƌŽƉƉĞĚ ƚŽ ŵǇ ŬŶĞĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ) ?
DĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ? ĨĞůůŽǁ ƚĞĂŵ ŵĞŵďĞƌ Ğƌƚ ZŽďĞƌƚƐ ǁĂƐ  “ ‘ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ŐŽďƐŵĂĐŬĞĚ ?
ƉƵǌǌůĞĚĂŶĚĂŵƵƐĞĚ ? ?Guardian  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?ǁŚŝůƐƚWƌŽĨ ?ŚƌŝƐ^ƚƌŝŶŐĞƌǁĂƐ “ĨƌĂŶŬůǇ
ĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚ ?ĞĚ ? Q^ŽŵĞŽĨŵǇĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?ǀŝĞǁǁĂƐĚŝƐďĞůief that this thing could have 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞĚ ?  ?Times 28.08.04:6). Not to be out done, Nature editor Henry Gee was 
ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƐŚŽƌƚŽĨ “ĨůĂďďĞƌŐĂƐƚĞĚ ? ?Daily Mail 28.08.04:25).  
 The qualities that brought such star struck, laudatory declarations from 
scientists are the same elements that make LB1 such a fine specimen for boundary 
analysis. Here was a creature with a skull shaped similarly to that of a modern 
human, apparently capable of tool-use, fire, and perhaps even boat-building, yet 
with a brain no bigger than that of a chimpanzee. She (the specimen was female) 
walked upright, and hunted a species of small elephant, but fully-grown was no more 
than a metre tall. Her hands were anatomically much like our own, but she had large 
teeth and no chin. Perhaps most challenging of all, she lived just 18,000 years ago, 
barely pre-dating the historical record. LB1 then was every bit the boundary-
straddling figure that Piltdown Man was, mocking the dichotomy of human and 
animal. 
Here, as in chapter four, I analyse how a missing link, an entity denied a 
categorical position by its own name  W a name which leaves it suspended in the 
ether somewhere between the recognised states of human and animal  W was given 
meaning through the boundary-working and category-working of scientists and 
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journalists. Though LB1 was declared human by both parties, there remained 
inescapable elements of otherness to her. Alongside limited capabilities and 
contradictory characteristics, there was her taxonomic positioning as floresiensis - 
outside our species sapiens - ĂŶĚ ŚĞƌ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ĂƐ ŐŝǀĞŶ ďǇ ĂƌƚŝƐƚƐ ?
ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ,Žǁ ? ƚŚĞŶ ? ĐŽƵůĚ ƚŚŝƐ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ĂƐ ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ
like us, be fixed? As was the case at Piltdown, the answer relies on the attachment of 
such creatures to pre-existing cultural figures that already inhabit a conceptually 
ambiguous position. The 92 years between the two discoveries are, of course, not 
ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚĂů ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ǁŚĞƌĞ  ‘ŬĂĨĨŝƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘dŽƌƌĞƐ ^ƚƌĂŝƚ ŝƐůĂŶĚĞƌƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ
sacrificed to bring Piltdown closer to us, LB1 required the form of a fictional creation 
 W ƵŶĞŶĐƵŵďĞƌĞĚďǇŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŶĞƐƐ ?- to 
make sense of its hybridity, by allowing an implicit prototypic classification whilst an 
explicit Aristotelian classification was being made. 
ƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞĂĨĨŝǆŝŶŐƌĞůŝĞĚƵƉŽŶŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ?ĨŽƌŝƚƐŐůƵĞ ?ĂŶĚƐŽ
inevitably other contaminants associated with self-identity were introduced to the 
process. At Piltdown, these included nationalism, gender, race, and 
anthropocentricism, all elements in how the minds of those involved in the 1912 
discovery concocted who they themselves were, and so in turn what humanness 
must be. Again, the march of time brought with it changes, changes reflected in the 
contaminants preƐĞŶƚ ŝŶ > ? ?Ɛ ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ZĂĐĞ ? ƚŚĞŶ ? ǁĞŶƚ ƵŶŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
role of gender was less obvious too, yet strong echoes remained: once again a 
ĨĞŵĂůĞ ĨŽƐƐŝů ǁĂƐ ƌĞƐƵƌƌĞĐƚĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ŵĂůĞ ŚƵŶƚĞƌ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĂƌƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ
nationalism was mobilised differently this time, it appeared to be just as potent a 
force. Whatever the precise deployment of these elements, the tendency for missing 
links to forge connections far more numerous than simply those of ancestor and 
descendant clearly remained strong. 
In addition to asking of LB1 what was asked of Piltdown man  W that is, how it 
ǁĂƐ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ďŝŶĂƌǇ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ŚĞƌĞ / ǁŝƐŚ ƚŽ ĂĚĚ ĂŶ
additional element to the analysis, considering in more depth how LB1 was 
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positioned within intraspecialist science, and the transition of the figure as it moved 
ĨƌŽŵƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?ƚŽƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ?&ŝƌŵůǇĨŝǆŝŶŐƐƵĐŚ
a conceptually unstable category as a boundary-spanning missing link requires the 
combined efforts of both scientific and popular systems of meaning. For the public to 
recognise the figure as one of us, or more accurately not one of us, but inhabiting 
our side of the boundary (and hence worthy of attention), LB1 needed to be more 
ƚŚĂŶ  ‘Homo ? P ŝƚ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ĂůƐŽ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? Analysing the manner in which the 
categories of human and Homo were used in the debate is revealing not only of the 
process of positioning LB1, but also instructive in understanding the wider 
relationship between scientific and popular culture which I considered in the 
previous chapter. Despite sharing basic Aristotelian principles, the additional 
ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ? ƉůƵƐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
contexts in which they are used,  means that spanning the two systems poses 
considerable challenges. Analysing this challenge begins with a consideration of the 
contested origins of Homo and its subsequent black-boxing. The box is placed under 
strain by linkages between Homo ĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶƉƌŽďůĞŵƐůŝŬĞƚŚĞ ‘ĞƌĞďƌĂů
Rubicon ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ P ĂŶ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇ ƚĞƐƚĂďůĞ ƉŽŝŶƚ Ăƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ŶŽ ŚƵŵĂŶ ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ
human. The incompatibility of the two categories is discussed, and why LB1 was 
declared human regardless. 
One of the principal scientists in the Flores find, Mike Morwood, himself 
touches on the troublesome nature of this meeting of scientific and popular systems 
ŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĞŶŝŶŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ “dŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŐĞŶƵƐ
Homo ŚĂƐ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ďĞĞŶ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ƚŝĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ  “ďĞŝŶŐ
ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?  ?Dorwood & van Oosterzee 2007:97). This difficult relationship is the key 
interest of this chapter. 
 
2. The Act of Taxonomy 
dŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ  ‘Homo sapiens ? ǁĂƐ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?
Carolus Linnaeus, the genus Homo ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ‘ŵĂŶ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞspecies sapiens  ‘ǁŝƐĞ ? ?/Ŷ
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a forerunner of later uncertainty we were not alone in this genus, but joined by 
Homo troglodytes  ? ‘ĐĂǀĞ-ĚǁĞůůĞƌ ? ) ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽŵŽƌƉŚŝĐĂƉĞƐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ
Linnaeus had received reports (Marks 2003:21). Now known as chimpanzees, these 
animals have long since been removed from Homo to their own genus, Pan, but the 
ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŽĨ >ŝŶŶĂĞƵƐ ? ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ  Wthe combination of similarity and difference that 
marks our relationship with both extant non-human primates and extinct missing 
links  W remains all too evident. So much so that recent genetics research has called 
for a reversal of this classification: for humans, common chimpanzees and bonobo 
chimpanzees to be placed within the same genus once more, on the basis of their 
genetic closeness comparative to other apes (Goodman et al. 2003). The fact that 
there appears little support for such a move, despite the evidence, reminds one that 
scientific classifications are not free from the influence of popular classifications: 
 
technical classifications grow out of and have to answer to our common 
sense, socially comfortable classifications. It just would not be socially 
feasible to call a donkey a fish, no matter how good your scientific grounds 
(Bowker & Star 2000:67). 
 
These problems are not unique to Homo sapiens and their phylogenetic 
relatives, since all attempts to categorise nature, as scientific taxonomy does, face 
the problem of a disjuncture between the ruler-straight demarcations of Aristotelian 
classification, and the ebbs and flows of the natural world. Despite what is implied to 
the uninitiated by the clean lines of taxonomic charts, there is no missing link 
between any two species, but rather innumerable missing links. The act of taxonomy 
shrinks all these links down to the width of a single line. In the face of similarity and 
difference, the decision as to what goes on which side of the line can rely as much on 
value judgments as it does on empirical evidence. 
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ƵƉƌĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ƚĞůĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů  ‘ƚƌĞĞ ŽĨ ůŝĨĞ ? ŝŵĂŐe of 
evolution, as consisting of sharply defined channels splitting cleanly at various nodal 
points, must be rejected, and that instead evolution would be better thought of as 
an estuary at low tide. The image of evolution given in his quote reproduced in chp. 
 ? ?ƐĞĐ ? ? ?ŝƐĂƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŵƵĐŚĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽZŽƐĐŚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ŵŽĚĞůŽĨƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉŝĐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
Even those tangible divisions that separate contemporaneous, analogous 
species, such as reproductive incompatibility, disappear once viewed from the 
perspective of evolutionary history, a perspective which the missing link demands. 
Here all species are interconnected through unbroken chains of progenitor and 
descendant. When you add in to this mix the self-interested role that modern Homo 
sapiens hold when drawing lines separating or joining ourselves and our evolutionary 
relatives, it is unsurprising that the categorisation of missing links as Homo, human, 
or neither, can become highly contested. 
 
3. Homo/human  
As so often is the case with science, glimpsing LinnĂĞƵƐ ?ĂĐƚŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ŝŶ-
the-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?- before it is black boxed  W reveals origins that are far messier, far more 
political and culturally specific, than the clean, sanitised picture drawn in scientific 
textbooks decades later. Linnaeus named the class into which he placed humans 
 ‘Mammalia ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ‘ŽĨƚŚĞďƌĞĂƐƚ ? ?ĂŶĂŵĞǁŚŝĐŚŝƚďĞĂƌƐƚŽƚŚŝƐĚĂǇ ?/ŶĚŽŝŶŐƐŽ
Linnaeus overlooked other possible defining characteristics, such as hair. Given that 
mammalia are only functional in the females of the class, and not present at all in 
some males (i.e. horses) the decision appears a strange one. Schiebinger (1993) 
ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ>ŝŶŶĂĞƵƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĂƐĂƐŵƵĐŚĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂƐ
it was empirical analysis  W in choosing mammalia as a defining characteristic, not just 
of humans but of their entire class, Linnaeus was lending support to a 
contemporaneous movement arguing against the practice of wet nursing in upper- 
and middle-class European families. As was the case with the racism of the Piltdown 
ŵĂŶ ĞƉŝƐŽĚĞ ? ŽŶĐĞ ĚƌĂǁŶ ? >ŝŶŶĂĞƵƐ ? ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůǇ-influenced picture of nature acted 
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ďĂĐŬ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ũƵƐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ? ,ŝƐ ĂĐƚ  “ŚĞůƉĞĚ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĞǆƵĂů
division of labour in European society by emphasizing how natural it was for females 
 W both human and nonhuman  W ƚŽƐƵĐŬůĞĂŶĚƌĞĂƌƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŽĨĨƐƉƌŝŶŐ ? ?ibid. p409). 
This act was by no means unique  W Bloor (1982) identifies a similar process in 19th 
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ƉŚǇƐŝĐƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŚĞŵŝƐƚƌǇ P  “ƚŚĞ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ƚŚĞ
classification ŽĨ ŵĞŶ ?  ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ) ? tĞ ƐĞĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝ ĂŶĚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
classifications acting back upon one another. 
Despite these contested origins, science has long closed the box marked 
Homo sapiens, obscuring its beginnings, refining its definition, and successfully 
maintaining ownership of the term since its inception. It remains separated from 
common language not only by its history and usage but also by its capitalisation and 
ŝƚĂůŝĐŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?a category 
which no one culture can lay claim to. Monopolisation of a categorical system has 
important outcomes  W ŝƚĂůůŽǁƐĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘Homo sapiens ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
ŽĨ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?dŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŚĂƐŽǀĞƌŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ?ŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚe 
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ŵŽƵůĚĞĚ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚ ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ ƵƉ
new definitions whilst old ones are closed off. As a result, the possible definitions of 
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĂƌĞ ĨĂƌŵŽƌĞŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ƚŚĂŶ  ‘Homo sapiens ? ?ĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŶŐĂůůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
concepts  W ƐŽƵůƐ ?  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ? ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
etcetera  W because no single culture has the authority to control it. Additionally, the 
ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƚŽĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?ŵƵŶĚĂŶĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŵĞĂŶƐ ?ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƚƐ
interactions with prototypic classifications are far more numerous than those faced 
by Homo. The borders of human are then considerably more fuzzy than Homo, and 
they are allowed to be, as they are not required to appear empirically testable. 
Conversely, the same lack of ownership makes fundamental changes to the 
ďŝŶĂƌǇ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƐƚĂŶĚƐ ĞǆĐĞĞĚŝŶŐůǇ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?  ‘,ƵŵĂŶ ? ŚĂƐ ? ƚŚĞŶ ? Ă
considerable inertia, which is only added to by the inevitably personal nature of the 
term, being a cornerstone of self-perception. Removing a block from the base of a 
tower is never a task to be taken lightly. In fact, the weight of modernity itself rests 
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on the distinction contained within human, helping to keep separate culture and 
nature (Latour 1993). This can be sighted in the following dictionary definition:  
 
Human: 1. Of, belonging to, or characteristic of mankind, distinguished from 
animals by superior mental development, power of articulate speech, and 
upright posture (Oxford English Dictionary 1989, my italics). 
 
Whatever criteria are used to define human, all are obliged to honour the 
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?Ɛ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ P  ‘ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ? ? ,ĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ
ƵƐĂŐĞŽĨ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ-ĂŶŝŵĂůďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ? ?ǁŚĞŶŽŶůǇ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ-ŶŽŶŚƵŵĂŶĂŶŝŵĂůďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ?
should strictly be acceptable. Unlike Homo sapiens then, its meaning is entwined 
ǁŝƚŚďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ  ‘ĂŶŝŵĂů ? ? ĂƐ ŝƚƐ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞŵ ?
Taxonomy on the other hand is nominally free of the constraints of the human-
animal boundary; such a boundary only makes sense within a binary system. The 
multiplex nature of taxonomy renders it meaningless: Homo is simply one category 
amongst millions, no more unique than Felis or Streptococcus. Additionally, the 
temporal dimension of the taxonomic system means that figures which appear 
neither exclusively human nor animal, figures which must be brushed under the 
carpet in the binary system, instead can be recognised with their own formal 
category, making the maintenance of any strict division nonsensical: it would cut 
straight through such classes. 
dŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  ‘ŶŽŵŝŶĂůůǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐ ƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ ŝƐ ĐƌƵĐŝĂů
however, for despite the impossibility of reconciling science and popular systems of 
ordering, there is in fact a very powerful linkage between them. There is a great deal 
ƚŽ ďĞ ŐĂŝŶĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ? ďƵƚ ŝƚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ
authority  W such as that granted by science  W to do so. The gain was evident in 
>ŝŶŶĂĞƵƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇ ƵƐ ĂƐmammalia. The act granted him the power to 
define what was acceptable behaviour for a specific female subset of the population. 
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tĂƐŚďƵƌŶ ?Ɛ ŽůĚ-War vision of Man the Hunter is demonstrative that the power 
Linnaeus wielded is not absent from twentieth century palaeoanthropology, and it 
was available too to agents in both case studies. Just as important an influence on 
the conflating of the two categories is of course the wish to capture the attention of 
ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƵďůŝĐ ?ĂƉƵďůŝĐĨĂƌŵŽƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƚŚĂŶ ‘Homo ? ?
Homo sapiens is then connected to the boundary through its own close ties 
ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ƚŝĞƐ / ƐŚĂůů ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ƚŽ ŝŶ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƵƌ ?dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŽĨ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ĂƉƌŝĐĞ ƚŽďĞ
paid in this connection of two mutually-incompatible systems, tensions that are 
ŚŝŶƚĞĚĂƚ ŝŶDŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ƐƋƵŽƚĞ ĂďŽǀĞŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ŝĞƐ ? ? ĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞ ƚŝĞƐ
between the two. This leaching between the categories leaves scientists attempting 
to find physical evidence of an intangible concept  W ǁŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐĂŚƵŵĂŶ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?
dŚĞ  ‘ĞƌĞďƌĂů ZƵďŝĐŽŶ ? ƚŚĂƚ / ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ďĞůŽǁ ŝs demonstrative of the difficulties 
scientists face in attempting to attribute humanness on the basis of limited physical 
evidence  W it requires a reifying of humanness. DŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚ
we can tie humanness to a specific brain capacity is telling: 
 
But should size matter? I thought. Surely, it is more a question of cognitive 
capabilities  W and there was abundant evidence that the Liang Bua hominids 
were smart. While they did not make adornments, paint, or bury their dead, 
they made use of fire, and were handy with scrapers, anvils, points and 
assorted stone implements (Morwood & van Oosterzee 2007:110). 
 
There is no hard, empirically-valid point at which the nonhuman becomes human. 
For Morwood, humanness is not apparent from brain size, but rather from 
capabilities and behaviours. He himself acknowledges here however that LB1 lacked 
many human behaviours, a reminder that these criteria suffer the same problems as 
brain size in determining humanness: 
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In reality, many of these features [in human ancestors] evolved gradually, and 
at different rates, and it could not be expected that they evolved suddenly as 
Ă ‘ƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ? ?dŚƵƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ?ŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨ
great controversy, as it was for most of the last century (Stringer & Andrews 
2005:131). 
 
dŚĞ ‘ĞƌĞďƌĂůZƵďŝĐŽŶ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĚŽũƵƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŚĂƐůŽŶŐ
been considered to be a critical quality of humanness (e.g. Lynch & Granger 2008
45
), 
and so the confusing of Homo and human leaves palaeoanthropologists with the task 
of defining a specific brain capacity at which the non-human becomes human. In 
their original submission to Nature, the team which discovered LB1 placed her within 
a new genus, Sundanthropus  ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ  ‘ŵĂŶ46 ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ^ƵŶĚĂ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ) ? DŽƌwood 
was desperate to label the find Homo, stating: 
 
Selecting the right name [Homo] for the species was important scientifically 
and politically, to ensure that LB1 was not regarded as just some Southeast 
Asian oddity of little relevance to the understanding of hominid evolution and 
dispersal generally (Morwood & van Oosterzee 2007:100-101). 
 
                                                     
45
 It should be noted that though Lynch & Granger (2008) see intelligence as crucial in the 
development of humans, they do argue that its role as a driver of human evolution has been greatly 
overstated, and that it is, in fact, a product of other, more mundane developments, such as the 
expansion of the female pelvis which allowed larger brained children to survive childbirth. 
46
 ^ƵŶĚĂŶƚŚƌŽƉƵƐŵĞĂŶƐ ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇ  ‘ŵĂŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ƵŶĚĂƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?though Morwood translates the label 
ĂƐ  “ape-man ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ^ƵŶĚĂ ĂƌĞĂ ?  ? ? ǀĂŶ KŽƐƚĞƌǌĞĞ  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ŵǇ ŝƚĂůŝĐƐ )  W perhaps a further 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? 
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However, fellow scientist and team member Peter Brown refused on the grounds 
ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐ ƐŬƵůů ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?Ăƚ  ? ? ?Đ ?Đ ? ?ǁĂƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇďĞůŽǁƚŚĞ  ‘ĞƌĞďƌĂůZƵďŝĐŽŶ ?ŽĨ
600 c.c., considered mandatory for inclusion in the genus Homo (Wood & Collard 
1999). Modern Homo sapiens have a cranial capacity of around 1400 c.c. Prominent 
Piltdown scientist Sir Arthur Keith had set the Rubicon at 750 c.c. (1949), whilst Franz 
Weidenreich declared it to be 700 c.c. (1943), at least in part because this ensured 
his discovery, Pithecanthropus, was on the human side (Krantz 1961:86). In the 
1960s, the discovery of the smaller brained Homo habilis by Louis Leakey (1964) led 
him to lower the bar further, down to 600 c.c. This is the figure that Wood and 
Collard cite in their influential
47
 (pre-&ůŽƌĞƐ )ƉĂƉĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌŽǁŶƵƐĞĚƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇ> ? ?Ɛ
status outside Homo. The Nature referees sided with Morwood however and LB1 
was declared Homo, bringing the Cerebral Rubicon, a major criteria for admission to 
the genus, down to just 380 c.c. That chimpanzees qualify on this most recent 
redrawing is demonstrative of the difficulties of attempting to reify humanness in a 
meaningful way. This process of repeated regrading to allow new discoveries to 
qualify for humanness also demonstrates that value judgments become as important 
as empirical evidence in the drawing of demarcation lines around missing links, and 
the influence that (potential) popular interest can have on such classifications. 
Whilst the bar is moved ever lower, there are further issues raised at the top 
end of the spectrum. Lynch & Granger (2008) recount the fascinating tale of the 
Boskops, a series of fossilised remains discovered in Southern Africa around the 
same time as Piltdown man. Incredibly, these figures had skull capacities nearing 
2000 c.c., around 25% larger than our own. If humanness can be conferred by skull 
size, then what of the Boskops? Were they more human than us: might they push us 
out into the trinary? If intelligence confers dominance, and they had so much of it, 
how could they have become extinct? It is perhaps the uncomforting nature of these 
                                                     
47
 tŽŽĚĂŶĚŽůůĂƌĚ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌŝƐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞtĞďŽĨ<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?Śƚtp://wok.mimas.ac.uk/) to have 
been cited by 164 articles in the last eight years. 
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questions that led to their discovery being almost entirely neglected within both 
science and popular culture over the last century. Thus today they are largely 
ƵŶŚĞĂƌĚ ŽĨ ? >ǇŶĐŚ  ? 'ƌĂŶŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĂƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ƐƵĐŚ
discoveries connect with us on a very personal, emotive level: 
 
Some of our ancestors are clearly inferior to us, with smaller brains and ape-
ůŝŬĞ ĐŽƵŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞƐ ? dŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ ĞĂƐǇ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ĨƵŶ ŽĨ ĂŶĚ ĞĂƐǇ ƚŽ ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ĂƐ ŽƵƌ
ƉƌĞĐƵƌƐŽƌƐ ? /Ŷ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ? ǁĞ ?ǀĞ ƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǀ ƌǇ ĨĂĐƚ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ
ancestor like Boskop, who appears un-ape-like, and in fact in most ways 
seems to have superior characteristics to ourselves, was destined never to be 
popular (p.164). 
 
The Cerebral Rubicon speaks of the tension between the taxonomic and 
popular systems of ordering. When the fuzzy, ill-defined concept human is confused 
with the ostensibly precise Homo the result is that scientists are left interrogating 
data for answers it cannot hold. 
Before moving on, a further point can also be made, concerning the 
relationship between categories within the two systems. The re-grading of this 
definer of Homo, from 750 c.c. to 380 c.c., was no doubt not achieved without 
argument amongst scientists, but it did happen, and in a relatively short 50 year time 
span. The unchallenged ownership science has of taxonomy gives it a flexibility the 
popular binary does not, as does its multiplex configuration. A discovery like LB1  W 
one that surprises scientists and public alike - can simply be placed into a new, 
formally recognised category, one that includes in it its relationship with pre-existing 
categories such as Homo sapiens.  ƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƌĞŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?
within the same period of time would seem to be impossible. Without the control of 
a single, broadly homogenous community, it is exceedingly resistant to such 
dramatic reconfigurations. It also lacks the capacity to formally recognise additional 
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categories. The result of this inertia is that nonfits require the delicate process of 
creating a trinary space, a third category that exists only implicitly, and so does not 
threaten to shatter the grid which holds it. 
  In modern palaeoanthropology, Homo is applied to modern humans and to 
our ancestors of the last two and half million years. Following on from the 
Australopithecus line, the earliest Homo was habilis, ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ‘ŚĂŶĚǇ ? ?ŝŶƌĞĨerence to 
its use of tools. At the time of its discovery, in 1960, tool use was believed to be a 
trait unique to humans, as it was not yet known that other animals such as 
chimpanzees and New Caledonian crows could utilise them (Stringer & Andrews 
2005:130-132). With this validation weakened, there is little to justify the awarding 
of a new genus to habilis. There is no great paradigmatic leap between late 
Australopithecines and early Homos that might justify the identification of a sudden 
dawning of humanness: 
 
there is no reason to expect an early Habiline [i.e. Homo] to be separate from 
its predecessor by a bigger gap than from its successor. It might seem 
tempting because the predecessor has a different generic name 
(Australopithecus) whereas the successŽƌ ?,ŽŵŽĞƌŐĂƐƚĞƌ )ŝƐ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇ ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
,ŽŵŽ Q Ƶƚ ŝƚ ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ǁŽƌŬ ůŝŬĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĨŽƌ ĨŽƐƐŝůƐ ? ŝĨ ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůŝŶĞĂŐĞŝŶĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ QdŚĞƐĞĂƌĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇƌĞŐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŽƵƌ
zoological naming conventions were never designed to go (Dawkins 2004 
pp.96-97). 
 
^ŽŵĞ ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞĂƌ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶƚůĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚHomo ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĂŶĚhabilis is 
perhaps as good a choice as any. Regardless, the point I am trying to make here is 
that Homo is not a natural kind that encapsulates humanness. If thought of as a 
group of closely related species that share a number of traits, it has a level of 
coherence. If considered a scientific categorisation of humanness, it quickly unravels. 
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4. Categorising floresiensis 
In addition to Homo, the two original floresiensis papers, by Brown & Morwood et 
Ăů ? ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ> ?ĂƐĂ ‘ŚŽŵŝŶŝŶ ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ ůŝŶĞĂŐĞƚŚĂƚŚĂĚƐƉůŝƚĨƌŽŵ
our closest living ancestor, the chimpanzee (Pan), some 5-7mya, and that later gave 
rise to ourselves, Homo sapiens. Members of the linage existing before this split are 
ůĂďĞůůĞĚ  ‘ŚŽŵŝŶŝŶĞ ? ? /ƚ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŝŵƉůǇ ĂŶǇ
particular relation to modern Homo sapiens beyond the fact that such creatures are 
closer to us, in evolutionary terms, than any other living ape. Functionally speaking, 
the category is entirely arbitrary, created to distinguish between the ancestors of the 
only two hominine species that survive in the present day, rather than reflect any 
substantive qualities of its occupants. The idea that hominin implies a privileged 
relationship with Homo sapiens can be further tempered by the fact that the 
hominini group includes at least eight different species of Homo (see chp. four, 
footnote thirteen), as well as several other genuses as well, including 
Sahelanthropus, Orrorin, Paranthropus and Australopithecus (Stringer & Andrews 
2005:12-16). The qualified vagary of those figures reflects not only the lack of 
certainty borne of extremely fragmentary evidence, but also the intangibles 
inevitably associated with the act of drawing dividers across continuums alluded to 
in my introduction. 
  tŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĞƐƚƵĂƌǇ ? ŽĨ ůŝĨĞ ? ĚŽ ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽů ŐŝƐƚƐ ĚĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞ
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? tŽŽĚ  ? ZŝĐŚŵŽŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƚŝĞ ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ƵƉŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ
hominin is based: 
 
Several classes of evidence, morphological, molecular, and genetic, support a 
particularly close relationship between modern humans and the species 
within the genus Pan, the chimpanzee. Thus human evolution is the study of 
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the lineage, or clade, comprising species more closely related to modern 
humans than to chimpanzees (p19). 
 
This stance conceptualises human as being that which separates us from other 
ĞǆƚĂŶƚƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚŝƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ?ƐƵƐĂŐĞŝŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐǁŝƚŚ
the term hominin however, the difficulty when applying this to evolution is that 
creatures who existed perhaps 5mya, and who might well have been functionally 
less similar to us than living chimpanzees are, become eligible for humanness purely 
by dint of their distant descendants. 
 A more common stance within the discipline is to use human as synonymous 
with Homo. Andrew Stringer
48
 supports this definition (2008: personal 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ) ?ĂŶĚtŽŽĚ ?ŽůůĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ƉĂƉĞƌThe Human Genus, on empirical 
characteristics of the genus Homo, implies that it  W rather than hominins generally - 
ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƚƌƵĞ ůŽĐĂůĞ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? ĞƌŶĂƌĚ tŽŽĚ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŐŝǀĞ ƚǁŽ ƐůŝŐŚƚůǇ
differing answers to this question in papers published just one year apart can 
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇŚƌŝƐZƵĨĨ ?Ɛ Weditor-in-chief of American Journal of Physical 
Anthropology  W consideration of the Homo/human relationship: 
  
dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ƐŝŵƉůĞ ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ƚŽ  ?ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ? ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ /
imagine that any answer would depend on whom you asked, and perhaps the 
specific ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ  ? Q ? /Ĩ ǇŽƵĂƌĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƚĂǆĂĂŵŽŶŐĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ŚƵŵĂŶ
ancestors, such as australopithecines, then you would normally use the 
currently accepted taxonomic designations, and probably "hominin" to refer 
to them all.  If you simply wish to refer to general evolutionary events since 
                                                     
48
 Andrew Stringer is a palaeoanthropologist and co-author of The Complete World of Human 
Evolution (2005). 
172 
 
the split of our lineage from the great apes, then "human" is probably fine 
(2008:personal communication). 
 
/Ŷ ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ŚƵŵĂŶŝƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ ƚŽĂůůŚŽŵŝŶŝŶŝ ?
When discussing specific taxa however, it is better reserved for members of Homo 
only. The reason for this is presumably that whilst the tensions between human and 
the rather abstract entity hominin are manageable  W or, perhaps more accurately, 
ignorable  W it would be to stretch credibility too much to discuss the more concrete 
entities Orrin or Paranthropus as human. Regardless, journal papers discussing 
particular fossils broadly follow this tacit rule. As they are concerned with specific 
ƚĂǆĂ ? ƚŚĞǇĂǀŽŝĚ ůĂďĞůůŝŶŐĂƐ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĚŝƐcoveries that are placed outside Homo, for 
instances finds that are positioned as Australopithecines (see, for example, Suwa et 
Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ? tŚŝƚĞ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ^ƵĐŚ ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ Ɛƚŝůů ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ-ůŝŬĞ ?
features (Asfaw 1999:629) or, in keeping witŚZƵĨĨ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ƚŚĞĨŝŶĚƐĂƐ
ďĞŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶůŝŶĞĂŐĞ ? ?ƌƵŶĞƚĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?,ĂŝůĞ-Selassie 2001:178). They 
do not, however, refer to the figure itself in its entirety as human, which contrasts 
with papers discussing Homo discoveries (Vekua et al. 2002:86, Leakey et al. 
1965:427). 
 
5. Was LB1 Human? 
5.1 Intraspecialist media 
ƌŽǁŶ ?DŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĂůŽŶĞŝŶůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ> ?
to scientific classifications: in striking contrast to the intraspecialist coverage of 
Piltdown man, only four of the fifteen
49
 journal papers included in this study (Jacob 
                                                     
49
 Seventeen journal papers were included in the study, but two of these only used floresiensis 
obliquely, in support of other arguments. As they were not concerned with the status of floresiensis 
specifically they have been excluded from consideration of how the find was labelled. 
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et al 2006, Martin et al 2006 a & b, Herschkovitz 2007) actually apply the label 
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ƚŽ > ? ? &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? Ăůů ĨŽƵƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ĚŝƐ ĞŶƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ > ? ?Ɛ
classification as Homo floresiensis, instead claiming it as a modern Homo sapiens, 
albeit one suffering from some form of disease  W this I shall refer to as the 
 ‘ƉĂƚŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůsapiens ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĂŐĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞ
conceptual leap that DaǁƐŽŶ  ? tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂƉĞ-jawed 
figure was.  
What factors can explain this difference in terminology? The obvious answer - 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ŚĂƐ
changed as taxonomy has become more professionalised - is at best no more than a 
partial one. Whilst the criteria upon which classifications are based has no doubt 
become more clearly defined and rigorous, the quote from Ruff given above shows 
ƚŚĂƚƵƐĂŐĞŽĨ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ŝƐƐƚŝůůƌĂƚŚĞƌĂŐƌĞy area. I have also shown that there remains 
a widespread acceptance within palaeoanthropology of the usage of human to refer 
to fossils classified as Homo ? ĂƐ > ? ǁĂƐ ? /Ŷ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŽ ƌŽǁŶ  ? DŽƌǁŽŽĚ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ
papers, a more compelling answer is simply that, faced with such a unique hybrid of 
ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŵŽĚĞƌŶĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐǁĞƌĞƚŽŽƵŶƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?ƐƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƐƚĂŬĞ Ă ĐůĂŝŵ ĨŽƌ > ? ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? /ŶƚŚĞŝƌ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ
Nature ? ƚŚĞ ƚĞĂŵ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ > ? ?Ɛ ĐŚŝŵĞƌŝĐƋƵĂůŝties by placing it in an entirely 
new genus, Sundanthropus  ? ‘anthropus ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ‘ĂƉĞ ? ) (Morwood & van Oosterzee 
2007:149-150), much as Dawson & Woodward had with their creation of 
Eoanthropus. It was only in discussion with the referees of Nature that LB1 became 
Homo ? dŚĂƚ ƌŽǁŶ  ? DŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?Ɛ ƚĞĂŵ ĐŚŽƐĞ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ĞǆƉŽƌƚ ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ
Homo when Dawson & Woodward had, likely is a reflection of the presence of more 
rigorous classificatory standards.  
There is an additional element to consider  W that whilst Piltdown man was 
declared human as a means of drawing it from its liminal position to more 
conceptually solid ground (and in particular ground that held greater scientific and 
public interest), it may be that LB1 was conversely already too human to be declared 
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human. Within days of the announcement of the find, dissenting scientists such as 
Teuku Jacob and Maciej Henneberg were making their own claims: that LB1 was 
actually a modern Homo sapiens (see chapter six). This highlights an important 
element in the boundary-working of missing links  W ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐ ? ŝƐ ũƵƐƚĂƐ
crucial to their newsworthiness and scientific importance as their humanness is. This 
ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐŽŶĂŶƚ ?  ?'ĂůƚƵŶŐ  ? ZƵŐĞ
1981:55) that I discussed previously. Once the rival claims became known, it became 
a strategic imperative for supporters of the Homo floresiensis thesis that they 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞ > ? ?Ɛ ŶŽŶŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? ůĞƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ďĞĐŽŵĞ  ‘ũƵƐƚ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ
ƵƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ> ?ǁĂƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ  ?'ŝĞƌǇŶ  ? ? ? ? ) ? tŚŝůƐƚ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚƐ ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ǁĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂŶWŝůƚĚŽǁŶƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĂƉĞ ? ?> ?ǁĂƐŝŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƐŝŵƉůǇĂ
 ‘ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?,ĞƌĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?ƐĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝty provided opportunities which 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ? Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ĨŽƌŵĞƌůǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ P  ‘ŚŽŵŝŶŝŶ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘Homo ? ĂůůŽǁ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ĐůŽƐĞ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ƚŽ ƵƐƚŽ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌůǇ
relevant, whilst still potentially far enough away to register as novel. For the 
ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇƚŽƌĞĂůůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƵďůŝĐŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƚŚĞŵŽƌĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?
was still required. 
 
5.2 Popular media 
If, within the intraspecialist scientific media, LB1 was only claimed as human on 
the basis of actually being a modern Homo sapiens, how was its hybridity dealt with 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ƌĞĂůŵ ? dŚĞ ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ? ŝŶ ŵĂŶǇ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? ŝƐ  ‘ǀĞƌǇ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ƚŽ ŚŽǁ
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ŵĂŶ ǁĂƐ ĚĞĂůƚ ǁŝƚŚ ? ? dŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ŵĞĚŝĂ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƵĚǇ ŝƐ ƵŶŚĞƐŝƚĂƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ
declaring the discovery to be human, whilst simultaneously acknowledging 
contradictory characteristics. In doing so, it follows the tone set by the original 
Nature press release:  
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The discovery of a new species of human living on the Indonesian island of 
Flores as recently as 18,000 years ago demonstrates that human diversity in 
the recent past was much greater than expected. The biggest surprise about 
the partial skeleton, discovered at a cave site called Liang Bua, is that it 
belonged to an individual who, while fully adult, was barely a metre tall and 
had a skull the size of a grapefruit (2004). 
 
The picture of a boundary-challenging figure, declared as human, occurs repeatedly: 
 
the discovery of the remains of a cousin species to Homo sapiens, a bizarre 
dwarf human, neither ape nor true man, which survived on a remote island 
for thousands of years after it was thought the last of our shaggy ancestors 
died out (Daily Mail 28.08.04:25). 
 
[HEADLINE] Scientists find new species of 3ft humans 
[BODY] Dr Morwood hailed the find as one of the most important of the past 
century. "It is a new species of human who actually lived alongside us, yet 
was half our size. 
"They were the height of a three-year-old child, weighed around 25kg [4st] 
and had a brain smaller than most chimpanzees. 
"Even so, they used fire, made sophisticated stone tools, and hunted 
stegodon - a primitive type of elephant - and giant rats. We believe their 
ancestors may have reached the island using bamboo rafts" (Daily Telegraph 
28.08.04:1). 
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[HEADLINE] From 18,000 years ago, the one metre-tall human that challenges 
history of evolution 
[BODY] Australian and Indonesian scientists have identified a new and 
completely unexpected species of human. It was only a metre high, had a 
small brain but a distinctly human face. It made delicate stone tools and it 
shared the planet with Homo sapiens at least 18,000 years ago (Guardian 
28.08.04:1). 
 
TOLKIEN would have been thrilled - real-life human hobbits lived happily on a 
remote lost world until 12,000 years ago. 
In a breathtaking discovery, scientists have found the remains of a new 
species of ancient pygmy on an island in Indonesia.  
The little fellas, around 3 to 4ft tall and with grapefruit sized brains, lived on 
jungle-covered Flores surrounded by giant lizards and mini elephants (Mirror 
28.08.04:25). 
 
As was the case with Piltdown, additional conceptual weight was required, not 
ƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽĨŽƌĐĞƚŚŝƐƐƋƵĂƌĞƉĞŐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌŽƵŶĚŚŽůĞŵĂƌŬĞĚ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?ďƵƚƚŽĨŽƌĐĞŝƚ
into the space between ƚŚĞ ƌŽƵŶĚ ŚŽůĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĂŶŝŵĂů ? ? dŽ ŵĂŬĞ > ?
matter required the opening up of territory between these absolutes. This was 
achieved via the utilisation of pre-existing trinary characters, a process which began 
as early as the Nature press release: 
 
As a form of dwarf human, the new species fits right in with the bizarre 
ĞǆƚŝŶĐƚĨĂƵŶĂŽĨ&ůŽƌĞƐ ? Q ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŵĂƌŽŽŶĞĚŽŶŝƚƐŝƐůĂŶĚŚŽŵĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŶĞǁůǇ
found species of human lived at a time when relic populations of full-sized H. 
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erectus may still have been living in nearby Java, and when the entire region 
had in any case been colonized by H. sapiens. Modern humans have been in 
New Guinea for at least 50,000 years, and in Australia for a comparable 
period of time (2004). 
 
These quotes succeed in the critical task of positioning LB1 where it needed to be to 
achieve popular interest, namely: as an intermediate, a third category  W not as 
ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ? )ĂƐŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ďƵƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŶŽƚĂŶĂŶŝŵĂů ?Žƌ  ‘ƌĞůŝĐ ? ?/ƚĂůƐŽŵĂŬĞƐ
steps towards anchoring this nebulous position, by linking the figure to pre-existing 
characters who occupy liminal positions within popular classifications. One of these  W 
the dwarf  W appears in the quotes above. Although applicable to modern humans in 
regard to sufferers of dwarfism (ironically, very similar to what dissenters were later 
to claim of LB1), the term originated, and is best known, for the diminutive mythical 
characters of folk legend, the Lord of the Rings ?'ŝŵůŝďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞƐƵĐŚĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?/ƚǁĂƐ
another Lord of the Rings character alluded to in the Nature press release that 
dominated the popular coverage of the find however. The release is headed by a 
ƋƵŽƚĞ P  ‘/ŶĂŚŽůĞ ŝŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ Q ? ?dŚŝƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŚ ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ ůŝŶĞŽĨdŽůŬŝĞŶ ?ƐThe 
Hobbit (1999 [1937]), the tale of a character that was cresting a wave of popularity 
ĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨ> ? ?ƐĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇƚŚĂŶŬƐƚŽWĞƚĞƌ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐLord of the Rings film trilogy. 
I have already discussed the parallels between the Hobbit character and LB1 in 
chapter six, but here my interest is in the Hobbit not as a popular motif, but rather 
its role as a prototypic locatŝŶŐ ĚĞǀŝĐĞ  ?ŚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚ  ‘ůŽĐĂƚŽƌ ? ) ? Ă ďƵƌŶŝŶŐ ďĞĂĐŽŶ
somewhere in the borderlands. 
 In chapter four, I discussed the prominent role that race played in making 
ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ĂůŵŽƐƚ-ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? ƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ŽĨ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ?
figures that were semi-human - i.e. human but less human than white European 
scientists and general public - ǁĞƌĞƌĞĂĚŝůǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ? ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ  ‘ƌĂĐĞƐ ? ?
>ŝŶŶĂĞƵƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ŽǁŶ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ŝŶƚŽ ĨŽƵƌ  ‘ƐƵďƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ? P ďůĂĐŬ
Africans, red Americans, yellow Asians and white Europeans, although the scientific 
178 
 
ƵƐĂŐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƌĂĐĞ ? ŽŶůǇ ƌĞĂůůǇ ƚŽŽŬ ŽĨĨ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶƚŚ ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ŝŶ
ǁŽƌŬƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ůƵŵĞŶďĂĐŚ ?Ɛ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨHomo sapiens into fives races (Marks 
 ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?^ƚŽĐŬŝŶŐ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŽƌŬƐŚŽǁƐƚŚat the concept of race at this time was a 
hybrid of various schools of thought, and Linnaeus was not the only figurehead of 
the biological sciences to be implicated in its production: 
 
when in the peroration of The Descent of Man Darwin linked himself to the 
Fuegian and baboon, in effect placing the Fuegians and other living savages in 
a chain that ran from ape to European, the racial hierarchy of nineteenth-
century polygenism and the cultural hierarchy of the eighteenth-century 
social theorists became part and parcel of one scheme of universal organic 
evolution (p13). 
 
This hierarchy was rendered pictorially by the Illustrated London News ?  ?ILN) 
coverage of Piltdown Man which placed the jaws of chimp, Torres Straits islander 
and European in an ascending chain of development (28.12.12:958). By the time of 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ? ƌĂĐŝĂů ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ŚĂĚ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĨŝĞůĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŚĂƉĞ ŽĨ
physical anthropology, led by prominent scientists Hrdlicka (one of the American 
 ‘ĚƵĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ) ĂŶĚ ,ŽŽƚon (Marks 2003:61). The multifaceted 
conception of race remained however, bringing together and blurring differences 
physical, cultural, linguistic (Stocking 1994), and in doing so becoming tied to some 
of the most potent, all-encompassing edifices with which we define our modern-day 
tribal identities, namely civilisation and nation. Hence the ILN ?Ɛ ƉŝĐƚŽƌŝĂů
juxtaposition of species and nationality. 
In the Flores case, occurring almost a century after Piltdown, there was no 
such living human figure available  W to try and claim any living Homo sapiens as 
examples of semi-humanness would be politically unacceptable. Instead, a figure 
was needed that existed outside the protections of our culturally and ethnically 
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sensitive times. The answer: a fictional creatŝŽŶ PƚŚĞ ‘ŚŽďďŝƚ ? ?/ƚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞƐŶŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
sensitivities, but serves the same role as the savage perfectly  W its anthropomorphic 
form brings it close to us, whilst its diminutive dimensions and hirsuteness keep it 
distant. Not only does a fictional locator avoid the risk of causing offence, but it also  
potentially has the benefit of a more universal appeal, a distinction which Daston & 
Mitman make in a similar context regarding the appeal of animals for advertisers: 
 
Striking images of animals are in great demand by global advertisers because 
 W in contrast to equally striking images of humans  W age, race, class, and 
culture do not interfere with identification and the desire to acquire (2005:6). 
 
/ŶdŽůŬŝĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞŚŽďďŝƚƐǁĞƌĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞ ŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĂĐĞƐŽĨŵĞŶ ? ?
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬǁĂƐĂƵƚŚŽƌĞĚĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƚŝŵĞĨƌĂŵĞƚŚĂŶ> ? ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚ
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂ ?ƐĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚŽďďŝƚĂƐĂŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞƌŽĨ> ? ?Ɛ
differentness unwittingly conflates species and race once again). It was used 
extensively in the media coverage  W all seven of the UK newspapers included in the 
study adopted the hobbit label. Its usage in the texts analysed is threefold, and any 
single example may operationalise the label in two or more of these usages 
simultaneously. The first of these  W as a popular motif to attract non-ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ?Ɛ
attention  W has already been discussed in chapter six. The second usage is where 
 ‘ŚŽďďŝƚ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝƐĞĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĚĞƚĂŝůŽĨƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚǁo 
examples below, but more common is the third usage: as a shortcut through the 
potentially labyrinthine process of positioning the figure conceptually, as in the latter 
two quotes below: 
 
"We now have the remains of at least seven hobbit-sized individuals at the 
cave site, so the 18,000-year-old skeleton cannot be some kind of freak that 
we just happened to stumble across first," said Bert Roberts, of the University 
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of Wollongong in New South Wales, one of the authors (Guardian 
28.08.04:1).  
 
Professor Brown complains that the PNAS paper is "unsupported by any 
published research". He says that Jacob's inability to point to a modern 
skeleton that matches the stature of the hobbit proves that LB1 deserves a 
hominid classification all of its own (Times 28.08.06:17). 
 
[HEADLINE] Hobbits join the fellowship of humans as brain reveals they are a 
new species (Daily Telegraph 04.03.05:07). 
 
REMAINS of nine "hobbits" have now been found by experts - confirming a 
new species of human (Sun 12.10.05). 
 
 The possibility does arise during the coverage of the discovery for alternative 
locators to be used  W chimpanzees, and microcephalic and pygmy humans are all 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ> ? ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ƐŵŽĚĞƌŶ Homo sapiens these latter 
two categories are clearly distinct from the former, and from the already discussed 
hobbit, with their status bringing them under the protection of norms of political 
correctness, and their usage as potential locators in the debate reflects this. The 
most noteworthy element to their deployment in this respect is that linkages drawn 
between LB1 and these categories are only made in claims attributed to scientists: 
 
After the skeletal remains of the 18,000-year-old human were discovered in 
the Indonesian island of Flores in 2003 some scientists thought that it must 
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have been a pygmy or a microcephalic - a human with an abnormally small 
skull (Daily Telegraphy 30.01.07:15). 
 
Henneberg argues that the skull of the Flores hominid is very similar to a 
4,000-year-old microcephalic Minoan skull found on Crete in 1975 (Guardian 
13.01.05:4). 
 
The researchers compared the Hobbit endocast with others including those 
from chimps, an adult female Homo erectus, a present-day woman, an adult 
female pygmy, and a microcephalic person with an abnormally small skull. 
Professor Falk said: 'The scaling of brain to body isn't at all what we'd expect 
to find in pygmies, and the shape is all wrong to be a microcephalic (Daily 
Mail 04.03.05:35). 
 
This virtually rules out the possibility that they were like modern humans but 
suffering from microcephaly, which stunts brain growth, as some scientists 
have argued (Times 12.10.05:25). 
 
This guarded usage  W giving responsibility for the claim solely to scientists  W is a 
reflection of the risk associated with claiming a connection between a less-than-
human, or at least differently-human, missing link, and a human microcephalic or 
pygmy. Even if this challenge could be overcome, the simple fact is that the 
popularity of the hobbit at the time of the discovery, and the associated recognition 
of its trinary characteristics, made it a far more suitable locator for public audiences. 
A low popular profile is not a problem that could be said to hold back use of 
chimpanzees in the debate however. Chimpanzees, and the great apes more 
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generally, have long been used as extant missing links, employed as unwitting 
boundary explorers par excellence (Haraway 1989, Marks 2003). Where chimpanzees 
are used in the debate it is only in the sense of the second usage I identified with the 
hobbit label  W namely in terms of a direct comparison of features. 
 
Independent experts said they were astounded by the find. "That a human 
only 3ft tall and with a brain the size of a chimpanzee lived less than 20,000 
years ago is frankly astonishing," Professor Chris Stringer, of the Natural 
History Museum, said (Times 28.08.04:6). 
 
Several features point to brain development more advanced than in Homo 
erectus or chimpanzees, indicating an ability for sophisticated reasoning and 
planning. This could explain the complex tools and evidence of fire found 
around the hobbit fossils; a small brain was not necessarily an impediment to 
refined thought (Times 04.03.05:29). 
 
The chimp too is unsuitable as a locator, because it is - despite its status as our 
closest extant relative - just not human enough. This is not to deny its role in 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝƐŝŶŐ> ? ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƌŽůĞŝƐŝŶ
demonstrating what LB1 is not. In this sense it is used in much the same way that 
scientists use the chimp  W more accurately the diversion from it - as the beginning 
ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ  ‘ŚŽŵŝŶŝŶ ? ? /Ŷ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ƚŚĞ
chimpanzee can be seen as a lighthouse, providing a reference point that LB1 might 
pass close to, but never too close lest it beach itself. The hobbit meanwhile is the 
harbour tug guiding it towards public interest. In the following quotes then, 
 ‘ĐŚŝŵƉĂŶǌĞĞ ? ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ůĞƐƐ-human comparison to LB1 
(first quote below), or to highlight (only) specific features of LB1 that are non-human 
(latter three quotes): 
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"We're not talking about a chimpanzee, we're dealing with a smart creature 
who could hunt in packs and light fires," says Bert [Roberts]. "Village elders 
still tell of local legends in which hobbit-like creatures survived nearby until 
ƋƵŝƚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ? ?Sun 30.04.05). 
 
HUNDREDS of tiny, delicate stone tools were found alongside the bones, 
strong evidence of the creatures' skill and intelligence, although their brains 
were the same diameter as a chimpanzee's - roughly the size of an orange 
(Daily Mail  28.08.04:25). 
 
The cave on the Indonesian island of Flores, where scientists found the fossil, 
also contained remnants of stone tools, fire, and a pygmy elephant, 
suggesting but not proving that Homo floresiensis may have had surprisingly 
advanced cognitive abilities given its chimpanzee-sized brain. (Daily 
Telegraph 08.10.05:14) 
  
LB1 is an adult and its pelvic shape suggests that it was female. Its teeth are 
quite worn and the growth lines on the skull are well knit. It had long arms, 
and its legs were light, and seemingly chimpanzee-like, but it walked upright 
(Guardian 28.08.04:1). 
 
Neither the chimpanzee, nor the microcephalic or pygmy, were used in the manner, 
and to the degree, that hobbit was in positioning LB1 with the trinary. For the 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐŐŝǀĞŶĂďŽǀĞ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƐŝŵƉůǇŶŽŵĂƚĐŚĨŽƌƚŚĞŚŽďďŝƚ ?ƐƐƵŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
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6. Contaminating Factors 
/ĨƌĂĐĞǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇĞǆŽƌĐŝƐĞĚĨƌŽŵ> ? ?ƐƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĂƚŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŽƚŚĞƌĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
identity that intruded upŽŶWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐũŽƵƌŶĞǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ?ŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐ
discourses is useful not only because it gives a better understanding of the manner in 
which the boundary positioning of missing links is achieved, but also because it 
reminds us of how the human-animal boundary intersects with many other systems 
through which we define who we are. Beginning with nationalism, directly 
comparing the reception of Piltdown man and LB1 is largely impossible due to the 
limits of my primary data. A fossil recovered from the Indonesian archipelago is 
rather less likely to elicit feelings of ownership in a London-based journalist, than 
one recovered from the green and pleasant lands of Sussex. From secondary sources 
there is evidence however that LB1 did become embroiled in these discourses. 
 
6.1 Nationalism 
Franklin (1999) suggests that the strength of the modern connection to animals, 
symbolically and emotionally, is in part due to ontological insecurity  W the 
breakdown of old community and family ties, for which animals become surrogates. 
If this is the case it is unsurprising that missing links continue to exercise great appeal 
ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐ ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵǁĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶ> ? ?Ɛ
reception, yet became operationalised in a somewhat different manner from that 
ƐĞĞŶ Ăƚ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ? &Žƌ Ă ƐƚĂƌƚ ? ƚŚĞ ƚĞĂŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƵŶĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ> ? ? ǀĂŶŐƵĂƌĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞǁ
ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉ ? ǁĂƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ůĞĚ ďǇ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶ
ĨƵŶĚƐ ? ŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞŵ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉĂƚŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůsapiens ? ĐĂŵƉ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ŝƚƐ ŵost 
ǀŽĐŝĨĞƌŽƵƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐWƌŽĨ ?dĞƵŬƵ:ĂĐŽď ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŬŝŶŐŽĨ/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂŶƉĂůĂĞŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ? ?
and a hero of the wartime resistance movement against the Japanese occupation. 
:ĂĐŽď ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ĚĞŶŝĞĚ /ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂ ĂŶ ĂŶĐŝĞŶƚĂŶĐĞƐƚŽƌ ? ƐŽ ŽŶĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ
suggest thĂƚƚŚĞƌŽůĞƐǁĞƌĞĂƌĞǀĞƌƐĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƚĂŬĞŶďǇƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽŶŝƐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚƵĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ŽĨ
the Piltdown case. As always, the picture was more complicated than this. The 
discovery team was the product of a collaborative agreement between Australian 
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and Indonesian institutions; one of the principal members was Prof. Thomas 
^ŽĞũŽŶŽ ?ĂĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŽĨ:ĂĐŽď ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆĐĂǀĂƚŝŽŶƚĞĂŵǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇƐƚĂĨĨĞĚďǇ
ũƵŶŝŽƌ /ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂŶ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? :ĂĐŽď ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ƐƚĂŶĐĞ ǁĂƐ ? ďǇ ŚŝƐ ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂƚ
least, put down to the fact that he ǁĂƐ ĂŶ ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵƵůƚŝƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ? ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵƚŽĨĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ĂŶĚ> ?ǁĂƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ50. 
By suggesting that modern humans developed in multiple locations, rather than 
simply evolving in Africa before beginning an outward migration, the multiregional 
thesis offers support to nationalistic discourses. It is ironic then that the same 
paradigm might have prevented Jacob from embracing LB1 as an important 
discovery. 
 It was in how the controversy played out, rather than the original line-in-the-
sand exercise between believers and deniers, that nationalism was mobilised in a 
ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ :ĂĐŽďǁĂƐŶŽƚĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ> ?ĂƐĂŶ  ‘ĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚ /ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂŶ ? ?
he was keen to claim the fossils themselves, and an extraordinary tug-of-war over 
ownership developed between himself and the discovery team. Making great use of 
old-ďŽǇƐ ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?:ĂĐŽďĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚŚŝƐůŽŶŐƚŝŵĞĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞ^ŽĞũŽŶŽƚŽĂůůŽǁŚŝƐůĂď
to take the bones away, without the permission of any of the Australian scientists, 
ǁŚŽŚĂĚƐŚĂƌĞĚůĞŐĂůŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĚǁŝƚŚ^ŽĞũŽŶŽ ?ƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶĨƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
issue, it seems as though the particularly hierarchical nature of Indonesian academia 
prevented any of the junior Indonesian researchers on the discovery team from 
publicly backing Morwood and company. It was at this stage that nationalism came 
into play. Anthropologist Gregory Forth, who has spent decades studying the living 
population of Flores, had access to local, as well as international, media during the 
controversy, and states: 
                                                     
50
 It is suggested that the fact that LB1 was part of an apparently isolated population challenges the 
multiregionalism hypothesis by undercutting arguments about widespread interbreeding between 
archaic human populations. LB1 would have need to be the opposite of what she was  W i.e. older, and 
yet more like modern humans  W to lend support to multiregionalism. 
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it is not difficult to discern a strong dose of nationalism. Describing Morwood 
and his fellow-ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĂƐ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?  ?ŵĂŝŶůǇ ? ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ
was Australian members of the team, rather than Indonesians, who 
announced the discovery to the media), a critical attitude specifically towards 
 ‘ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶƐ ? ŝƐĂůƐŽ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ :ĂĐŽď
(2006:339). 
 
Morwood makes a similar accusation, here specifically referring to claims Jacob 
allegedly made in the Guardian which implied colonialist behaviour on the part of 
DŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ƐƚĞĂŵ P 
 
he not only restated that LB1 was a modern human male with microcephalia, 
but that there was now a battle raging between him and the Australian 
researchers, who could not tell Indonesian scientists what to do; could not 
ƉůĂǇ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ  “ƐŚĞƌŝĨĨ ?  W Ă ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ĂƐƚ dŝŵŽƌ
(2007:215). 
 
If Jacob did make this claim to the Guardian, then it was not published, although the 
following did appear: 
 
Prof Jacob, who has been accused by the Australian scientists who led the 
excavation of "kidnapping" the bones from Indonesia's centre of archaeology, 
said the Australian team had "rushed" their work and lacked expertise 
(Guardian 13.1.05:2). 
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This discourse came to ĂŚĞĂĚǁŚĞŶĂĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌŽĨ:ĂĐŽď ?Ɛ ?:ĞĂŶ-Jacques Hublin of 
ƚŚĞDĂǆWůĂŶĐŬ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŝŶ>ĞŝƉǌŝŐ ?ǁƌŽƚĞĂůĞƚƚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨ:ĂĐŽď ?ƐƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?
'ĂĚũĂŚDĂĚĂ ?ĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐDŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ƐƚĞĂŵ P 
 
I see this whole story as a pure example of scientific neo-colonialism, western 
arrogance and simply using people. It is also a lesson on the role of the media 
in our field and how cultural, linguistic and nationalist issues can interfere in a 
very negative way with science (reproduced in Morwood & van Oosterzee 
2007:233). 
 
This letter was later used to support the successful motion to suspend all access 
rights to the Liang Bua site by the discovery team for a year.  
Aside from this very knowing mobilisation of nationalist sentiments in the 
battle for the bones of LB1, there is also the reaction of the local people of Flores 
themselves. This cannot be accessed from my primary data, but fortuitously 
anthropologist Gregory Forth (2006) has carried out his own research on local 
reactions to the discovery. His account shows that tribes in the region from which 
LB1 was recovered were unwilling to link Homo floresiensis to their own histories. A 
good deal of the reason for this was that LB1 became tied to specific local 
dimensions of nationalism, or at least the same sense of belonging which underpins 
it. One such example relates to the claims of Jacob and the pathological human 
ĐĂŵƉ ? /Ŷ ůŝŐŚƚŽĨ :ĂĐŽď ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ > ? ǁĂƐĂ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞĚŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
local pygmy populations, some saw the categorisation of the find as a new species  W 
floresiensis - as an attempt to drive a wedge between inhabitants of the island: 
 
dŽƉĂƌĂƉŚƌĂƐĞŽŶĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ PƚŚĞƐŬĞůĞƚŽŶĚƵďďĞĚ ‘,ŽŵŽĨůŽƌĞƐŝĞŶƐŝƐ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ
nothing more than the fact that the modern population of Flores is made up 
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of short, including very short, individuals as well as taller people; they are all 
equally human and Florenese, and not a member of different species. What 
one appears to confront here is an ideological reluctance to countenance an 
interpretation of human (or hominid) remains on the island that threatens 
modern Florenese unity  W a threat which perhaps takes on a political 
ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞƌĂŽĨ ‘ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?ǁŚĞŶ&ůŽƌĞƐĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ
ŝƐďĞŝŶŐƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚĂƐĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůƵŶŝƚŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?&ŽƌƚŚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
 
This is another example of how missing links, separated from us by inconceivable 
periods of history, can nevertheless appear close enough to stir up personal 
sentiments which cut across numerous domains. 
An additional local dimension involves the long reach of the Catholic Church, 
and its considerable following on Flores (>90% of the populous (ibid. p338)). In the 
1950s, a Dutch missionary archaeologist, Theodor Verhoeven, uncovered the 
remains of several short individuals from around 2000 BCE. Florenese Catholics, 
viewing Verhoeven as one of their own, have adopted his discoveries as part of their 
own histories. By contrast, the potentially conflicting Homo floresiensis is 
consistently connected with the Australian scientists involved in the discovery. As 
such it is viewed as being the claims of outsiders (p339), and so discounted in a not 
dissimilar way to how the British media of 1912 largely ignored foreign dualist 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?&ŽƌƚŚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚďƌŝŶŐƐƚŽŵŝŶĚ^ŽŵŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ
of the La Chappelle-aux-Saints Neanderthal discovery discussed in chapter five, 
where the circumstances of the discovery resulted in the Catholic Church taking on a 
ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? Ɛ ƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ŚĂĚ ŶŽ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ
presence in the WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ŝƚƐ ƌŽůĞ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂŶƚ ? ŝƐ ŽŶĞ ƚŚĂƚ / ŚĂǀĞ
ignored, yet it is clear that in certain circumstances it is no more insoluble to mixing 
with missing links, and the process of making sense of them, than race or sex is. 
If the nationalism seen during the Piltdown episode was largely unreflexive, 
during the Flores case its greatest use in the debate was clearly as a deliberate 
189 
 
attempt to whip up popular and political opinion in Indonesia against the Australian 
members of the discovery team. That its mobilisation here was more complicated, 
and more knowing than it was in 1912 Britain, reflects both changed times and 
changed circumstances. 
6.2 Gender  
LB1 was, like the figure recovered from the soil of Piltdown, believed to have 
been female. In the coverage of the latter this was largely ignored however  W 
ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐǁŝƚŚĂŵĂůĞƉƌŽƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚ
(e.g. ILN 28.12.12:958, Guardian 21.11.12:8). The sole exception was the Express ?
 ‘EĞǁ tŽŵĂŶ ? ƐǁŝƉĞ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ^ƵĨfragettes, which was no more a recognition of 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƐĞǆƚŚĂŶEŽǀ ?th ŝƐĂĐĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ƵǇ&ĂǁŬĞƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚŝĐŽŶŽĐůĂƐŵ ? 
Again, the coverage of LB1 reflects the changed world which was imagining this 
figure, but the picture is not as different from 1912 as one might expect. All reports 
acknowledge the find as female, but when narrating there is clear preference for 
gender neutral pronouns: 
 
Australian and Indonesian scientists have identified a new and completely 
unexpected species of human. It was only a metre high, had a small brain but 
a distinctly human face. It made delicate stone tools and it shared the planet 
with Homo sapiens at least 18,000 years ago (Guardian 28.08.04:1). 
 
Also known affectionately as "Flo", it hunted pygmy elephants the size of 
ponies and giant rats as large as golden retrievers, while trying to avoid huge 
Komodo dragons and other predatory lizards that are extinct (Times 
28.08.04:6). 
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Their Eden remained undisturbed while modern humans colonised the world. 
It was finally wiped out by a volcanic blast (Mirror 28.08.04:24). 
 
There are exceptions to this, and the Daily Telegraph in particular acknowledges 
> ? ?ƐƐĞǆ ?ĂƐƐŚŽǁŶŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƋƵŽƚĞďĞůŽǁ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƚĂďůŽŝĚƐŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƚ
seems as though old habits do indeed die hard. The latter two quotes below show 
the Mirror and Sun reverting to Edwardian-like discourses: 
 
The near-complete, 3ft-tall skeleton with a human face was found in a cave 
by Indonesian and Australian scientists on the island of Flores, where the 
woman and her fellow tribe members hunted dwarf elephants and lived 
alongside full-sized Komodo dragons and an even larger species of lizard 
(Daily Telegraph 28.10.04:1) 
 
Just how Flores Man - who used tools and hunted for meat in groups - hung 
on and whether he met modern humans is uncertain (Mirror 28.08.04:24). 
 
Now scientists believe thousands of hobbits lived at the same time as modern 
man in a bizarre "lost world" inhabited by rats the size of golden retrievers, 
giant Komodo Dragon lizards and pony-sized elephants - thought to have 
been EATEN by the new species of man  (Sun 12.10.05, my italics). 
 
Such descriptions are admittedly rare, and overall it is certainly the case that there is 
ŵŽƌĞƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ> ? ?ƐĨĞŵĂůĞŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚůĞƐƐŽĨĂƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚthis creature was 
being steamrolled into the mould of male figure. There is one clear-cut case of 
parallelism between the two missing links though. It concerns what is surely the 
191 
 
most influential imaging of LB1 of all  W ŶĂŵĞůǇ WĞƚĞƌ ^ĐŚŽƵƚĞŶ ?Ɛ ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ is 
ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ŝŶ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ Ɛŝǆ ? :ƵƐƚ ĂƐ &ŽƌĞƐƚŝĞƌ ?Ɛ ĚĞƉŝĐƚ ŽŶ ǁĂƐ ŽĨ Ă ŵĂůĞ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?
Schouten chose to draw a male Homo floresiensis, the reason for which is given in 
DŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĚ P 
 
Imagine my surprise, however, when I first saw the painting of LB1 a couple 
of days before the Nature publication date. The figure was professionally 
done and looked very lifelike with a dead giant rat casually draped over one 
shoulder, but the painting was clearly male  W the penis and testicles were a 
dead giveaway  W while the real LB1 was probably female. Apparently, hunting 
giant rats was thought to be more of a male activity, hence the sex change. It 
was too late for me to change it back (Morwood & van Oosterzee 2007:192-
193). 
 
Of course what Morwood skips in his explanation is why  W even if we are to accept 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŐŝĂŶƚ ƌĂƚ ŚƵŶƚŝŶŐ ? ǁĂƐ Ă ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇ ŵĂůĞ ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ  W the figure had to be hunting 
anyway. Despite increased awareness of sexual politics, its seems as though the 
allure of the (Male) Mighty Hunter remains too great to resist. This should come as 
no surprise, for the qualities that Haraway identifies in the trope continue, in many 
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ƚŽďĞŚĂƌŵŽŶŝŽƵƐǁŝƚŚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝ ŶĐĞƐ ?dŽƚŚĞƐĞǁĞŵŝŐŚƚĂĚĚ
the highly competitive nature of modern science in which access to research funding 
can be a near daily struggle, as has been observed in ethnography studies (Dingwall 
 ? ? ? ? P ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ) ? dŚĞ  ‘Ŭŝůů Žƌ ďĞ ŬŝůůĞĚ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ŝŵĂŐĞ
may well have familiar echoes in light of this. 
 
6.3 Anthropocentricism 
dŚĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐ ƵƉŽŶ > ? ?Ɛ ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ / ŚĂǀĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ĂďŽǀĞ ĂƌĞ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
different from anthropocentricism, for although they are all key elements in how we 
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construct our own identities, they are influences more on how a missing linŬ ?Ɛ
humanness is shaped, rather than why it is shaped as human in the first place. I have 
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƚŚĞĞƌĞďƌĂůZƵďŝĐŽŶ ?ƐĚŽǁŶǁĂƌĚƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇĂƐƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽ
ĂĚŵŝƚ ŵŽƌĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ƚŽ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ DŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŬĞĞŶŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ ůĂďĞů ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĚ
Homo ĨŽƌ ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ďŽƚŚ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ? ƐŽ ŚĞƌĞ / ƐŚĂůů ŵĞƌĞůǇ ƌĞǀŝƐŝƚ ƚŚĞ
argument briefly. 
Anthropocentricism was a necessary force for claiming LB1 as human, for 
although Morwood cites floresiensis ? ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ĨŝƌĞ ĂŶĚ ďĂƐŝĐ ƐƚŽŶĞ ƚŽŽůƐ ĂƐ
reason for its declared humanity, at the same time he acknowledges that it lacked 
several key human characteristics: 
 
[not] the least hint of symbolic behaviour, such as pigments, art, adornments 
or formal disposal of the dead, which are core characteristics of all modern 
human cultures (Morwood & van Oosterzee 2007:114). 
 
dŚŝƐŬĞĞŶŶĞƐƐƚŽůĂďĞů> ?ŚƵŵĂŶƌĞŵŝŶĚƐƵƐƚŚĂƚĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚƐŚƵŵĂŶƐ ?
ĂƌĞ ďŝŐŐĞƌ ŶĞǁƐ ƚŚĂŶ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ĂƉĞƐ ?. This attitude encourages both 
scientists and journalistƐ ĂůŝŬĞ ƚŽ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĞ Ă ĨŝŶĚŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ ĂƐ  ‘,ŽŵŽ ?, but also the 
ŵŽƌĞĞŵŽƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ?  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?/ƚƋƵŝƚĞůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇŐŝǀĞƐĂĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇŵŽƌĞ
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ĨŝƚƐ ǁĞůů ǁŝƚŚ  “ŵĞĚŝĂ ŶĞǁƐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?  ?ĂƐƐŝĚǇ  ? ? ? ? ) ?The 
recollections of Australian science journalist Deborah Smith, who won a Eureka 
Science Prize for her coverage of Homo floresiensis, hints at this too with the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŚƵŵĂŶŝƐŝŶŐǁĂǇƐŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ P 
 
I can remember the look on my editors face wŚĞŶ/ǁĞŶƚƵƉĂŶĚƐĂŝĚ ‘ŶŽǁ/ ?ǀĞ
got a very good front page story here, its about a little person, they hunted 
ƉǇŐŵǇĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚƐ ?ŐŝĂŶƚƌĂƚƐ ?ƚŚĞǇůŝǀĞĚŽŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?ƐĚŽŽƌƐƚĞƉƵŶƚŝů ? ? ? ? ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ
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ago, they fended off Komodo dragons, they been found by AustraůŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚǁĞ
ŐŽƚ Ăůů ƚŚŝƐ ĨĂŶƚĂƐƚŝĐ ŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ? ĂŶĚ ƐŚĞ ũƵƐƚůŽŽŬĞĚ Ăƚ ŵĞ ĂŶĚ ƐĂŝĚ
 ‘ĞďŽƌĂŚ ?this story has everything ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵǇŝƚĂůŝĐƐ ) ? 
 
7. Conclusion 
Two threads were spun out in this chapter, and here the task is to bring them 
together. One of those threads concerned how LB1 specifically was positioned 
relative to the human-animal boundary, the other the wider relationship between 
scientific and popular categorisations of the boundary. Test subjects are often 
ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ ‘ŐƵŝŶĞĂƉŝŐƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ the zoomorphic label seems particularly apposite to 
LB1 in the present account. As we follow her through the maze of connections 
leading back and forth between science and popular culture, we find gaps, overlaps 
and tensions both within and between category systems. 
 Within the intraspecialist media, and in contrast to Piltdown man, LB1 was 
only declared human when she was claimed as a modern (pathological) Homo 
sapiens. In part this appeared to be because, in light of those claims just referred to, 
LB1 was in danger of losing her otherness entirely. Scientists supporting the new 
species classification operationalised a popular culture concept through its absence 
to aid a scientific debate  W ďǇŶŽƚůĂďĞůůŝŶŐ> ? ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?ƚŚĞǇůĞŶƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂ
that this was a new, unique figure worthy of scientific attention. 
 dŚŝƐŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐǁĂƐ ƐŽƵŐŚƚŽƵƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ƌĞĂůŵ ƚŽŽ ?,ĞƌĞ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ǁĂƐ
applied universally in the coverage of the figure  W without it, LB1 was restricted to 
arcane scientific classifications that were simply not meaningful enough to really 
grab the attention of non-specialists. Yet here too there was a battle to position the 
figure somewhere outside the usual demarcations of human, so simultaneously with 
the application of human there was talk ŽĨ ‘ĐŚŝŵƉŐĂŝƚƐ ? ? ‘ŐƌĂƉĞĨƌƵŝƚ-ƐŝǌĞďƌĂŝŶƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ
Ă ƚŝŶǇ ƐƚĂƚƵƌĞ ? dŚĞ ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐ ŝŶ Ă ŵŝƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉĞĂů ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ
hypothesised as suggesting that people are stimulated by figures which dovetail 
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more easily with the prototypic classifications used in everyday actions, rather than 
the more abstract Aristotelian picture. Perhaps excitement follows directly from such 
ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƌŵŽƐƚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ?ĞƉŝƐŽĚŝĐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ
ǁĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ZĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ?ĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽ> ? ?ƐŽƚŚerness was the hobbit, a locator that 
already occupied the trinary space between the recognised classes, human and 
ĂŶŝŵĂů ?&ƌĞĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƚŚĂƚŵĂĚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞWŝůƚĚŽǁŶĚĞďĂƚĞ
unavailable, and immensely popular too, the use of the figure was a masterstroke of 
scientific popularisation. 
 Ɛ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ Ăƚ WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ? ŝŵĂŐŝŶŝŶŐ > ? ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ĂŶ
ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ? ŽǁŶ ŵƵŶĚĂŶĞ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ
ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ ƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇǁĂƐ ĨŝůƚĞƌĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐŽŶƚĞŵporary dimensions of 
self-perception. Only by exploring her humanness in this way could it be made 
ĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐ ?'ĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽĐĞŶƚƌŝĐŝƐŵǁĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ > ? ?Ɛ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ƚŚe fact 
that LB1 was declared human in the first place. Nationalism too reappeared, both as 
an influence on Florenese willingness to accept the find as a human ancestor, and as 
a tool in the dispute between scientists over access to the fossils and the dig site. 
The considerable cultural changes that have occurred over the 92 years between 
Piltdown and Flores were evidenced in different nuances to these connections, yet 
certain images, such as the male Hunter, proved resistant to change. 
  
The key interest of the chapter though was what, in light of both Piltdown 
man and Homo floresiensis, we can say about the relationship between science and 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶƐ ?DŝƐƐŶŐůŝŶŬƐĂƌĞďƵƚŽŶĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ
countless nonfits, yet their resonant role as proto-humans makes the challenges 
raised by them particularly acute. These challenges are evidenced in the tangled 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ  ‘Homo ? ĂŶĚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? Ă
relationship LB1 allowed us to analyse. 
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 Within science, protagonists refrained from labelling the find human, except 
when claiming LB1 was a pathological modern human, though only because the 
ĨŝŶĚ ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐǁĂƐŝŶĚĂŶŐĞƌ ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?Homo and hominin were used to place the 
find in an ordered system of meaning. As examples of the discrete units mentioned 
above, both classifications suffer when confronted with the seamless flow of 
evolution. However, if these difficulties become overwhelming a new category can 
be created to release tensions. Thus early in > ? ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ĐůĂƐƐ
Sundanthropus was created when it seemed impossible to force the creature to fit 
Homo ?ǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇŝƚǁĂƐĚĞĐŝĚĞĚĂŶĞǁƐƉĞĐŝĞƐŶĂŵĞǁĂƐĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ> ? ?Ɛ
contradictions. 
 dŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ŝƐ ǀĞƌǇ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? hŶůŝŬĞ Homo it is not part of a 
multiplex system, but an apparently far simpler binary one. Though it might be 
defined in countless ways, its fundamental criterion is its distinction from the other 
ĐůĂƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďŝŶĂƌǇ P  ‘ĂŶŝŵĂů ? ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞŶ ŝƌƌĞǀŽĐĂďůǇ ƚŝĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚe human Wanimal 
boundary. Without the control of a monopolising cultural group, as in the case of 
Homo, it is exceedingly difficult to limit and refine possible definers of human, and so 
a profusion of images exist. Specific deployments of the term are however fortified 
through the use of particular narratives and tropes, as detailed in chapter six. 
Problematic cases, whether they be the fossilised bones of LB1 or the literary 
creations of Tolkien, are conceived of prototypically, yet making sense of them for a 
general audience requires their integration with the formal system with which 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞƐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚŶŽŶŚƵŵĂŶƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞďŝŶĂƌǇ ?
This can be achieved by immersing their difficulties in the space of the trinary, with 
the meeting points between it and the categories it separates ill-defined and subject 
to constant revision. Tacit redrawings of the human boundary were observable in 
both case studies, as missing links were brought closer and unwanteds moved 
further away. 
Human is then given meaning by the human Wnonhuman boundary, a 
boundary which is irreconcilable with scientific taxonomy, where Homo is nominally 
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just one genus among thousands. Despite the conflict between these categories, and 
between science and popular systems of ordering, there is a very powerful linkage 
between them, spurred on by multiple elements. Firstly, a scientific representation 
ŽĨ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ?ŚƵŵĂŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĐĂŶĐĂƌƌǇĂŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůŽĨĨŽƌĐĞ ?tĞŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶƚŚŝƐĨŽƌĐĞ
wielded in the work of both Linnaeus and Washburn, both of whom, consciously or 
not, sought to shape nature according to their own cultural beliefs. In doing so they 
naturalised those beliefs such that their claims no longer relied on their own mortal 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ďƵƚ DŽƚŚĞƌ EĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ? WĞƚĞƌ ^chouten's drawing of a hunter, and 
Morwood's justification of LB1's humanness by reference to fire and tool use, were 
ƉĂƌƚŽĨƐƵĐŚĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ŝƚŝƐŽŶůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂďĞů ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƚŚĂƚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĐĂŶ
ŝŐŶŝƚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐ P ‘Homo ? is too esoteric for this task, and if 
LB1 was to be a media sensation and so guarantee the future status and research 
budgets of the scientists involved, it had to be human. Thirdly, I have suggested that 
it is both appealing at a personal level, and potentially helpful at a creative, 
intellectual level, for scientists themselves to interrogate such discoveries in terms of 
humanness. This is supported by the use of the term human within intraspecialist 
science media in spite of the fact that it lacks any clear scientific definition.  
There are dangers in this blurring of scientific and popular classifications, 
ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ  ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ŝĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚDŽƌǁŽŽĚĂůůƵĚĞĚƚŽǁŚĞŶƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞ Homo. 
For society, perhaps the greatest danger lies in the naturalisation of social divisions 
of which Linnaeus and Washburn were but the most overt examples. For science, it is 
the danger that conflating Homo and human leaves both categories corrupted. The 
clotheshorse nature of human  W a rather blank template ready to don whatever 
attire is required  W ƌĞůŝĞƐŽŶ “ŽďũĞĐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?>ŝĞǀƌŽƵǁ ? ? ? ? )ƚŽŐŝǀĞŝƚŵ ĂŶŝŶŐ ?dŚŝƐ
ŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚ “ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ?^ŚĂƉŝŶ ?^ŚĂĨĨĞƌ
1989) of science. The result is that human is essentially meaningless in its scientific 
usage, as we saw in both case studies. 
Furthermore, within taxonomy there is no human-animal boundary, and the 
object which has such unique status within popular culture is here simply Homo 
197 
 
sapiens, a binomially classified entity like any of the millions within taxonomy. Here 
there cannot be the fuzzy demarcations of popular culture to reconcile our 
prototypic experiences and our Aristotelian orderings, as these represent disorder, 
and so the lines separating Homo from other categories are sharp. When missing 
links betray the certainty of these divisions the taxonomic response is to grant them 
their own territory with its own clear borders. The danger for Homo is that its 
proximity to human leads to more being asked of it than it  W than any sharply 
defined category  W can possible fulfil, a danger seen in the Dawkins quote given 
above on the gap between Habiline and Australopithecus. 
 
We can derive from these points that in this context human is very much a 
boundary object, conceptualised differently by science and popular cultures, yet 
retaining enough integrity that scientists can use the label to communicate 
successfully with the public and, perhaps less visibly, draw on popular tropes and 
discourses to help shape their analysis. More than this though, there is a fuzziness to 
human within the single field of science considered here. We saw then that 
palaeoanthropology has no clear definition of the category, yet generally used it in 
association with Homo. Whilst there are dangers in the intermixing of the two, 
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ƵƐĞ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞ ?
dŚĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ĚŽ ǁĞůů ƚŽ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ŚƵŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ŽƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ
holds its rewards. Its blurred boundaries mediate between what must be pinned 
down (Homo), and what cannot be (the personal, emotive aspects of humanness). 
Such definitional opacity is an anathema for science culture, yet attempts to fix the 
category in position result in impossibilities like that of the Cerebral Rubicon, where 
scientists search for physical evidence of an intangible concept  W what makes a 
ŚƵŵĂŶ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?. Despite then disorder being seen as a threat to science it is clear it 
cannot escape it, and given its usefulness in allowing scientists to operationalise 
valuable, nonscientific concepts like human, they should be thankful for this. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction 
In chapter one the three key research questions of the thesis were set out as follows: 
 
 What shapes the positioning of missing links relative to the human-animal 
boundary? 
 
 What do we learn about the communication of knowledge between science 
culture and popular culture during these episodes? 
 
 How do scientific and popular classification systems interact during these 
episodes? 
 
 The thesis identified a locale at which the boundaries of human-animal and 
science-nonscience crossed  W namely the missing link  W and placed the site under 
observation so as to understand both better. For both binaries, the missing link is a 
threat which refuses to comply with the dichotomising mind that seeks to order it. It 
is detailing this threat, and the categoriser's response, that the thesis has sought to 
elucidate over the previous four chapters, and it is this material that I now proceed 
to recount. 
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ŽǁŬĞƌĂŶĚ^ƚĂƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƵƐĞĨƵů ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
the analysis, primarily in highlighting both the manner in which social boundaries 
become embedded in acts of classification, and also the powerful influence of socio-
cultural ideas on these seemingly technocratic acts. Aristotelian dichotomies abound 
in Western thought: good-evil; alive-dead; mind-body; gay-straight; science-art. Very 
real consequences issue from these boundary-drawing acts, as is the case with all 
conceptual divisions, for they do not only divide, but also order: they determine the 
status of protagonists, and the relations between them. Despite then, their 
presentation as natural facts, they are laden with cultural values. The binaries 
interrogated here are no exception. The first, human-nonhuman animal, is as 
universal, as fundamental, in its scope as any imaginable, singling out one species 
from all those other millions that share with it the Earth's ecosystem. The structure 
of this binary's ordering grants those that use it a dominance over all nonhumans. 
The second binary, science-nonscience culture, acts similarly: both separating off one 
subset of culture from all others, and granting it a dominance evident in its 
untouchable authority. 
 The use of Gieryn's (1983, 1999) model of boundary-work emphasised the 
parallels between these two orderings. Both are discursively produced, often by 
agents identified as scientists; both are theoretically weak in justification, yet 
extremely durable in practice; both enable the dominance of the few over the many. 
Though both divisions are culturally situated, the human-animal boundary is 
ostensibly different in that it prescribes a natural division rather than a social one. 
One is reminded, in different ways, of the work of both Douglas (1969) and Latour 
(1993): that to consider nature and culture separately would be a fallacy. Divisions of 
culture and nature act back upon one another in human societies, mutually 
reinforcing one another, whilst it is only their conceptual separation in modernist 
thought that allows contemporary society to so successfully intermix them in 
practice. My own work during this thesis is no different  W extensive use is made of 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ?  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ?ǁŽƌůĚ ? ƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ǁŚĂƚ /ŚŽƉĞ ĂƌĞ
illuminating metaphors of cultural processes. The hydrologic model of science 
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communication is a fine example. I believe such parallel thinking is not only 
beneficial, but fundamentally unavoidable, as such metaphors exist in even the most 
basic, apparently literal, statements (Lakoff & Johnson  2003). The key though is to 
recognise when such linkages are taking place, and to remember that the pictures of 
nature used are no less cultural than those processes they are used to illuminate. 
The challenge of interrogating these binaries side by side is then a worthy one. 
Lievrouw's work (1990) was helpful in unpacking this process: 
 
Representations [of scientific knowledge claims] are generated by a dual 
process of anchoring (classifying an unfamiliar phenomenon into a set of 
categories) and objectifying (converting the unfamiliar and abstract 
phenomenon into a familiar and concrete phenomenon by developing an 
image of it) (p.5). 
 
Obviously the two processes are interlinked, for categories bring within them 
particular images, and vice versa. That said, answering the first question above, with 
its focus on the categorisation of missing links as 'human', is primarily concerned 
with the means through which Piltdown and LB1 were anchored. This makes up 
section two below. Here we see the symbolic role unwittingly played by missing 
links, influencing both their scientific and popular classification. The careful working 
of boundaries is also apparent, as some figures are granted access to categories 
whilst equivalents are chased away. In this way the boundaries of human are 
repeatedly redrawn. The uncomfortable meeting of scientific and popular 
classifications is also discussed, as is the reasons why scientists continue to 
encourage such intermingling, despite the problems it brings.  
Section three, tackling the second question above, deals more with the 
process of objectifying the finds. Studying how images of these figures were 
developed allowed us to consider the process of scientific communication. 
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,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞ ŚŽǁ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ
 ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ƚŽ ĞŶŐĂŐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞries, protecting their 
authority whilst using many of the same discourses as nonscientists. The 
ƵŶŝĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵ ? ŵŽĚĞů ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ŝŶ ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ĨŽƌ
failing to reflect the huge influence that popular culture had on sciencĞ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ
knowledge claims of both finds. It also fails to recognise the value of the public realm 
as a creative space for both scientists and nonscientists. This section finishes with an 
alternative model of science communication which seeks to encompass the lessons 
learnt. 
In section four I detail the trinary concept utilised in understanding both 
ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬƐĂŶĚƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚďŽƚŚ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?ƐĂŶĚŽǁŬĞƌ
 ?^ƚĂƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/ĞŶĚďǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐŚŝŶƚƐ ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨ> ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐuggest that 
the strains placed on the human-animal binary may be beginning to take their toll, 
and that there is a growing awareness of its frailty.  
Finally, in section five, I briefly consider the ethical implications of the 
boundaries considered, and for the need for humans to justify the dominance it 
awards us. 
 
2. What shapes the positioning of missing links relative to the human-
animal boundary? 
Both Piltdown Man and LB1 were declared human, despite their obvious 
contradictions. In the intraspecialist paper that announced the find, the discoverers 
Dawson & Woodward claimed Piltdown Man as human as early as the title of the 
paper, but no justificatŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ĂĐƚ ǁĂƐ ĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐŬƵůů  “ĐŽƵůĚ
scarcely be removed from the genus ,ŽŵŽ ? ?ƚŚĞũĂǁǁĂƐ “ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ ?ĨƌŽŵ
it. Its brain size too defied binary divisions: at 1070 c.c, it was roughly halfway 
between human and chimp. The authors did show recognition of these complexities 
in their classification of the find, creating the new genus Eoanthropus ('dawn man') 
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in which to place it. The chimeric qualities which justified this new genus were not, in 
the eyes of its patrons, enough to dent its humanness however. 
 The mainstream media was no different in shoehorning Piltdown. The first 
coverage, in the Guardian, was typical, acknowledging that the figure had as many 
ape features as it did human, yet not hesitating to celebrate its humanness. In an oft-
recurring example of conceptual confusion, the article utilised a metaphor in which 
Piltdown was plĂĐĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĂƉĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞůŽǁĞƐƚŵĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) W
presumably meaning it was neither  W and yet was still claimed as the latter. 
 Within the intraspecialist media, LB1 was not declared human, except where 
dissenters claimed it to be a pathological modern Homo sapiens. The decision of the 
discoverers not to use the label in the original two papers may be explained by the 
fact that it was only classified as Homo following the input of peer reviewers  W 
previously Brown & Morwood et al had been ready to grant it a new genus 
Sundanthropus ('^ƵŶĚĂŵĂŶ ?) due to its contradictions. It was decided instead that a 
new species name  W floresiensis  W would be enough. The decision of later papers to 
avoid human is more telling for the answers we seek, for it is best explained as a 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐƐĞŶƚĞƌƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƐŝŵƉůǇĂĚŝƐĞĂƐĞĚŵŽĚĞƌŶŚƵŵĂŶ ?/Ŷ
light of these arguments, the usual imperative  W to declare the find human  W was 
replaced by its opposite: to downplay the figure's humanness, lest it simply became 
one of us. For scientific as much as popular interest then, the otherness  W that is to 
say, the novelty  W of a missing link is as crucial to its importance as its sameness. 
Perhaps the fact that missing links speak so directly to the prototypic classifications 
through which we experience the world directly, and challenges more abstracted 
Aristotelian conceptions, helps explain their popular appeal and symbolic richness. 
 In the mainstream media, there was little more questioning of LB1's 
humanness than there had been of Piltdown's. From the Nature press release 
announcing the discovery onwards, the creature was  W despite being unlike any 
known previously  W undeniably human. 
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 The status of both Piltdown Man and LB1 as 'one of us', was key to their 
reception. In both case studies, scientists and journalists alike were driven to declare 
the figures human despite their many nonhuman characteristics. Without the 
declaration, these creatures were simply animals like any others, and without any 
particular relevance to the general public they were no more worthy of attention. 
The links these figures forged with contemporary individuals were not limited simply 
to this most fundamental of identifiers, but included many, in a reminder of the 
interlinking of natural and social boundaries (Douglas 1969). Most obvious of these 
was nationalism, which in an age of imperialism, in a Europe on the precipice of 
devastating interstate conflict, was particularly powerful in determining Piltdown's 
reception. Where German, French and American scientists saw a mistaken confusion 
ŽĨ ĂƉĞ ũĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƐŬƵůů ? ŝƚƐ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞƌƐ ƐĂǁ ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ůĞƐƐ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ  “ĂƌůŝĞƐƚ
ŶŐůŝƐŚŵĂŶ ? (Woodward 1948) ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ  “ĐƌŝĐŬĞƚ ďĂƚ ? (Dawson and Woodward 
1915:148), ǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƌĞƐƐĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞĚ “ƌĞŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞǁĞĞŶũŽǇĞĚŚĂůĨ
a century ago in the days of Huxley and Prestwich  W the heyday of English 
ĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ?  ?Guardian 20.12.12:16). Notions of a particular geographic tie to a 
fragmented, ancient fossil were present too in Indonesia 92 years later, when 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞŵŽďŝůŝƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽďĂŶ  “ŶĞŽ-ĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝƐƚ ?
(Hublin in Morwood & van Oosterzee 2007:233) Australian scientists from the site of 
their discovery on Flores. 
 Gender, race and speciesism too became connected to these figures through 
the discourses which made sense of them. Both creatures were believed, on the 
basis of their physical remains, to have been female. For the patriarchal society that 
received Piltdown Man, this was an easily ignored detail, and the creature was 
reanimated as a male Mighty Hunter. The only exception was in fact no exception at 
all: the Daily Express hailed the ĨŝŶĚĂƐ “dŚĞEĞǁtŽŵĂŶ ?(23.12.1913), drawing a 
mocking parallel between its imagined lack of femininity, and the suffragette and 
suffragist movements of the time. Such overt sexism was unacceptable in the 21
st
 
century case study, yet the masculising language of old occasionally crept into the 
tabloid coverage of the find, and Schouten's iconic recreation of LB1's deep time 
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took a detour through Edwardian England with its direct echoes of the Illustrated 
London News ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) weapon-wielding male hunter.  
 The presence of race in the Piltdown case meanwhile was a further reminder 
that society, as well as nature, was being shaped in the discourses around these 
figures. Numerous non-European 'savages' were used in the effort to make sense of 
Piltdown's otherness. Their humanness was expended for the sake of Piltdown's, not 
only naturalising England as a timeless entity, but simultaneously justifying its 
subjugation of the colonies. Furthermore, these unfortunates shouldered a burden 
that the Man the Hunter trope would later carry forward: protecting Europeans from 
the implications of Darwin's theory  W that there was no binary, and no boundary to 
justify our dominance, only instead the seamless sweep of evolution. For the agents 
at Piltdown, these people were the boundary: a buffer between the animals and 
themselves. Meanwhile contemporary primates, also utilised in positioning Piltdown 
Man, were left out in the cold, turned away for their lack of English pedigree, and for 
having the temerity to remain extant. 
 When, post-1945, it became no longer possible to sacrifice the humanity of 
foreigners for this task, Man the Hunter was invoked as a new line of defence. As a 
popular trope, it was already present at Piltdown, seen in the Illustrated London 
News ?ĚĞƉŝĐƚŝon (28.12.1912) and the accounts of its lifestyle given by scientists and 
journalists alike. Now though it became a formal scientific account too. This 
imagining provided not only a naturalising of techno-militaristic patriarchal society, 
but offered a clear adaptive shift to neuter the implications of evolutionary theory. 
The same skills that granted scientists dominance in Western, Cold-War society then 
also granted humans uniqueness in  W and so dominance of  W the animal world. 
 By the time of LB1's arrival, Man the Hunter too had been worn away, eroded 
both by new social currents that could not see their own existence echoed in the 
aggressive image of the Hunter, and by zoological research which showed that group 
hunting and tool use were far from being skills unique to ourselves. To make sense of 
this new discovery's semi-humanness required a figure that  W like the savage before 
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it  W already occupied the boundary, but which did not have the basic protections that 
all humans have (discursively at least) in an era of universal human rights. The 
ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĐƚŝŽŶĂů ,Žďďŝƚ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ŽŶĞ ŽĨ dŽůŬŝĞŶ ?Ɛ  ?ƌĂĐĞƐ ŽĨ ŵĞŶ ? ? ǁŚŽƐĞ
liminal characteristics  W anthropomorphic yet hirsute and mis-sized  W were already 
well recognised.  
 Unlike its frontline forbears however, the fictional nature of the Hobbit 
offered little protection for the boundary, and the new instability of this division was 
reflected more widely in the discourses around LB1. Far greater reflexivity was 
present than was the case at Piltdown, with scientists and journalists alike 
questioning the borders of human, explicitly redrawing the boundary where it was 
only previously done so unseen. Such is the conceptual inertia of the binary 
however, that agents preferred  W in the absence of a sacrificial lamb like the savage, 
or a bulwark like the Hunter  W to surrender some of our humanness in making sense 
of LB1, rather than attempt to overrun the boundary itself. Further evidence of a 
more complex relationship with the boundary was derived from contradictions 
between the use of the Hobbit as a locator on the one hand, and a particular reading 
of the Lost World literary trope on the other, both of which were used in  
 “ŽďũĞĐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ? ?>ŝĞǀƌŽƵǁ ? ? ? ? )ƚŚĞĨŝŶĚ ?dŚĞƵƐĂŐĞŽĨƚŚ ,ŽďďŝƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚ
an anthropocentric speciesism, yet in the Lost World discourse was a misanthropic 
vision of modern humans as the Hunter, encroaching on LB1's innocent paradise. 
These contradictions went unresolved. 
 
 Central to understanding the positioning of missing links are the categories 
'human' and 'Homo', and the relationship between them. At the heart of both case 
studies, though it often went unsaid, was the question 'what is humanness?'; 'what 
makes this creature human?'. This was true of both intraspecialist and mainstream 
media, the only difference being that within the former it was asked through proxies 
such as skull capacity and tool use. It should be no surprise that at the heart of all 
enquiry into our evolutionary ancestors lies this most self-centred of questions, and 
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ŝƚŝƐŽŶĞƚŚĂƚĞǀŽůǀĞƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇŝŶƚŽ ‘ǁŚĂƚŝƐmy understanding of being ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐ
lay the appeal of Man the Hunter for twentieth century Western scientists.  
 The attraction of human is such that it distorts the sharp lines of science's 
taxonomic system, bending them around itself. LB1 discoverer Mike Morwood 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ P  “dŚĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŐĞŶƵƐ Homo has always been 
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐĐůŽƐĞůǇƚŝĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ďĞŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ?DŽƌǁŽŽĚ ?ǀĂŶ
Oosterzee 2007:97). The reason for this mixing is hinted at in his explanation of why 
he wanted LB1 to be categorised as Homo: 
 
Selecting the right name for the species was important scientifically and 
politically, to ensure that LB1 was not regarded as just some Southeast Asian 
oddity of little relevance to the understanding of hominid evolution and dispersal 
generally (Morwood & van Oosterzee 2007:100-101). 
 
Behind these careful words is an admission that human status is not simply a lure for 
the general public and journalists, but one which attracts scientists too. Though 
professions are notorious for their disavowal of popular language within their 
identified domain (Abbott 1988, Shapin & Schaffer 1989), such is the draw of 
'human' that scientists use it even within their intraspecialist work. Although its 
usage is somewhat undefined, here it is generally taken as being synonymous with 
Homo. The fact that in both case studies scientists were ready to create new genuses 
outside Homo ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŽƉůĂĐĞĂ  “ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ relationship is 
far from concrete however. Furthermore, the differences between the systems in 
which Homo and human exist mean that it cannot be concrete.  
 Homo is a taxonomic category. Cultures adopt categorical systems which suit 
their specific requirements. For science, taxonomy's utility lies in its powerful 
combination of Aristotelian immutability and multiplex flexibility. Science culture's 
raison d'etre is one of control: to master chaos by ordering it. This task can only be 
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achieved by the distillation of complexity. Taxonomy achieves such an act by 
shrinking countless generations of individuals down to the width of a single line, such 
as that between Homo and its progenitor Australopithecus. This particular line holds 
no special status, being no different from the multitude of other lines separating 
multitude other genuses. As a property of science, Homo can be defined with 
whatever specificity is required, and according to whatever evidence is most current 
and most accepted. 
 Human is a popular classification which is easy to example but impossible to 
define comprehensively. Its key role in self-perception, its immediacy to everyday 
experience, means that the influence of dynamic, prototypic classifications is 
considerable. Furthermore, without the ownership of a particular cultural group, 
there is little to prevent its meanings and definitions propagating freely in a 
disordered manner. Conversely, this lack of control means the binary system in 
which it operates has a great deal of inertia. If human does have one fundamental 
quality, it is that it distinguishes from animal, and so it is irrevocably tied to the 
boundary, and the binary system. The binary system is not tasked with creating 
accurate, ordered maps, but with the more pragmatic goal of enabling its users to 
successful negotiate through their everyday (nonscientific) pursuits. 
 Missing links, by their very nature, challenge the Aristotelian basis of both 
taxonomic and popular systems. Taxonomy is designed with such challenges in mind 
however, and so can respond either through the creation of a new category, or  W 
making use of science's monopoly  W the redefining of an old one. Without the 
ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĐĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ? ďƵƚĂůƐŽ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ĨĞĂƌ ŽĨ
disorder, the popular binary is content to lose its troublesome monsters somewhere 
out in the shadowy borderlands between human and animal, or, simply ignore their 
questions, and address them as one or other recognised category. 
 The conflation of human and Homo creates problems. Starting from a 
theoretical standpoint, human is tied to the boundary yet this boundary is senseless 
when placed in the context of the taxonomic system, where the division between 
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Homo and Australopithecus is nominally no different from any other division 
between genuses. Homo cannot then be thought of as a natural kind encapsulating 
humanness. The conflation also results in scientists attempting to reify humanness. 
The 'Cerebral Rubicon' is such an example, an attempt at a empirically valid criterion 
 W i.e. skull capacity  W for humanness. Between the 1940s and 2004 the Rubicon was 
reduced from 750 c.c. to 380 c.c as new finds appeared which scientists wished to 
declare human. LB1 was the most recent muse for this regrading, her skull so small 
that we are left with the illogicism that chimpanzees now qualify for humanness. 
Finally, the personal interest invested in human influences Homo too, so that 
chimpanzees are kept from Homo despite being close enough genetically (Goodman 
et al. 2003), and suitable according to the Rubicon. Meanwhile, the Boskops, a 
species of human discovered in South Africa around the time of Piltdown who had 
skull capacities 25% bigger than our own, are ignored by both science and popular 
culture alike due to uncomfortable implications for ideas of our uniqueness. 
 Despite these troubles, the case studies show that scientists continue to 
court the category human, for it allows them great authority in defining 'natural' 
human behaviour; it attracts popular interest and the resources which come with it; 
it is stimulating for scientists themselves when interrogating their work. These 
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ƌĞůǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ŽĨ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ? ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƐĞĞƐ ĂƐ Ă
threat, so revealing the paradox at the heart scientific orderings of our ancestors. 
 
3. What do we learn about the communication of knowledge between 
science culture and popular culture during these episodes? 
dŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚ ĨŽƌƚŚĞ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ŝŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐ ƚŽƚŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )
ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌĞ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? dŚŝƐ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůǇ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ?model 
claims Ă ĐůĞĂƌ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂůŝǌĞĚ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉƵƌĞ ? ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ?p.519) on the one hand, and inferior, unreliable popular science on the 
other. Hilgartner argues that this is a crass simplification of a complex reality, in 
which clearly separating the content of the science that goes on within laboratories 
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and university departments from that in the public realm is impossible. The success 
of the model is attributed the protection it affords scientists: it allows a boundary 
between themselves and wider society which they can cross at will, but which 
nonscientists cannot.  
 Both missing links provided an opportunity to chart the relationship between 
science and nonscience culture at a time when the usual boundaries between the 
two were tested by the level of public interest in the story and, interlinked, the 
culturĂůƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŶ ‘ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞ ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞ
very thing that made it unusual meant also that it was particularly worthwhile to 
study: its cross-cultural impact was inversely proportional to its perceived normalcy. 
This opportunity was used to critique the pure/popular model, and then, in turn, 
question Hilgartner's own 'continuum' vision of science communication. 
 'ĞĞ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? )ŽĨ “ĚĞĞƉƚŝŵĞ ?ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůƐƚĨŽƐƐŝůƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂůůŽǁƵƐ
fascinating glimpses of the past, they are just that: glimpses. Both debates journeyed 
far beyond the limits of what was empirically supportable, but this material was not 
worthless, it is simply that it was telling of ourselves, not of Piltdown and LB1. 
Missing links offer an irresistible chance to draw ourselves on our past and so 
naturalise a particular view of the world. Both debates hinged on contemporaneous 
perceptions of identity, and scientists and journalists alike were subject to these 
influences. As a result a militaristic Hunter image dominated Piltdown's humanness, 
whilst the discourses around LB1 centred on a less aggressive 'cute' underdog. Here 
the dangerous Hunter was modern Homo sapiens, and it was not a status that was 
celebrated. These figures are also telling, again as I've shown above, of how we 
conceptualise our relationship with other life. 
 Studying the process of science communication during the two episodes, a 
ŬĞǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?/ƚŝƐŽŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚŐƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚ
scientists could ĞŶŐĂŐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ Ă
ĐůĂƐƐŝĐ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ Ă  “ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ŽďũĞĐƚ ?  ?^ƚĂƌ ĂŶĚ 'ƌŝĞƐĞŵĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚĂƚ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ
movement between different domains whilst holding different meanings for each of 
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them. Human was used in all three media studied to anchor the finds (the absence of 
it in the intraspecialist coverage of LB1 was due purely to the argument of 
dissenters). Referred to above was the absence of any clear definition of the term 
within both its popular and scientific usage. Going beyond this though, prominent in 
the case studies was the fact that intraspecialist texts were unable to use many of 
ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ďǇ ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ŵĞĚŝĂ ƚŽ  “ŽďũĞĐƚŝĨǇ ?  ?>ŝĞǀƌŽƵǁ
1990) the finds, and in doing so pin down the meaning of human. These techniques 
largely revolved around narration, whether in terms of creating a image of how this 
human lived (i.e. the Hunter); linking to pre-existing narratives (i.e. the Lost World 
literary genre); or locators like the Hobbit which brought with them their own 
narratives. An additional element, just as worthy and yet just as galling for notions of 
pure science, was the philosophic reflections on the implications of the discoveries 
for our conceptual systems. Such material is liable to dismissal as distortion by the 
pure/popular model, yet it arguably produced the most revealing knowledge claimed 
during either episode. 
 Contrary to the claims of the pure/popular model then, the absence of 
objectifying was the only meaningful difference between intraspecialist media on the 
one hand, and mainstream media on the other. Scientists were actively involved in 
non-intraspecialist accounts during both case studies, even involving themselves 
heavily in narration: both the Hobbit and Lost World tropes were introduced before 
journalists even heard of the LB1 story, and it was Woodward and Pycraft who spun 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŚĞƌŽŝĐ  “ǁĂŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ ŚƵŶƚĞƌƐ ? ? ƵƚŚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ? ƚŚĞŶ ? ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ŶŽ
grounds for division. During the Piltdown episode there was no stable separation on 
grounds of style or content either. The maturation of media niches during the years 
between the studies was evident in the clearer stylistic differences in coverage of 
LB1, yet apart from the afore mentioned narrations, key claims remained equivalent 
across domains. As Hilgartner argues then, there is no clear separation of science 
and nonscience, but rather a relationship that more closely resembles a continuum. 
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 The pure/popular model grants solely science the status of knowledge 
producer, yet iƚƐ  “ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?(Shapin & Schaffer 1989) means that only 
interspecialist and mainstream media were able to engage with the central question 
of humanness in a worthwhile manner. This meant that the public domain was a 
much-needed creative space within which scientists and nonscientists alike could 
tackle such issues. As shown above, human is not a scientific concept, and for all the 
undoubted value of the data produced by scientists of the two missing links, 
scientists could claim no more expertise in the question than anyone else. This is the 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌǇĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ? ?ŽůůŝŶƐ ?
Evans 2002). Despite this, they used their authority  W that granted by the 
pure/popular model  W to dominate both episodes. By using the distinction, science 
itself could remain protected as a separate enclave. Anyone wishing to challenge a 
scientist's account could only do so in the popular science domain, which scientists 
could abandon if necessary, and dismiss as a distortion.  
 On a more practical level, the popular realm proved its worth too as a means 
of sidestepping logistical problems, namely the discrepancy between the near 
instantaneous news cycle and the exceedingly long cycle of peer reviewed science. 
During the LB1 case, some dissenters made their claims directly to the mainstream 
media. Such a move was attacked as a deviation from proper procedures, not least 
because it meant that scientists' claims were being made public before they had 
been peer reviewed. However, an analysis of coverage of the find showed that 
scientists who stuck to the science cycle received less media coverage than those 
that shortcut straight to the mainstream media. Given that the discovery team were 
themselves working with a film crew long before the find was announced (at press 
ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶĂŶĚ^ǇĚŶĞǇ ) ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐƐĞŶƚĞƌƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĐŽŶĚĞŵŶ ? 
 The picture we are left with is one very different from the pure/popular 
ŵŽĚĞů ?Ɛ ? ,ŝůŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵ ŵŽĚĞů ƚŽŽ ǁĂƐ ĨůĂǁĞĚŚŽǁĞǀĞr, as, whilst the 
Gieryn-esque river metaphor on which it was built avoided the clear demarcations of 
the pure/popular model, it internalised the idea of isolated, upstream scientific 
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knowledge production and downstream popular knowledge consumption. The work 
of this thesis directly challenges such an assumption: some scientific claims appeared 
directly within the popular realm; popular tropes were present before any public 
engagement with the finds; scientists were actively involved in popular 'distortions'; 
these distortions were in fact an integral part of the investigation; many knowledge 
claims appeared only in the popular realm, in the form of reflections of the 
conceptual implications of the finds. Popular influence was not then a distortion, but 
rather a development of the claims made with intraspecialist science. All in all, the 
'upstream' metaphor in the continuum model is little less problematic than that 
which it seeks to replace: 
 
ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ  “ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?  ?tŝůƐĚŽŶ ĂŶĚ tŝůůis 
2004) is itself curiously resonant with linear notions of innovation. For all its 
ǀĂůƵĞ ĂƐ Ă  “ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ŽďũĞĐƚ ?  ?'ŝĞƌǇŶ  ? ? ? ? ) ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ? ƚŚĞ
ƚĞƌŵ  “ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ĂůƐŽĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐ ƚŚĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝƐƚŝĐĐŽŶŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
direction of flow. If engagement processes are to escape instrumental use as 
 “ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ DŽƌƚ  ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚŝƐ
unidirectional stream metaphor is revealingly unhelpful (Stirling 2008:264). 
 
 In response to this, I suggested an alternative model which mirrored more 
effectively the complexity of scientific communication seen here, inspired in part by 
ƵƉƌĞ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĞƐƚƵĂƌǇŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ŽĨĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? / ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ?ŚǇĚƌŽůŽŐŝĐ
model', for it took the logical step of envisioning the entire process of the water 
cycle, rather than just a subsection of it, as the river metaphor did. Information then 
circulates, through a variety of routes which can, over time, change direction or 
position. Some of these routes appear routine, others more surprise deviations. As 
we move downstream the process of exchange becomes greater, as information 
meanders across the cultural landscape, and tidal influences switch the direction of 
flow. This metaphor stresses the instability of science communication - that though 
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there are regular patterns, no two episodes are identical, and the potential for 
extreme behaviours is always present. These cases of missing links may well be such 
extremes, but their existence is a call to recognise the heterogeneity of science, 
rather than to dismiss them as aberrations. A final element of the metaphor retains 
the successes of the continuum model, using an example from nature to remind us 
that although we can categorise multiple cultures and processes separately, these 
are but a taxonomic abstraction of a world that exists as flows; currents; eddies. 
 It may appear as though such a metaphor implies that no new information is 
created, that it simply recycles endlessly, but this would be a mistake. Instead, it 
suggests that new knowledge is created not through acts of isolated genesis within 
the minds of geniuses, but through the evolution of thought: the adaptation of 
knowledge to novel contexts. 
 
4. What is the relationship between scientific and popular 
classification systems during these episodes? 
Throughout the thesis, I have referred to parallels between the human-animal and 
science-nonscience dichotomies. As the thesis has progressed, a final parallel has 
become increasingly obvious: both dichotomies are protected by what I have 
labelled 'the triŶĂƌǇ ? ? / ďĞŐĂŶ ďǇ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƐ Ă ŚŝĚĚĞŶ  “ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?
(Bauman 1991) between human and animal, in which lurked the missing link, and 
other chimeras of science fact and popular fiction. Such troublesome figures are the 
outcome of the stresses placed on formal, Aristotelian classifications by everyday 
overlapping, prototypic classifications. Missing links can be easily assimilated within 
prototypic classifications, joining other grey cases such as savages and hobbits. In 
contrast to Bauman's conception however, the trinary is not a threat to the binary, 
but its protector, hiding its inconsistencies. Here goes the nonfits who refused to 
comply with the fallacy that evolutionary theory could explain the nature of life 
without saying anything of the position of humans in nature.  
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 In chapter four I discussed the missing link itself as if it was the trinary. 
Additionally, as the trinary went unacknowledged during the Piltdown episode, and 
furthermore needed to go unacknowledged if it was to successfully fulfil its task of 
protecting the human-animal boundary from the transgression of monsters, I 
suggested that such opacity was a fundamental characteristic. Applying the concept 
to the science-nonscience boundary allows us to develop this original formulation 
however. The missing link of the science-nonscience binary  W i.e. the boundary 
transgressor  W are scientists themselves, whilst the trinary is popular science. This 
distinction reminds us that whilst the concept of a missing link is an example of the 
trinary, the actual creatures LB1 and Piltdown Man are simply boundary-crossers: 
the figures that create the need for the trinary. Returning to popular science as 
another example of the trinary, we find a legitimating space in which scientists can 
engage in popular discourses whilst protecting the idea of a distinct enclave called 
'science'. Far from being hidden, this trinary is embraced by scientists, as chapters 
five and six show. The fundamental characteristic then is not that the trinary is 
unseen, but rather that it protects the binary system. The crucial difference between 
the two is that, unlike the human-animal trinary, the presence of popular science 
does not threaten to undermine the binary in which it stands.  
 The reason for this lies in the strategic requirements of the agents drawing 
the boundaries. For scientists wishing to engage popular culture, keeping with them 
their scientific authority whilst simultaneously preventing nonscientists from 
travelling in the opposite direction, the answer is the creation of a third space which 
fulfils these requirements. To be able to reference this space in justifying their 
actions, this boundary drawing must be explicit. Boundary transgressors like LB1 and 
Piltdown Man by contrast have no say in their positioning. Here the boundary is 
drawn by extant Homo sapiens (scientists and nonscientists alike), whose 
overwhelming priority is to protect the dominance awarded to them by the division 
between themselves and animals. For those controlling this boundary then, there is 
ůŝƚƚůĞƚŽďĞŐĂŝŶĞĚĨƌŽŵŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌĂĨŽƌŵĂů ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? 
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 A further development of the trinary concept is apparent in the final chapters 
of the thesis. I introduced the trinary as a third category between two absolutes, but 
it is better thought of not as a category at all, but rather as a space between: a 
conceptual void into which categories (plural) can go. Describing the trinary as a 
category risks confusion: it could imply there is only one such class when there are in 
fact innumerable possible heterogeneous categories occupying the same space. 
Furthermore, these conceptual voids exist between all Aristotelian categories, and in 
scientific taxonomy that is a great many (I refrain from labelling these particular 
voids trinaries for reasons detailed below). It also allows us to utilise more 
appropriate metaphors. To elucidate these points, I will refer to the role of the 
ƚƌŝŶĂƌǇ ŝŶ ƚǁŽ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ P ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽůŬ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨ
indigenous tribes on the island of &ůŽƌĞƐ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚǀŝĂ&ŽƌƚŚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŽƌŬ ? 
(It is not my aim here to present an in-depth investigation of folk categories 
in the manner that I have attempted to do with science and popular cultures 
throughout this thesis. Instead, this is merely an opportuŶŝƐƚŝĐ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ &ŽƌƚŚ ?Ɛ
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů ŝŶŚĂďŝƚĂŶƚƐ ŽĨ &ůŽƌĞƐ ? ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ > ? ? ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
framework I have applied elsewhere.) 
The indigenous groups on the island of Flores have, like Western popular 
culture, a strictly dichotomous division of human and animal, and the trinary is 
similarly evident here too. Despite having no conception within their own origins 
stories of the gradual transition from nonhuman animal to human animal form that 
is contained within evolutionism, both the Nage and Manggarai tribes have 
characters in their folklore that muddy the clear division of the human and 
nonhuman. For the Nage, these take the form of hairy wildmen called ebu gogo 
(whom some scientists and journalists were keen to connect to LB1), whilst the 
Manggarai have the story of Empo Paju, a hairy figure that became human after 
being taught the use of fire by villagers (providing yet another example of how 
humanness is conceived). Both hold an ambiguous, liminal position, and yet their 
influences on the reception of LB1 are very different for their respective tribes. Empo 
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WĂũƵ ?Ɛ ŝŶƐƚĂŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ůĞĂƉ ĨƌŽŵ ŶŽŶ-human to human gives the Manggarai a 
template for the transition required for the semi-human Homo floresiensis to be 
connected to them. Forth finds a correspondingly greater acceptance of LB1 as 
floresiensis amongst the Manggarai than the Nage, whose own liminal protagonist 
never makes the transition to full humanness, and so is left forever wandering the 
no-mans land. The result is that the Nage are much more accepting of the idea that 
> ?ǁĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇĨƵůůǇŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĂƐ:ĂĐŽď ?ƐŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ) P 
 
/ŶŚĂďŝƚĂŶƚƐ ŽĨ &ůŽƌĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞ Ă ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŶĂŵĞĚ  ‘&ůŽƌĞƐ ŵĂŶ ?
 ? Q ?ĂƐĂŶĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ ŝŶŚĂďŝƚĂŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝƐůĂŶĚŽŶůǇ ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞĐĂŶďĞ
unĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?  ?/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂŶmanusia) and, more 
particularly, as a distant human ancestor. It is not difficult to see why people 
would be disinclined to identify Homo floresiensis, considered as a possible 
ancestor, with figures like the Nage ebu gogo. For Nage describe ebu gogo as 
hairy wildmen who were not fully human, or were at best ambiguously 
human, and thus definitely not like themselves, and who moreover are 
supposed to have survived, as a separate population, until just a few 
generations ago. Relevant here is the essentially descriptive and non-
evolutionary nature of Nage and other Florenese ethnozoological knowledge, 
particularly in regard to how relations among animal categories are 
conceived. Whilst this knowledge allows for a hypothetical transformation of 
one animal kind into another in the course of a single life cycle (Forth 1998), 
it does not recognize the possibility of humans deriving, over long periods of 
time, from non-humans. Thus, to the extent that they are considered non-
human, or imperfectly human, ebu gogo cannot be conceived even as distant 
relatives  W and nor, for that matter, can monkeys or apes (Forth 2006:340). 
 
The point I wish to make from this brief account is the heterogeneity of 
trinary categories. Intermediates inhabiting the space will not necessarily make it 
217 
 
easier for subsequent nonfits to bridge any gap between human and animal. Instead, 
they may in fact inhibit them. The trinary is then a pluralist space, that does not 
determine the nature of the categories it holds. 
 The reaction of science culture to missing links is very different to that of 
popular culture, and it mirrors wider differences in responses to conceptual voids. 
Whilst popular culture is content to leave transgressing figures anchored amongst 
pre-existing liminals that litter the water between human and nonhuman like 
abandoned shipwrecks, science responds to nonfits such as LB1 by confronting them 
head-on. Given the primary motivation of science  W control through ordering  W this is 
hardly surprising. Instead of leaving such figures floating semi-submerged, science 
constructs a new bedrock, and raises an island on which they can stand, one that can 
be clearly seen by all. True to the industrial age of which science is a part, the 
boundaries between this man-made creation and its surrounds are hard and sharp, 
like ocean meeting concrete. Here order is created, through the compression of 
complexity: time; generations; differences  W all are compacted into the small mass of 
the island. 
These islands are formally recognised categories: in scientific taxonomy there 
are many, potentially infinite, as it is a multiplex system. Those categories I have 
focused upon  W hominin; Homo; Homo sapiens  W all concern the same subject  W 
humans  W at differing levels of resolution. The latter is the most fine-grained of 
these, and around it, at ever increasing distances, lie islands labelled Homo 
neanderthalensis, Homo erectus, Homo habilis, Australopithecus afarensis, and many 
more besides. In 2004 LB1 forced itself into this picture, its novel features reflected 
in the surprised exclamations of scientists recounted in chapter seven. To 
incorporate it into their system of knowledge required the creation of a new 
landmass, Homo floresiensis.  
Through this process the conceptual void is pursued, for it represents that 
most galling of states: disorder, the absence of scientific control. Science then abhors 
the trinary, and here it is not a protector but a threat. For this reason I do not use the 
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more specific term trinary here. Despite its pursuit, the void remains however, as for 
every island to be an island  W that is a distinct, separate entity  W there must be a gap 
between it and the next landmass, and inevitably it is into this space that the void is 
squeezed. Here it lurks until the uncovering of the next nonfit, when the process of 
eliminating space and constructing solid ground begins again. 
 /ŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŽŶůǇƚǁŽŝƐůĂŶĚƐ ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚ
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂŶŝŵĂů ? ?ƐŝĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚof an organic process, here the shoreline is  W 
despite its durability  W flexible and prone to constant implicit redrawings. In contrast 
ƚŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂŝŵŽĨ
creating order. Rather, they are shaped by more  pragmatic concerns: allowing their 
adherents to operate successfully in their everyday (nonscientific) activities. Of 
greater interest here then is protecting the human-animal boundary that awards us 
carte blanche in our interactions with nature, rather than forensically charting the 
relationship between it and ourselves. Accordingly, the void here is not a threat  W 
quite the opposite in fact, for it allows the disarming of those troublesome cases that 
threaten the status quo  W and so is not pursued, but rather left as a repository for all 
non-fits. Here they lie semi-submerged, visible to observers - and so navigable  W but 
not accorded landmass status, a status which would challenge the integrity of the 
divide between us and everything else. 
As an aside, the difference in the response of popular culture and science to 
ƚŚĞƚƌŝŶĂƌǇŵĂǇŚĞůƉĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƉĂŶĐŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƵŵĂŶ ?ƐƚŚŝƌĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇĂŶĚ
the trinary used here  W specifically in regards to whether such an entity is a threat (as 
it iƐĨŽƌĂƵŵĂŶ )ŽƌĂƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŽƌ ?ĂƵŵĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚǁĂƐŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ
of the Jews at the hands of Nazi Germany, and the adoption of certain scientific 
principles by the Nazis is well commented on (e.g. Aly et. al 1994), and Bauman 
himself makes such a connection (1991:39). My own work, in comparison, is as 
interested in nonscientific as much as scientific responses, hence the different 
ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ?dŚĞ “ƚŚŝƌĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?ŝƐƚŚĞŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨŽƌŵ
of conceptual void, as the trinary is. 
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Despite science's assaults on the void, it profits from it as popular culture 
does. All creative acts require space, and popular culture can use the trinary not only 
as a conceptual shortcut, attaching nonfits to pre-existing liminals, but also as a 
ƐƉĂĐĞ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ůŝŬĞ ƌ &ƌĂŶŬĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ŵŽŶƐƚĞƌ Žƌ ƚŚĞ
ŝŶŚĂďŝƚĂŶƚƐŽĨƌDŽƌĞĂƵ ?ƐŝƐůĂŶĚŵŝŐŚƚďĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ?&ŽƌďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ-crossing scientists, 
this innovative space lies between human and Homo, discussed in chapter seven. For 
science culture, if we imagine the taxonomic system on a horizontal axis, then there 
is a second axis too, separating Homo and human, which we can picture vertically. 
Whilst science pursues the void on the horizontal, it is the vertical space allowed by 
it that lets scientists utilise the Homo/human distinction so rewardingly. In chapters 
five and six it is this space which scientists boundary-work in their courting of 
popular interest in these figures, as Woodward did with his Earliest Englishman.  
No doubt it is more interesting, and meaningful, for scientists themselves to 
think about these creatures in terms of human, as well as Homo, too. The choice of 
two fictional scientists  W Frankenstein and Moreau  W as examples is not by chance. 
When scientists must ƚŚŝŶŬĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŝƚ ŝƐtĂƐŚďƵƌŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞDŝŐŚƚǇ
,ƵŶƚĞƌ ?ŽƌƵŶďĂƌ ‘ƚŚĞDŝŐŚƚǇ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƚĞ ? ?ƚŚŝƐĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐĐ ŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚƵŵĂŶ
and Homo is as invaluable as the trinary was to Shelley or Wells. The science of 
Homo ?Ɛ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŝƐ ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ďǇ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ
ďĞŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŽďǀŝŽƵƐŝŶ'ƌĂŶŐĞƌ ?>ǇŶĐŚ ?Ɛ ? ?  ? ? )ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƐŬŽƉƐ
and their giant brains: 
 
ĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƵƐ ďĂůĂŶĐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŽƵƌ ŵŝŶĚ ?Ɛ
own internally constructed version of it. Maintaining this balance is one of 
ůŝĨĞ ?Ɛ ĚĂŝůǇ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ? tĞ ďĂƐŬ ŝŶ ďĂƌĞůǇ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĂŐĞ Ăƚ
ŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĚƐůŝŐŚƚƐ ? Q ?KƵƌďŝŐďƌĂŝŶƐŐŝǀĞƵƐƐƵĐŚƉŽǁĞƌƐŽĨĞǆƚƌĂƉŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ
we extrapolate straight out of reality, into worlds that are possible, but never 
ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ? ŽƐŬŽƉ ?Ɛ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ďƌĂŝŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
representations may have made it easier for them to accurately predict and 
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interpret the world; to match their internal representations with real external 
events. Perhaps, though, it also made them excessively internal and self-
reflective. With their perhaps-astonishing insights, they may have become a 
species of dreamers, with an internal mental life literally beyond anything we 
can imagine (p.175). 
 
These ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐďƌŝŶŐƵƐ ?ŽŶĐĞŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŽ>ĂƚŽƵƌ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ
underpinning modernity. Whilst modernity  W with science in the vanguard  W seeks to 
maintain a rigid separation between the worlds of nature and culture, human and 
animal, its production relies on a mixing of those very categories. Whether imagined 
hybrids like those above, or physical hybrids like the cow-human embryos created in 
advanced laboratories, the trinary spaces between categories, and crucially between 
category systems, are every bit as fundamental to their creation as the technologies 
used. Furthermore, the use of hybrids here, at least in the case of LB1, to explore 
notions of humanness (see below) offers support for ŝƌŬĞ ĂŶĚ DŝĐŚĂĞů ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )
addition to an element oĨ >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŚǇďƌŝĚƐĂƌĞ
used specifically to think with: 
 
the discursive invisibilization of hybrids is not something that is always 
routinely, almost automatically, accomplished. Elaborating Latour's story, we 
might suggest that for some hybrids, there is great argumentational effort 
put into working through their implications for human identity vis-a-vis the 
nonhuman "other" (purification) (pp.255-256). 
 
dŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĨƌĂŵĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?3) notion 
of boundary-ǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚŽǁŬĞƌĂŶĚ^ƚĂƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝ ĂƚŝŽŶ ?hƐĂŐĞŽĨ
the latter in the context of boundary analysis tends to focus on the concept of 
 “ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?  ?^ƚĂƌ  ? 'ƌŝĞƐĞŵĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ) ? ďĞŝŶŐ  “ĐĂƚĞ ŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ĨŽƌ 
221 
 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ƐŽĐŝĂů ǁŽƌůĚƐ ?  ?ŽǁŬĞƌ  ? ^ƚĂƌ  ? ? ? ? P) ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ůĞǀĞů ?
ŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  “ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?  ?ibid.). These objects hold 
differing meanings for the various domains that perceive them, yet retain enough 
essence to allow these domains to interact with one another productively. As 
boundary-work is based on how cultures are demarcated, and boundary object on  
how cultures cooperate, the two are at times contrasted, rather simplistically, as 
being two sides of the same coin. The relationship between them is more complex 
however. Boundary-work deals with the explicit drawing of boundaries by individual 
agents, through the study of micro-ůĞǀĞů ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ŽǁŬĞƌ ĂŶĚ ^ƚĂƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ŝƐ
concerned with boundaries at the macro-level, and how they are embedded in, and 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?&ƌŽŵ'ŝĞƌǇŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ/ŚĂǀĞ
taken the idea of boundaries as analytic categories, and an interest in how different 
cultures demarcate themselves. Going beyond ƚŚŝƐ ? ŽǁŬĞƌ  ? ^ƚĂƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŚĂƐ
provided a model for the ways in which cultures interact more generally, and the 
vital role of categorisation in this process. 
 Despite their valuable contributions, neither framework can single-handedly 
encompass the findings presented here, and for this reason I have developed the 
trinary concept to describe both popular science and missing links. In performing 
strategies of boundary work, an agent is liable to draw on the flexibility presented by 
the trinary to manipulate boundaries, yet beyond this fact  W that trinaries can be 
utilised in demarcation (as, for example, popular science is used to demarcate 
science and popular cultures)  W boundary work has little further to add. Trinaries also 
have elements of boundary infrastructures, for they exist between different cultures, 
and allow cooperation between them. We saw then both the missing link and 
popular science allow for information to be exchanged between science and 
nonscience. However, Bowker and Star state: 
 
Boundary objects arise over time from durable cooperation among 
communities of practice. They are working arrangements that resolve 
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anomalies of naturalization without imposing a naturalization of categories 
from one community or from an outside source of standardization. (They are 
therefore most useful in analysing cooperative and relatively equal situations; 
issues of imperialist imposition of standards, force, and deception have a 
somewhat different structure) (p.297). 
 
Here then they differ from trinaries, for we have seen that the authority wielded by 
scientists allowed them to monopolise public discourse around the finds (regardless 
of the origin of the knowledge claims they used)  W in fact the popular science 
ƚƌŝŶĂƌǇ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝƐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚŝƐŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ ?ĂƐƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬ ?ƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝƐ
to protect human dominance of the natural world. The trinary then allows both 
demarcation and cooperation between cultures, by creating a dynamic, prototypic 
flexibility between apparently immutable Aristotelian binaries so that they might be 
safely transgressed without threatening the whole system. This flexibility is 
controlled by the dominant interest however, so it is utilised in a manner which 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐĂƉŽǁĞƌďĂůĂŶĐĞŝŶŽŶĞƐŝĚĞ ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ŝŶŬĞĞƉŝŶŐǁŝƚŚthe theme of 
undermining notions of nature/culture separation, the trinary has been applied to 
both a social and a natural boundary. 
 
 Having attempted to develop the trinary concept, it is necessary in this final 
section to consider the notion that certain elements of the floresiensis debate might 
render elements of the trinary hypothesis null and void, at least in respect of missing 
links. The discovery of LB1 prompted a bout of self-reflection that was entirely 
absent from the Piltdown discovery. The ideĂƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚ
utilise several oft-quoted trademarks of humanity - fire-use; tool making; organised 
hunting  W and yet was different enough physically to be categorised as a different 
species, is a profound challenge to the human-animal binary. The dating of the find, 
bringing it almost within the historical record, only sharpened the discomfort 
ďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƚŚĞĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇ ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐWŝůƚĚŽǁŶ ?ƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞǁĂƐďƵƌŝĞĚƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞŽƵƚ
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ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŚŝŶƚĞƌůĂŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝŶĂƌǇ ? > ? ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞrable debate and 
philosophic reflection regarding what we are, and where we stand in relation to the 
world around us. It was a debate that scientists and journalists alike joined. Given 
that a fundamental question of the thesis is how the cultures popular and scientific 
engage with these very issues, I have chosen to reproduce several of these 
discussions in detail: 
 
Until very recently, evolutionary thought was couched in terms of a linear, 
progressive trajectory rising from lower life forms and culminating in man. I 
have argued elsewhere that this view is not, regrettably, as extinct as it 
should be.  
In palaeoanthropology, this idea is seen in the view that only one species of 
hominid has existed at any one time, each one succeeding the next in a 
scheme of orderly replacement. This idea began to crumble in the 1970s, 
since when discoveries of ancient relatives of humans have revealed a 
marked diversity of form. Human evolution is like a bush, not a ladder. 
But these discoveries concerned the more remote reaches of human 
ancestry. Despite the fact that some of our relatives, such as Neanderthal 
man and Homo erectus, are thought to have become extinct in relatively 
recent times, our complacency that this view holds for recent history has not 
been shaken. 
UntiůŶŽǁ ?> ? ?ƐĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ? ?/ĨŝƚƚƵƌŶƐŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚŝǀ ƌƐŝƚǇŽĨŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐ
was always high, remained high until very recently and might not be entirely 
extinguished, we are entitled to question the security of some of our deepest 
beliefs. Will the real image of God please stand up? (Gee in Nature.com 
27.10.04). 
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WHAT are we? Well, we are human beings, members of the genus Homo, the 
species sapiens. We are mammals, like the horse, whale, pig and mouse. 
More specifically, we are rather odd, upright, mostly hairless, huge-brained, 
walking, talking apes. 
We can build and use tools, from simple stone axes to robotic machines. We 
are - or rather our species is - capable of producing works of sublime beauty 
and performing acts of incomprehensible evil.  
No other creature in the history of our planet has produced a Beethoven or a 
Bach, a Michelangelo, a Newton; nor, for that matter, a Hitler or a Stalin. 
Nothing, not even the brainy bonobo chimps nor the clever dolphins, comes 
close. We are, surely, unique - or at least we thought we were until this week. 
The sensational discovery of the remains of a dwarf humanoid - nicknamed, 
predictably enough, the Hobbit - in a cave in the tropical wilderness of 
Indonesia's Flores Island challenges our uniqueness. It raises some profound 
and difficult questions about where we come from and what we are. 
Because the popular account of human origins now turns out to be rather 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽǁŚĂƚǁĞŚĂĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ? Q ? 
For here we would have, in our midst, a thinking, reasoning, toolbuilding, 
talking, fire-using being, human in all the ways that matter and yet a being of 
a completely different species. 
Psychologically, this would be profoundly unsettling. Every society on Earth, 
every religion, every creation myth and legend, teaches us that Man is 
unique. The Judaeo-Christian tradition, for example, stated that we were all 
descended from two humans - Adam and Eve. It is a long time since most 
people believed this to be literally true but the idea that Homo sapiens is a 
species apart is still cherished (Daily Mail 28.10.04:48). 
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The idea that our ancestors had contact with other human species is a 
profound and disturbing one. The whole term "human species" begs the 
question. If they are other species, can they really be what we mean by 
"human"? Human is a moral category as much as a biological one. That's why 
it is such a useful weapon word in the debates about abortion. To call 
someone or something human is generally meant as praise, and implies that 
they should be treated as we treat ourselves (Guardian.co.uk 01.11.04). 
What can Ebu [LB1] teach us? As yet we cannot be quite sure, because the 
potential implications of her discovery are so profound. For example, the 
existence of the new species she represents, dubbed Homo floresiensis, 
throws inƚŽĚŽƵďƚŵĂŶǇŽĨŽƵƌĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? Q ? ?
And Ebu could teach us an even deeper lesson. Many of us have yet to 
appreciate the complexity of our past, and remain wedded to the idea that 
Homo sapiens evolved along a simple, linear path that began in Africa and 
ended with us conquering the planet. 
That may be partly true, but what is not is the notion that we are somehow 
unique and special for having done so. While some Homo erectus went on to 
become Homo sapiens, others went on to become an altogether different 
species. And in evolutionary terms, they were very successful. 
For that reason, the discovery of H. floresiensis is not only startling, it is 
humbling. It means we now know that until very recently we were not alone 
but shared the world with people of another species. That realisation may 
give us a renewed sense of what it means to be human (New Scientist 
30.10.04). 
 
 In light of these reflections, is there any conceptual space left for the trinary? 
Certainly, the boundary appears a less imposing obstacle in their wake. However, as I 
ŚĂǀĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚŝŶŵǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚƌŝŶĂƌŝĞƐ ?
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where there is any gap  W i.e. any demarcation  W there is always space. For the trinary 
to be destroyed in its entirety there can only be a continuum covering all animal 
ĨŽƌŵƐ P ĂƐ ŝŶ ƵƉƌĞ ?Ɛ ĞƐƚƵĂƌǇ ? ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐ ?
eddies, vortices, not discrete boxes. For this to happen the boundary must be 
destroyed. The quotes above bring the boundary into question only tangentially: 
they do not challenge it directly, but rather the demarcations of one of its categories 
 W  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?tĞƐĞĞ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ďĞŝŶŐĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚŽƵƚŝŶƚŽ
the trinary so that LB1 might rest upon it. This act in itself is not novel however, in 
fact we witnessed it in the Piltdown debate, when humanness was expanded so that 
WŝůƚĚŽǁŶĐŽƵůĚďĞďƌŽƵŐŚƚĐůŽƐĞƌǁŚŝůƐƚ ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ?ǁĞƌŵŽǀĞĚĂǁĂǇ ?/ŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ǁŚĂƚ
we saw was humanness being granted to the trinary, and such is the case with the 
ƋƵŽƚĞƐĂďŽǀĞ PƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ? ŝƐŶŽƚƵŶŝƋƵĞƚŽHomo sapiens; our evolutionary 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ůŝŶĞĂƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ŽƵƌ  “ĚŝǀŝŶĞ ? ĨŽƌŵ ? ďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ Ă
 “ďƵƐŚ ?ŽĨŝŶƚĞƌůŝŶŬĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞũƵƐƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƚŽŚĂǀĞŽƵƚůŝǀĞĚ ?> ? ?ƐŝŶtelligence 
shows that large brains are not a pre-requisite of human-like behaviour. The 
expansion of humanness for Piltdown was a temporary construction, like a jetty 
stretching out over the water from the human landmass, easily decommissioned 
once the shiƉŚĂĚƐĂŝůĞĚ ?tŚĞƚŚĞƌ> ? ?ƐůĂŶĚŝŶŐǁŝůůƉƌŽǀĞƚŽďĞƉ ƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ
to be seen. These quotes are all still framed by the dichotomising mind, and while 
the dichotomy remains, so will the trinary space. 
 That said, the debate has advanced. Whilst the expansion of humanness was 
conducted implicitly during the Piltdown debate, here it is done so explicitly. This is 
not to say the trinary itself is rendered explicit  W ƚŚĂƚ> ? ?ƐŶŽŶ-fit was recognised  W 
but rather that the process of reconciling LB1 with the binary was more overt. This is 
ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ƚŽ ǁĞĂŬĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ĂƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚŝůƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŽĨ  ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞƐ ?
was weakened during Piltdown, here it is the humanity of Homo sapiens generally 
that is sacrificed to incorporate the non-fit: we are all moved closer to the 
borderlands. I have previously suggested that part of the human-ĂŶŝŵĂů ďŝŶĂƌǇ ?Ɛ
durability comes from the carte blanche it grants us. If, however, figures like LB1 
succeed in loosening our monopoly over human, and so make it more porous, the 
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superiority of the category over its opposite might become a moot point. Human 
might remain a kind apart, but we, the species Homo sapiens, might not. The result 
would be that we had less reason to hang on to the binary so dearly. 
 Perhaps more likely however we shall see the human-animal binary moving 
towards a status like that of the science-culture binary, where the void between is 
openly acknowledged, and yet the boundaries remain entrenched. 
There are though a small number of statements from the floresiensis 
coverage that hint at going beyond the binary, and I have saved these until last: 
 
Descartes held that speech and reason set man apart from all other animals, 
and thus non-human animals were beyond ethical consideration. The slow 
erosion of this approach is one of the most important societal changes of the 
past 40 years. While there are still arguments over what a fox feels as it is 
chased by hounds, almost nobody would now argue that animals are beneath 
moral consideration. True, we remain deeply confused in our attitudes: the 
number of animals used for research is sharply down, but the hideously cruel 
foie gras industry has doubled in size over the past 14 years; few still wear 
fur, but we choose to ignore the often unspeakable conditions on factory 
farms. Yet the general trend is undoubtedly towards humane treatment of 
animals, and greater humility in human beings: less, and less cruel 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽŽĚƌĂŝƐĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ? Q ? 
The change springs not from mere sentimentality or anthropomorphism, but 
a realisation, powered by scientific discovery, that the distance between 
animal and human being, between us and them, is far smaller than tradition 
and religion have asserted. That gap grew narrower still this week with the 
discovery of Homo floresiensis, or Flo, the miniature cousin of man, 18,000 
years old and 3ft tall (Times 28.10.04:28). 
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[E]vidence for the diversity of human species through time has been 
downplayed, first by the cultural inertia of stories of an upwards progression 
towards the human state; second, by the curious chance that Homo sapiens 
happens to be the only species of human around today - a situation probably 
unprecedented in 7m years. The evidence for the coexistence of humans and 
Neanderthals in Europe for at least 10,000 years until Neanderthals 
disappeared around 30,000 years ago, and the fact that anthropologists have 
known for years of the multiple lineages of prehumans living in Africa 
between 4-2m years - has done little to dent the robust idea that humans are 
so distinct from the rest of the animal world that they rule the earth by virtue 
of inherent perfection, or divine fiat.  
The Flores finds could change all that with a single stroke.  
For one thing, they underscore the fact of human diversity until very recent 
times. "Maybe little folk from Flores will hammer the point home more 
effectively because they are so different in anatomy but so close in time," 
says Tim White [palaeoanthropologist]. "How will the creationists cope?" For 
another, the evidence challenges the human-centric idea that humans 
characteristically modify their surroundings to suit themselves, rather than 
allowing natural selection to adapt them to their environment. If the Flores 
skeleton is evidence of the kind of evolutionary size change more associated 
ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƌĂƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚƐ ? ƚŚŝƐ ? ƐĂǇƐ ƌŽǁŶ ?ŽŶĞ ŽĨ > ? ?Ɛ
discoverers] "is a clear indicator" of human-like creatures "behaving like all 
other mammals in terms of their interactions with the environment". "Darwin 
and Wallace would be pleased," adds Tim White. "What better 
demonstration that humans play by the same evolutionary rules as other 
mammals?" (Guardian 28.10.04:4). 
 
In both these excerpts there is evidence of the process I have already identified, 
questioning the trinary tangentially whilst remaining wedded to a binary framing. 
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The Times ƚŚĞŶ ƐƉĞĂŬƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐĂƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ ĂŶŝŵĂů  ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ ? ? ǇĞƚ Ă
smaller gap is still a gap. The Guardian expands the boundaries of humanness, whilst 
leaving the value of its distinctiveness unquestioned. There is another element in 
both though. The Times places LB1 in the context of human-animal difference, and 
though a gap remains, the process of convergence this piece identifies hints at the 
possibility of that not always being the case. The Guardian too brings the category of 
 ‘ĂŶŝŵĂů ?ŝŶƚŽƉůĂǇ ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ> ? ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƌĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ‘ƚŚĂƚ ŚƵŵĂŶƐƉůĂǇďǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐĂƐŽƚŚĞƌŵĂŵŵĂůƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞƐĞǁŽƌĚƐĂƚůĞĂƐƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽŐĂƉ ? 
 
5. The Ethics of Undermining Boundaries 
In chapter three, whilst discussing the ethical dimensions of the thesis, I flagged up 
the implications of my conclusions. It is clear that there is a very strong normative 
dimension to both boundaries I have analysed, with the human-animal division of 
particularly wide-ranging influence. The arguments put forward here have 
attempted to weaken the ground on which this binary stands, if only by reflecting 
but a glint of the enormous complexity placed in the shadows by this monolithic 
wall. One might argue hoǁĞǀĞƌ ƚŚĂƚ ? ĨŽƌ Ăůů ŝƚƐ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ƚŚĞ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ?Ɛ ŵŽƌĂů
dimension contains a powerful discourse of human betterment  W encouraging us to 
ƐŚƵŶ  ‘ďĞƐƚŝĂů ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ŝŶ ĨĂǀŽƵƌ ŽĨ ŵŽƌĞ ĞŶůŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚ ? ŶŽďůĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŽ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŽƵƌ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ?tĞŝŶƌŝĐŚƉŝƚŚŝůǇŽbserves the form this discourse takes: 
 
When animals do something that we like we call it natural. When they do 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞ ?ǁĞĐĂůůŝƚĂŶŝŵĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
 
The contention that we should see animals and humans as no different is one 
taken by philosopher John Gray in his polemic Straw Dogs (2002), which argues that 
ŚƵŵĂŶƐĂƌĞŽŶůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌĂŶŝŵĂůƐŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ “ĂƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝŶůŝĨĞ ?
(p.199). From this position he directs a highly misanthropic attack on religion, 
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science, morality and progress, savaging them for being nothing but comforting lies. I 
ƌĞũĞĐƚďŽƚŚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?&ŽƌĂůůƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ?ƐĨĂŝůŝŶŐƐ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚĂů
truth: that humans are, in certain important respects, entirely unique amongst 
biological organisms. Whilst some mammals appear capable of self-awareness, no 
other creature can even begin to comprehend their environment in the manner that 
Homo sapiens have attempted to throughout their existence. Such are the 
possibilities of our mental powers, both demonstrated by and amplified through 
technological advance, that it is easy to see us as occupying an entirely separate 
plain from other life. None other could detect the existential threat, to all life on 
Earth, of an incoming asteroid, and attempt to nullify it. None could consider the 
possibility of life on other planets, let alone attempt contact. None could devote 
several years of their life, and 80,000 words, to the most esoteric of socio-
philosophical excursions (and let us be thankful for that). 
 This difference does not however justify how the boundary is used. The carte 
blanche awarded by it is mistaken, not least because when this dominance is 
exercised we see humans at their furthest removed from notions of humanity. The 
ecological destruction inflicted daily on our surrounds; the industrialised brutality of 
much of the meat and dairy industry; the imminent cataclysm of mass species 
extinction: these might be made possible by our unique capabilities, but they are 
driven by that most instincƚƵĂů ?  ‘ĂŶŝŵĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ P ŐƌĞĞĚ ? ĞƐŝĚĞ ŵŽƌĂů
condemnation, such actions must be denounced pragmatically, for their self-
destructive madness  W for the barren soils, rising seas and lost biowealth which will 
blight our future existence. Are these the actions of a species worthy of unaccounted 
stewardship of life on Earth? 
 Undermining the boundary is not, as Gray would have it, a call to abandon 
the principles for which it nominally stands, but a demand that we live up to them. 
By questioning it we see its weaknesses, and the need either to abandon it, or act as 
it would have us act. It is a challenge that we justify its continued existence. Without 
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such awareness and appropriate action the binary is doomed regardless, for very 
little from either side of its division will survive.  
What goes for humans goes for scientists specifically regarding the other 
boundary we have considered. The weakness of the science-culture distinction 
requires recognition, and acknowledgement that the authority granted by it to 
scientists should be wielded sensitively. A good beginning would be to pay 
appropriate deference to the wider culture in which science operates, and which, as 
we have seen, provides so many of the ideas for which scientists take sole credit.  
Missing links provide stories about ourselves, as do, ultimately, both 
boundaries which we have observed the link transect. We would do well to evolve a 
greater awareness of what we lose sight of when constructing such divisions. 
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